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INTRODUCTION
A widespread perception exists that contemporary criminal law
doctrine cannot accommodate the self-defense claims of battered
women who kill abusive men. That perception dominates not only
the media, but also current reform discussions both in scholarly
literature and in many state legislatures. In response to the
dominant belief that traditional self-defense doctrine is inapplicable
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382 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:379
to these cases, proposals for radical redefinition of various elements
of self-defense jurisprudence have been advanced.' This Article
demonstrates that the belief is wrong and that proposed redefini-
tions of legal rules will provide neither the necessary nor the
sufficient condition for changing the courtroom climate in which
battered women's homicide cases are tried.
The impetus in current reform efforts toward redefinition of
substantive criminal law and of evidentiary rules comes from two
related, and incorrect, assumptions. The first incorrect assumption
is that jury verdicts convicting battered women result from the
"fact" that most battered women do not kill in circumstances
traditionally defined as "confrontations," 2 but rather that they kill
during a lull in the violence, or when the man is asleep, or by hiring
someone else to kill him. For many legal scholars this assumption
appears to be derived from a review of appellate decisions involving
battered women. 3 None of these scholars, however, has conducted
a systematic survey of those decisions as a means of testing the
assumption. This Article presents the findings of such a survey, and
the appellate decisions do not support the commonly encountered
assertion that most battered women kill in nonconfrontational
situations.
4
1 For scholarly proposals favoring such redefinition, see infra notes 80-92 and
accompanying text. Ten legislatures have considered legislation aimed at redefining
the rules governing trials of battered women accused of homicide. For legislative
changes, both enacted and proposed, see infra notes 224-26, 234-38 & 257-91 and
accompanying text. For commentary on media portrayals of battered women who
kill, see infra note 9 and accompanying text.
2 In this Article, "confrontation" describes a fact pattern that would entitle a
defendant to a self-defense instruction under the law of most jurisdictions. A
confrontational case is one where the defendant killed her spouse or lover and where
evidence (disputed or not) was offered at trial that (1) he had behaved in a way that
she interpreted as posing an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to her,
(2) she did not provoke his behavior by unlawful actions and was not the initial
aggressor, (3) she violated no duty to retreat, and (4) the force she used was
proportional to the threat she perceived. A nonconfrontational case is defined in this
Article as a killing that occurred under one of the following circumstances: (1) the
man was asleep; (2) the man was awake, but the woman was the initial aggressor on
the particular occasion; or (3) the woman hired or persuaded someone else to kill the
man. See infra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
3 For a description of the literature that is premised on this factual assumption,
see infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
4 For a description of the methodology of the survey, see infra Appendix I. For
a summary of this Article's conclusions from the survey data, see infra note 12. For
a more detailed analysis, see infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
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The reformers' second incorrect assumption is that existing
doctrine is defined in a narrow and male-identified fashion to
encompass one-time-only and time-bounded encounters between
men of roughly equal size and strength. Using these assumptions,
critics argue that the law by definition refuses to take into account
the social context of a battered-woman defendant's act, even in
those cases that involve traditionally defined confrontations. In the
legal literature the basis of this assumption is, again, the body of
opinions issued on appeals from homicide convictions.5 A survey
of those opinions, however, does not support the view that existing
definitions exclude consideration of social context.
6
Proceeding from these two unsupported and incorrect empirical
assumptions, most proponents of reform are asking the wrong
question. They ask not whether, but how substantive and evidentia-
ry law should be redefined to guarantee the fair-trial rights of
battered women who kill, and they describe "fair trials" either not
at all or as those that result in not guilty verdicts. I will suggest that
the proper inquiry requires a definition of fair trial that is not
outcome-oriented and a careful evaluation of the appropriate
definition's substantive-law, evidentiary-rule, and procedural-
provision determinants. Reformers must decide carefully what is
broken before setting out to make repairs.
Fair trials should be defined as those in which a defendant is
able to put her case fully before the finder of fact, to "get to the
jury" both the evidence of the social context of her action and legal
instructions on the relevance of that context to her claim of
entitlement to act in self-defense. 7 My conclusion, after review of
the cases from that perspective, is that the most common impedi-
ments to fair trials for battered women are the result not of the
structure or content of existing law but of its application by trial
judges.
In a way, the failings of many current reformers are similar to
those which they often attribute to the criminal law. Authors and
5 For a description of the literature that proceeds from this premise, see infra
notes 80-92 & 104 and accompanying text.
6 For a detailed survey addressing four substantive-law and two evidentiary-law
definitions, as well as their interrelationship in the context of self-defense jurispru-
dence, see infra notes 105-85 and accompanying text. For a summary of that survey,
see infra Table. See also infra notes 229-38 and accompanying text (explaining the
perils of a separate standard of reasonableness for battered women).
7For a discussion of the reasons underlying this definition of fair trial, see infra
notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
1991]
384 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:379
legislators criticize legal definitions for refusing to take "context"
into account.8 The reformers themselves, however, have failed to
look at context, both the factual context of most battered women's
cases and the legal context in which they are tried. This Article
begins with an examination of the factual context and challenges the
assumption that most battered women are convicted because they
kill in circumstances that do not involve a traditionally defined
imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm. That assumption
has led to the dominant portrayal of the typical battered-woman
homicide defendant as a vigilante who strikes back at the only
available moment, during a respite from attacks, often when the
man is asleep. Many images from outside the appellate opinions
reinforce this picture. A commentator recently described the image
by contrasting it with others:
Killing in self-defense is a fundamental right for men and
nations....
But when women kill their husbands because they are afraid
for their lives and those of their children, it's considered shock-
ing-and criminal. According to the popular myth, a wan, mousy
wife suddenly loses it and kills the hapless guy in his sleep. Or she
hires a friend to blow him away and stuffs his body in a garbage
can. It's all very weird and female.
9
Much current scholarship, although it purports to be derived
from an analysis of appellate opinions, seems in fact to be premised
upon an uncritical acceptance of the popular portrayal of a battered
woman who kills. It is a compelling stereotype. It is inaccurate. It
is not supported either by empirical work in other disciplines or by
appellate opinions.
The work of sociologists and criminologists demonstrates, even
with the most conservative reading of representative empirical
studies, that over seventy percent of all battered women who kill do
so when faced with either an ongoing attack or the imminent threat
of death or serious bodily injury; and some studies suggest that the
figure may be closer to ninety percent.10 These estimates are
8 See infra notes 91 & 130 (citing criticisms of male-dominated legal standards of
reasonableness).
9 Abigail Trafford, Why Battered Women Kill: Self-Defense, Not Revenge, Is Often the
Motive, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1991, Health (Magazine), at 6. For a collection of press
accounts from the past 200 years describing some nonconfrontation killings which
may have fed the "popular myth," see ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL (1980).
10 For a discussion of their studies and conclusions, see infra notes 68-77 and
accompanying text.
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consistent with the results of this Article's analysis of appeals from
battered women's homicide convictions, a sample that is likely to
contain an overrepresentation of nonconfrontation cases:11 at
least three-quarters of the cases involve confrontations.1 2 Part I
of this Article therefore concludes that most homicide convictions
of battered women do not result from the fact that circumstances
of the killings were outside the traditional definition of self-defense.
In Part II of this Article, I will criticize the second incorrect
assumption-which similarly dominates current scholarship and
legislative efforts-that existing legal definitions are insufficient to
accommodate the self-defense claims of battered women, even those
who kill during confrontational situations. It is true that the law of
self-defense has developed in a context in which the overwhelming
majority of defendants were men. It is not true, however, that the
law by definition ignores the context of a woman defendant's
actions.
In the area of substantive law, most scholars focus on four
aspects of self-defense jurisprudence: the definitions of the
standard for measuring the reasonableness of the defendant's
actions, of the temporal proximity of danger facing the defendant,
of the proportionality of force used to meet the threatened harm,
and of the defendant's duty to retreat. These factors are not in fact
generally defined in a way that excludes consideration of the
circumstances in which battered women kill.13 In most jurisdic-
tions, the standard of reasonableness against which the necessity of
a defendant's act is measured explicitly includes consideration of
the characteristics and history of the defendant on trial; her acts are
measured in light of her own perceptions and experience. The
definition of the required temporal proximity of that harm is, again
in most jurisdictions, broader than the particular instant of the
defendant's action; the definition includes its context-the circum-
stances surrounding the action, including past events. Only a
" For a description of the bases of the conclusion that appellate opinions contain
a disproportionate percentage of nonconfrontation cases, see infra notes 58-59 and
accompanying text.
12 In 75% of the opinions, the facts at trial met the confrontation definition. Five
percent of the opinions contained too little factual discussion to permit categoriza-
tion. The remaining 20% involved nonconfrontational situations (8% were sleeping-
man cases, 4% were cases in which the defendant hired or persuaded someone else
to commit the homicide, and 8% involved undisputed evidence that the defendant
was the initial aggressor). See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
13 For an analysis of each of these factors and of their interrelationship, see infra
notes 105-42 and accompanying text.
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minority of jurisdictions impose a duty to retreat, if safe retreat is
possible, before using deadly defensive force, and most of that
minority exempt a person attacked in her home from the duty to
retreat. No jurisdiction has aperse rule prohibiting use of a weapon
against an unarmed attacker; rather, the proportionality of force is
measured on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the
relative sizes, ages, and physical conditions of the decedent and
defendant, as well as any history of violence between them.
A similar pattern exists in the law of evidence, which is the focus
of legislative reform efforts. The existing evidentiary law in every
jurisdiction provides that testimony about a defendant's history of
abuse by the decedent is admissible. 14 Expert testimony regarding
the effects of a history of abuse, usually in the form of testimony
about the "battered woman syndrome," 15 is admissible in the
overwhelming majority of the states whose appellate courts have
addressed the question. In all but two of these states, the testimony
has been ruled admissible on the basis of existing evidentiary
provisions, without the necessity of special legislation.
1 6
To say that existing definitions can accommodate the self-
defense claims of battered women and can provide for their
evaluation in the relevant social context is not to say that trial courts
apply those definitions when the defendants are battered women.
Thus, Part II will also address the disparate application of existing
standards. It concludes that, to the extent that there is a problem
in getting to the jury, it is generally the result not of definitions, but
of the application of the law at the trial level. That conclusion is
supported by the disparity between reversal rates in these cases and
in other homicides. Forty percent of the battered women's
convictions were reversed on the ground of trial errors. Only 16%
of the reversals were because of errors dealing with expert testimo-
14 For a discussion of the principle which requires, in jurisdictions that define
broadly the temporal proximity of harm, that the jury be instructed that a person who
has suffered past violence from an attacker is justified in reacting more quickly and
more harshly than a stranger in the same factual circumstances, see infra note 122
and accompanying text.
15 Some current statutes and proposed legislation refer to "battered person
syndrome." See infra text accompanying notes 263-64.
16 See infra Table. The threshold-showings that a defendant must make before
history-of-abuse and battered-woman-syndrome testimony are received vary according
to a state's substantive-law choices about social context. The threshold-showing
requirements are generally lower in the majority of jurisdictions that include a
subjective analysis in the reasonableness test and a liberal definition of the temporal
proximity of danger. See infra notes 154-66 & 176-80 and accompanying text.
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ny. The rest were reversed on the basis of the same errors (in
roughly the same proportion) as in other homicides, where the
reversal rate was only 8.5%.17 The conclusion is reinforced by the
tone of the reversal opinions, many of which explicitly criticize trial
courts for failing to apply to these defendants long-standing
principles developed in the context of a jurisdiction's rulings on
appeals involving male appellants. It is further corroborated by the
appellate opinions from the jurisdictions that have adopted special
substantive-law standards to measure the necessity of the defen-
dant's act against a "reasonable battered woman" definition. In
those states, there are both trial and appellate judges who, despite
the redefinition of reasonableness, apply that definition in a way
that precludes defendants from getting to the jury.
18
In Part III of this Article, which addresses areas where the
reform is actually needed, I will begin by describing the operation
of procedural rules (the crucial importance of which is ignored by
most commentators) that set the standards by which trial judges are
to measure the defendant's evidence for the purpose of determining
whether she is entitled to any self-defense instruction at all. When
the rules are defined in a way that entitles judges to make credibility
judgments as part of their assessment of the sufficiency of the
defense evidence, they often have the effect of encouraging
disparate application of self-defense standards and of permitting
directed verdicts of guilt in battered women's cases.
19
Finally, having concluded that the problem is neither that most
cases arise from nonconfrontational situations nor that substantive
and evidentiary law is defined too narrowly, but rather is the result
of disparate application of existing standards, I criticize reform
proposals that ignore that reality. I will specifically criticize those
proposals that create special substantive-law standards for battered-
women defendants or evidentiary rules aimed specifically at
battered-woman-syndrome expert testimony.20 I will offer sugges-
17 For a discussion of the data on overall homicide and felony reversal rates,
drawn from a recent study by the National Center for the Study of State Courts, see
infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
18 For an analysis of these opinions, see infra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
19 For a description of the rules governing the quantity and quality of evidence
required before a defendant is entitled to any jury instruction on self-defense, see
infra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
20 For an analysis of the substantive-law proposals, see infra notes 224-32 and
accompanying text. For an examination of the proposed evidence code reforms, see
infra notes 257-78 and accompanying text.
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tions for a method of analyzing each jurisdiction's choices in
substantive, evidentiary, and procedural areas, for deciding whether
redefinition is necessary, and for creating new definitions.
21
The conclusion, drawn from this Article's analysis of the existing
context of self-defense jurisprudence and of the shortcomings of
most current proposals for change, is that reform efforts should be
aimed at guaranteeing battered women defendants access to
generally applicable fair-trial determinants. New definitions should
be created only when the whole context of the jurisdiction's self-
defense law makes clear they are necessary, and in those instances
the redefinitions should not be geared specifically to battered
women as a separate class of defendants.
I. EMPIRICAL CRITICISM OF THE ASSUMPTION THAT MOST
HOMICIDES BY BATTERED WOMEN INVOLVE
NONCONFRONTATIONAL SITUATIONS
A. The Assumptions of Legal Scholars
Much current legal scholarship is premised on, or accepts
uncritically, the assumption that the majority of battered women
defendants kill in nonconfrontational situations that would not raise
a traditionally defined self-defense claim, that sleeping-man and
other lull-in-the-violence cases are the norm.22 In most of this
21 For a description of the suggested analytical framework, see infra text
accompanying note 210. My specific suggestions for reform of substantive and
evidentiary law follow immediately after the discussion of current proposals in each
area. See infra notes 239-56 and accompanying text (discussing substantive-law
proposals); infra notes 280-92 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary-law
proposals). There are no current proposals for reform of the rules that govern
whether a defendant gets to thejury on her claim. My proposed procedural reforms
are discussed infra notes 212-22 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL
SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGALJUSTIFICATION 34 (1987) (noting that two-thirds of all cases
reviewed, largely from press accounts, involved nonconfrontational killings); Phyllis
L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense,
8 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 139 (1985) (asserting that the majority of appellate
opinions addressing admissibility of expert testimony arose from nontraditional
confrontation cases); Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims, 67
OR. L. REv. 393,409 (1988) ("The battered woman who kills her husband often does
so in a non-confrontational setting.") (citing EWING, supra, at 34, and Crocker, supra,
at 139-40); David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New
Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases 66
OR. L. REV. 19,49 (1987) ("Typically, when the woman strikes back, she is not in what
most people would consider immediate danger at the time she killed her abuser.");
Rocco C. Cipparone,Jr., Comment, The Defense of Battered Women Who Kill 135 U. PA.
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scholarship, this "fact" is asserted without any empirical support or
is based on an unsystematic review of cases.23 This assumption
provides the impetus for suggestions for radical redefinition of self-
defense jurisprudence. 24  One author suggests legislation that
L. REV. 427, 436 (1987) ("If, as often occurs, a woman has killed her batterer during
a lull in the beatings-such as when he is asleep or when he had his back turned-a
claim of self-defense is likely to be unsuccessful." (footnotes omitted)); David L.
Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical
Dissent 72 VA. L. REv. 619, 621 (1986) ("Frequently, however, a battered woman kills
her mate after an attack has ended or at some time when, seemingly, no immediate
threat is present."); Jill S. Talbot, Note, Is "Psychological Self-Defense"A Solution to the
Problem of Defending Battered Women Who Kill?45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1527, 1528-29
(1988) ("Although some women who kill their spouses in the midst of battering
incidents can show an imminent threat of serious injury or death, many battered
women kill their spouses during a lull in the violence, perhaps even when their
spouses are asleep.").2 3 See CathrynJ. Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident
on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 11, 43 (1986). Rosen states:
[A] doctrinaire insistence on treatment of the battered woman's defense
[sic] as a justification is unnecessary and may be fatal to widespread and
successful use of the battered woman's defense [sic]. Most battered
woman's defense [sic] cases involve situations in which the defendant was
not, in fact, in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm at her
victim's hands.
Id. No authority exists for this quite incorrect assertion aside from a series of string
cites to selected nonconfrontation cases. See id. at 13-14 nn.13-16.
24 The assumption's uncritical acceptance also appears in the writings of scholars
who do not endorse redefinition for the purpose of creating special standards for
women. For example, one author addressingproblems of proof in battered women's
homicide cases noted:
When a battered woman does fight back, she often does so during a respite
in the beatings, and she often uses force which would appear excessive when
considered only in light of the immediate situation. For example, in a
number of cases a woman has killed her husband while he was sleeping, and
several women have even set their sleeping husbands afire.
Jimmie E. Tinsley, Criminal Law: The Battered Woman Defense, in 34 AM.JUR. 2D Proof
of Facts § 1, at 8 (1983) (footnotes omitted). Another has stated:
Homicides committed by battered women frequently occur with a time lag,
while the man is asleep or while his back is turned. Typically, the man beats
the woman, sometimes threatening to kill her, until he passes out or falls
asleep. Fearing that when he awakes he will beat her more severely or act
on his threat, she attacks him while he sleeps.
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Self-Defense WorkforBattered Women, in WOMEN AND THE i.fw
ch. 9A, § 9A.02[2][d][iii], at 9A-11 (Carol H. Lefcourt ed., 1987) (footnote omitted);
see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law
of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 634 (1980) [hereinafter Schneider,
Equal Rights] (noting that homicides by battered women "frequently" occur after a
time lag, while the victim is unaware). But see CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE
HOMIcIDE: BATrERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAW at viii-ix (1989)
(concluding, on the basis of a sample of two hundred "stories" drawn from appellate
1991]
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would codify a "psychological theory of self-defense" to remedy
what he perceives to be the injustice of applying traditional
standards of self-defense to battered women, most of whom he
believes to have acted in nonconfrontational circumstances.
25
Another author asserts that because most battered women kill in
nonconfrontational situations, the appropriate legal approach to
defending them is to argue excuse (that factors peculiar to the actor
prevent a judgment of criminal responsibility, even though her act
was a crime) rather than self-defense or justification (that the act
was lawful and not a crime). 2 6  One proposes a "reasonable
battered woman" standard,2 7 while others argue for a "reasonable
woman" (rather than a "reasonable man" or "reasonable person")
justification standard.
28
Although these authors describe both "confrontational" and
"nonconfrontational" situations, most do not take particular care in
their definitions. To some, a confrontation is an on-going attack
and nothing less.29 To others, a battered woman lives in a con-
opinions and other sources, that nonconfrontation cases are "not quite as common"
as the confrontation ones, while failing to systematically break the cases down into the
two categories).
25 See EWING, supra note 22, at 77-94. Ewing's proposal has received considerable
criticism. See Stephen J. Morse, The Misbegotten Marriage of Soft Psychology and Bad
Law: Psychological Self-Defense as aJustification, 14 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 595, 618 (1990)
(criticizing Ewing's proposal partially on the grounds that it would provide incentives
to solve social problems with violence; and suggesting that the solution lies in
aggressive use of the tools already available to the criminal justice system); Talbot,
supra note 22 (criticizing Ewing's proposal as formalistic and complicated, and noting
that it still fails to prove battered woman defendant's act was reasonable); cf Stephen
J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 105, 118
n.40 (1990) (characterizing Ewing's survey as revealing "a surprisingly high percentage
of killings in the non-confrontational settings," but noting that his sample, in which
only one-third of the cases were confrontational, does not purport to be representa-
tive).
26 See Rosen, supra note 23, at 45-56.
27 Kinports, supra note 22, at 415; see also Nancy Fiora-Gormally, Case/Comment,
Battered Wives Who Kill: Double Standard Out of Court, Single Standard In', 2 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 133, 164 (1978) (arguing for both a "reasonable battered woman" standard
and a "reasonable woman" standard).
28 See Crocker, supra note 22, at 150; Victoria M. Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet:
The Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REv.
545, 573, 588 (1988). Crocker bases her argument on finding a majority of
nonconfrontation cases in a thirty-five case sample of appellate opinions. See Crocker,
supra note 22, at 145 n.106. Mather bases her argument on a review of appellate
opinions in which she makes no attempt to separate confrontational from noncon-
frontational cases. Mather, supra, at 562-571. From her review, however, she
generalizes that "[a] woman will usually notbe able to defend herself during an actual
attack." Id. at 567.
29 Many seem to believe that the current law of self-defense requires an actual
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stant confrontation, which puts her in a state of imminent deadly
attack regardless of the abuser's actions at the time of the killing.
30
To date, no legal writer has actually tested the assumption that most
cases arise from nonconfrontational situations by using the
confrontation definition employed in most jurisdictions as a
measure in a systematic survey of battered women's self-defense
cases.
31
B. An Analysis of the Appellate Opinions
To test the factual assumption of most legal scholars that the
typical battered woman's homicide case involves a nonconfronta-
tional situation, I analyzed appellate opinions, -which constitute the
same sample 2 on which most of the authors have relied. 3
ongoing attack instigated by the decedent and does not permit the use of deadly
defensive force to meet the threat of an imminent serious attack. See, e.g., Crocker,
supra note 22, at 138-39 (separating battered women's self-defense cases "into two
categories: non-traditional confrontation cases, in which the battered woman kills
either in anticipation of or following a physical attack; and traditional confrontation
cases, in which she kills while being physically attacked."); Kinports, supra note 22, at
394 n.6 (explaining that she does not address cases "where battered women kill their
husbands during a beating" and characterizes those cases as resembling"classic cases
of self-defense"); Kathee R. Brewer, Note, Missouri's New Law on "Battered Spouse
Syndrome." A Moral Victoty, a Partial Solution, 33 ST. LouIs .U. LJ. 227, 231 n.39
(1988) (relying on Crocker, supra note 22, at 142-43, for the assertion that "[i]n a
classic self-defense situation, also referred to as a traditional confrontation case, the
woman kills while actually being attacked"); Cipparone, supra note 22, at 434-36
(asserting that the utility of a self-defense claim is limited to the relatively narrow
range of facts where a woman killed her batterer during an "acute battering
incident"). But see Sarah C. Madison, Comment, A Critique and Proposed Solution to
the Adverse Examination Problem Raised by Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony in State
v. Hennum, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1023, 1029 (1990) (more accurately describing a
"typical" self-defense situation as one where the "batterer lunges at her or physically
threatens her with death or serious bodily harm").
30 See, e.g., GILLESPIE, supra note 24, at 68 (stating that in battered women's cases,
"it is not at all an exaggeration to say that the threat of death or serious injury is
always imminent"); Crocker, supra note 22, at 139-140 (arguing for recognition that
a confrontation exists in cases where "the abuser has verbally threatened the
defendant, but not yet actually struck her; where the physical violence appears to have
stopped, but the defendant continues to feel terrified and kills her husband when he
reappears; and where the woman kills her husband while he is asleep or when his
back is turned." (footnote omitted)).
" One scholar who does not share the assumption that most cases are
nonconfrontational concludes, without quantifying the cases in her sample, that the
confrontation cases are slightly more common than nonconfrontation ones. See
GILLESPIE, supra note 24, at xii-xiii.
32 1 evaluated each of the opinions on-which other scholars relied and conducted
a search, see infra notes 44-66 and accompanying text, that retrieved additional cases.
" See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text. Some authors relied on sources
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"Confrontation" is used here to describe a fact pattern that would
entitle a defendant to a self-defense instruction under the law of
most jurisdictions.3 4 A case is defined as a confrontational bat-
tered woman's homicide35 if the defendant killed her spouse or
lover and at trial evidence (disputed or not) was offered on the
record and discussed on appeal (whether or not ruled admissible by
the trial judge) that (1) he had abused her in the past,3 6 (2) on the
occasion of the homicide he behaved in a way that, according to her
testimony, she interpreted 37 as posing an imminent 8 threat of
in addition to appellate battered woman homicide cases. See EWING, supra note 22,
(sample includes newspaper articles); GILLESPIE, supra note 24 (sample includes
women defendants charged with various non-homicidal violent acts against men and
with homicides of men who were not their partners).
34 The elements of thejustification ofself-defense are, generally, thata defendant
may use physical force when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes
necessary to prevent the imminent (or immediate) use of unlawful physical force
against the defendant. A defendant may not use physical force in self-defense if he
or she provoked the encounter by unlawful conduct or was the initial aggressor. See
1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7
(1986).
Mostjurisdictionfs impose additional requirements that must be satisfied before
the use of deadly physical force is justified to repel an attack. The defendant must
reasonably believe that the attacker is using or is about to use deadly physical force.
Some jurisdictions require that, before resorting to deadly force, the defendant
retreat from the encounter, if safe retreat is possible. Most of those jurisdictions
exempt a defendant who is attacked in his or her home from the retreat requirement.
See id. § 5.7(f).
35 "Homicide" cases for purposes of this Article are those in which the defendant
was charged with any degree of non-negligent killing.
36 The term "history of abuse" is used throughout the Article to refer to the
decedent's physical violence against the defendant. "Mutual history of abuse" is used
to describe situations where there was evidence that both parties initiated past
violence. If the record only contained evidence of abuse in which the defendant
attacked the decedent, or if the record indicated no offer of evidence of history of
abuse, the case was not classified as a battered-woman case. For a discussion of the
standards for admissibility of history-of-abuse evidence, see infra notes 154-60 and
accompanying text. "History of other violence," in contrast, is a term used to
describe evidence of violence directed against third persons by the decedent. For a
discussion of the standards governing the admissibility of history-of-other-violence
evidence, see infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
37 1 did not attempt to judge the reasonableness of her interpretation or belief
that she was faced with danger requiring the use of deadly, defensive force. Rather,
I identified cases in which the reasonableness of that belief would have been a
question put to thejury in mostjurisdictions. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying
text.
38 The question of the closeness in time of the threatened harm to the defendant's
act is defined in this Article as the temporal proximity of danger. For discussion of
the states' choices between "imminence" and "immediacy" as the definition of the
required temporal proximity, see infra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
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death or serious bodily injury 9 to her, (3) she did not provoke4 °
his behavior by unlawful actions and was not the initial aggres-
sor,41 (4) she violated no duty to retreat,42 and (5) the force she
used was proportional to the threat she perceived. 43  A noncon-
frontational case, on the other hand, is defined as a killing that
occurred while either (1) the man was asleep, (2) the man was
awake, but the woman was the initial aggressor on the particular
occasion, or (3) the woman hired or persuaded someone else to kill
the man.
The search" sought to identify all appeals from convictions in
battered women's homicide cases in which a claim of self-defense
39 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 10.00(10) (McKinney 1991) ("'Serious physical
injury' means physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes
death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ."). For a collection
of cases defining "serious bodily harm," see Kinports, supra note 22, at 432 n.164.
40 "Provoke" is used throughout this Article to describe the self-defense
requirement of most states that the defendant did not seek out the encounter and,
by his or her own unlawful conduct, provoke the attack. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 35.15 (McKinney 1991) (denying justification for use of defensive physical force
where defendant provoked the attack and was the initial aggressor). This use of
"provoke" should not be confused with either the common criminal law use of the
term "provocation" to describe unlawful actions of the decedent, which may warrant
the reduction of a charge of murder to heat-of-passion manslaughter, see, e.g., State
v. Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161, 172-73 (Wis. 1983) (discussing history of abuse and
battering on day of killing as provocation by the decedent), or the use of the term
that is common in the battered woman context to describe what the defendant did
to "deserve" prior beatings, see, e.g., People v. Ciervo, 506 N.Y.S.2d 462, 464 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986) (prohibiting prosecution use of a defendant's prior bad acts to prove
what she had done to provoke her husband into beating her, but permitting the
prosecution's use of such evidence to prove motive, impeach the defendant's
credibility, and rebut her claim that she was "a victim of 'battered woman's
syndrome'"). For discussion of the discredited theory that battered women typically
provoke the violence directed at them, see Kinports, supra note 22, at 434-35; Mather,
supra note 28, at 551 & nn.43-45.
41 The requirement, that the defendant cannot be the "initial aggressor," is usually
the same as the requirement that she not provoke the encounter. It is also
characterized in some states as the requirement that the defendant be "free from
fault." See, e.g., Collier v. State, 275 So. 2d 364,367 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973) (outlining
the elements of self-defense as the requirements that the defendant not provoke the
attack; that there must be impending peril to life, or great bodily harm; and that
there must be no reasonable way to escape without exacerbating the danger).
42 For a discussion of the duty to retreat, and of the exceptions to the duty, see
infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
43 The proportional-force requirement is that a defendant may use only that force
necessary to repel the ongoing or threatened attack. See infra notes 129-35 and
accompanying text.
4 The methodology of the search and of the use of a computer program to
analyze the opinions is described infra Appendix I.
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had been raised at trial. Specifically, the search was aimed at
appellate opinions4 5 issued in cases where (1) the defendant was
a woman, (2) the defendant was accused of killing her spouse or
lover,46 (3) there was evidence of a history of abuse4 7 of the
woman by the man, (4) the defendant claimed to have acted in self-
defense,48 and (5) the defendant was convicted. No attempt was
made to decide whether in fact the defendant in each case acted in
self-defense.
49
The cases meeting the above requirements were put into the
confrontation category only when the following factors existed: (1)
the man was awake; (2) he behaved in a way that the woman
interpreted ° as posing an imminent or immediate threat of death
or serious injury to her; and (3) there was evidence that she did not
provoke his behavior by unlawful conduct and was not the initial
aggressor. A case was classified as confrontational if there was
evidence (disputed or not) of record for each element of the
definition.51 The same principle of selection was employed in the
45 These were both reported and unreported opinions that reached the merits of
the claimed trial errors. For a description of the cases and of the methodology of
their identification, see infra Appendix I.A.
46 This study's sample is drawn from those cases involving men and women in
intimate heterosexual relationships, and includes present and former spouses, both
legal and common-law, as well as present and former intimates who may or may not
have lived together. Because this Article responds to proposals for legal redefinition
raised in the context of battered women killing abusive male partners, the few
reported opinions whose facts indicated that an abusive same sex partner was killed
by an abused gay man or lesbian were analyzed separately for comparison purposes,
but excluded from the main sample. For authority supporting the position that
heterosexual women comprise the overwhelming majority of victims of partner
violence, see Kinports, supra note 22, at 393 n.2. For a discussion of lesbian and gay
battering, see Nancy Hammond, Lesbian Victims and the Reluctance to Identify Abuse, in
NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN BATrERING 190, 191-96
(Kerry Lobel ed., 1986), and authorities collected in Crocker, supra note 22, at 122
n.6. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Materials for Battered Women and the Law
(1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (providing a list of
background sources on lesbian and gay battering).
For a definition of "history of abuse," see supra note 36.
48 This sample includes cases involving only self-defense claims as well as cases
involving self-defense claims and alternative defenses (most commonly insanity,
accident, and heat-of-passion provocation).
49 See supra note 34 & 37.
50 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
51 This Article's requirement of evidence for each element of the definition is a
more rigorous standard than that which I will argue should govern an evaluation of
the sufficiency of the evidence for determining whether a self-defense instruction is
warranted. See infra notes 219-33 and accompanying text. This stricter definition of
confrontational cases was adopted so that any error from ambiguity would result in
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nonconfrontation category: if the facts of record established that
the man was asleep at the time of the killing or that the woman had
persuaded someone else to kill him, the case was classified as
nonconfrontational. Similarly, if the record contained undisputed
evidence5 2 that the defendant was the initial aggressor, the case
was put in the nonconfrontation category, even if the killing
occurred during an ongoing, face-to-face struggle.
53
The focus of this study on appellate decisions raises the
possibility of two types of distortion, neither of which poses a
problem for criticizing the conclusions drawn by other scholars
from the same sample, but each of which suggests the need for
caution before extrapolating the conclusions from the sample to the
entire universe of battered women's cases. 54  First, the sample
excludes cases that were resolved by guilty pleas. 55 Second, it
excludes cases in which the prosecution dismissed the charges
before trial,56 as well as cases in which the defendants were
acquitted after trial.57 It is hard to' assess the degree of distortion
overinclusion of cases in the nonconfrontation category.
52 Where the evidence on this point was in dispute, a case was put in the
confrontation category only if the evidence offered by the defendant, in the context
of other record evidence, met this Article's confrontation requirements.
" These latter cases certainly involved "confrontations" in the colloquial sense.
They are excluded from my definition because the defendant's status as the initial
aggressor removed her from the category of cases in which a defendant would be
entitled to a self-defense instruction in most states. In some of these initial-aggressor
cases, as in other nonconfrontation cases, the juries were in fact instructed on self-
defense. See infra note 214.
4 Sociologists and criminologists recognize the need for a comprehensive survey
of all battered women's cases and of design proposals for such a survey. See infra
note 69.
55 The exclusion of guilty pleas from the sample may partially explain why only
a small minority of battered women's homicide cases are reflected in appellate
decisions. See infra note 77.
56 See, e.g., HENRY P. LUNDSGAARDE, MURDER IN SPACE CITY: A CULTURAL
ANALYSIS OF HOUSTON HOMICIDE PATTERNS 63 (1977) (noting that, of the 15 cases
of women arrested for killing their husbands in Houston in 1969, the grand jury
declined to indict in nine, and the police department did not file charges in one and
dismissed another); Christine E. Rasche, Characteristics of Mate-Homicides: A
Comparison to Wolfgang, Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Academy of
CriminalJustice Sciences 21 (Apr. 5, 1988) (transcript on file with author) (noting,
from an analysis of mate homicides in a Florida county between 1980 and 1986, that
"women were more likely to have their cases dropped [by prosecutors] than were
men," and for many of those cases "the prosecutor's determination was that the
killing was a case of self-defense").
7 Rarely can the prosecution seek appellate review in criminal cases that result
in acquittals. One exception to this prohibition is found in Kansas, where appeals by
the prosecution on reserved questions of law are permitted. In such cases, the
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in the confrontation/nonconfrontation breakdown resulting from
the omission of guilty pleas due to the wide variety of factors that
incline the prosecution and the defense to reach a non-trial
disposition. 58 The probable distortion from the exclusion of
dismissals and acquittals, however, is easier to assess. These cases
are likely to have included an over-representation of confrontation
cases, while those leading to convictions are likely to have included
an over-representation of nonconfrontation cases. 59 The sample
of appellate decisions, therefore, is likely to include a greater
percentage of nonconfrontation cases than occurs in the total
number of arrests.
Two hundred twenty-three cases were identified as meeting the
definition established for battered women's homicide cases.
60
These cases generated a total of 270 opinions. 61 The incidents,
rather than the opinions, were used as the base for this portion of
the Article's analysis.
62
appellate resolution of the legal question has no effect on the defendant who was
acquitted. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 578-79 (Kan. 1988) (holding that
the trial court erred in giving a self-defense instruction in a sleeping-man case,
because evidence failed to satisfy the objective prong of that state's "reasonably
prudent battered wife" standard of reasonableness).
58 These factors include the strength of the prosecution's case (which may incline
the defendant, but not the prosecutor, toward aplea), the strength of the defendant's
challenges to the case (which may incline the prosecutor, but not the defendant,
toward a plea), and the defendant's perception of her ability, by pleading, to minimize
her exposure to incarceration, regardless of the likelihood of success at trial. This
latter consideration, common to all defendants, is often most significant for
defendants with family obligations. In some instances, a battered woman's incentive
to plead guilty, according to one survey of trial counsel and experts, may stem from
her desire to avoid testifying about the decedent's abuse of her in front of her
children and/or his family. See Telephone Interview with Sue Osthoff, Executive
Director of the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women (July 22,
1991).
59 This common-sense conclusion is supported by the study described in Diane R.
Follingstad et al., Factors Predicting Verdicts in Cases Where Battered Women Kill Their
Husbands, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 253, 265 (1989).
60 For a description of the criteria used in this study, see supra notes 45-53 and
accompanying text and infra Appendix I.A. For a list of all cases analyzed, see
Mainfile (computer manuscript on file with the author) described infra Appendix II.A.
61 In some cases there were opinions from both the intermediate and the highest
courts regarding the same conviction. In others, there were successive opinions
following reversals of convictions, retrials, and appeals from subsequent convictions.
See Mainfile, supra note 60.
62 For the allocation of cases into the confrontation and nonconfrontation
categories, see Confrontation/Nonconfrontation (computer manuscript on file with
the author) described infra Appendix II.B.
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Of the 223 incidents comprising the base, 75% involve confron-
tations.68 Twenty percent are nonconfrontational cases (4% "con-
tract killings," 64 8% sleeping-man cases, and 8% defendant as
initial aggressor during a lull in the violence).65 In the remaining
5%, the appellate opinions did not include a discussion of the
incident facts introduced at trial.66 As the breakdown indicates,
the appellate opinions do not support the conclusion that most
battered women kill during nonconfrontational situations.
C. The Conclusions of Scholars in Other Disciplines
Current work by scholars in other disciplines is consistent with
the conclusion that most battered women who kill do so during
confrontations. It is estimated that each year in the United States
approximately 500 women kill their spouses.6 7  Most female
homicide defendants had been battered by the men whom they
killed.68 Studies by sociologists, criminologists, and social psychol-
65 See Confrontation (computer manuscript on file with the author) described infra
Appendix II.B.1.
64 These were cases in which the defendant hired or persuaded a third person to
commit the homicide.
65 SeeNonconfrontation (computer manuscript on file with the author) described
infra Appendix II.B.2.
" See Question (computer manuscript on file with the author) described infra
Appendix II.B.3.
67 According to the FBI, the number of husbands killed by wives was 516 in 1989
and 475 in 1988. See Telephone Interview with Jim Burch, Information Specialist,
Department ofJustice Bureau of'Justice Statistics (Nov. 29, 1991). These figures do
not include the number of "boyfriends" and other nonmarital partners killed by
women. Their inclusion is likely to bring the total number to about 750 per year in
recent years. See Trafford, supra note 9. These recent spouse-homicide figures may
suggest a reversal of a trend noted by earlier studies. The number ofwomen arrested
for murder or non-negligent manslaughter (of partners and others) decreased steadily
from 1977 to 1986. See Peggy S. Plass & Murray A. Straus, Intra-Family Homicide in
the United States: Incidence, Trends, and Differences by Region, Race, and Gender,
Presentation at the Third National Family Violence Research Conference 5-7 (July 6,
1987) (transcript on file with author); see also Kinports, supra note 22, at 442 n.214
(noting that the percentage of women arrested for homicide decreased slightly
between 1970 and 1979 (citing EILEEN B. LEONARD, WOMEN, CRIME, AND SOCIETY:
A CRITIQUE OF THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 28-32 (1982)). Between 1979 and 1984,
the number of male partners killed by women decreased by over 25% percent. See
Angela Browne & Kirk R. Williams, Exploring the Effect of Resource Availability and the
Likelihood of Female-Perpetrated Homicides, 23 L. & Soc'Y REv. 75, 80 (1989) (citing
Angela Browne & Robert L. Flewelling, Women as Victims or Perpetrators of
Homicide, Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of
Criminology (Oct. 29-Nov. 1, 1986)).
68 See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 143 (1987); GILLESPIE,
supra note 24, at xii; JANE TOTMAN, THE MURDERESS: A PSYCHOSOCIAL STUDY OF
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ogists have shown that the vast majority of homicides by women of
their partners occur during confrontations. 69 These scholars often
do not use the term "confrontation." Most describe cases involving
ongoing attacks by the decedents as ones resulting from "victim
precipitation," a term first used by Marvin Wolfgang to describe
killings in which the victim was the first to use physical force against
the slayer. 70 "Victim precipitation" is a narrower category than the
class of cases meeting the legal requirements for a self-defense
instruction, since an event is only classified as victim precipitated if
the decedent was first to use actual physical force. It is, however,
also potentially a broader concept because the force directed at the
defendant need not amount to a deadly attack by the victim.
71
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 48 (1978); George W. Bernard et al., Til Death Do Us Part: A
Study of Spouse Murder, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 271,274 (1982); Browne
& Williams, supra note 67, at 77 (construing PETER D. CHIMBOS, MARITAL VIOLENCE:
A STUDY OF INTERSPOUSAL HOMICIDE (1978), and A. E. Daniel & P. W. Harris, Female
Homicide Offenders Referred for Pre-trial Psychiatric Examination: A Descriptive Study, 10
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 261 (1982)); Nancy C.Jurik & Russ Winn, Gender
and Homicide: A Comparison of Men and Women Who Kill, 5 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 227,
234 (1990); see also Schulhofer, supra note 25, at 128 (explaining that most battered
women who kill reported calling the police at least five times before the lethal
incident).
69 The studies do not separate battered women from other women defendants.
The rate of confrontations for the separate category of battered women who kill has
not been analyzed. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text; see also Daniel G.
Saunders, When Battered Women Use Violence: Husband-Abuse or Self-Defense? 1 VICTIMS
& VIOLENCE 47,50-51 (1986) (noting that "[n]o study could be found that questioned
the frequencies with which battered women used self-defensive violence or that
detailed the sequence of events when both partners were violent in a single episode").
Nothing in the current scholarship suggests that the confrontation rate will be lower
in battered women's homicide cases, but the analysis of those data has yet to be
conducted. Angela Browne, author of When Battered Women Kill, estimates that at
least 70% of battered women homicide defendants kill during confrontations. See
Telephone Interview with Angela Browne (June 1, 1991). Roland Maiuro, editor of
Violence and Victims, estimates that the rate of confrontational killings by battered
women is "over two-thirds." See Telephone Interview with Roland Maiuro (July 1,
1991).
70 See MARvIN E. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 252 (1958); see also
Ann Goetting, Patterns of Homicide Among Women, 3 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3,
11-12 (1988) (explaining and applying Wolfgang's definition of "victim precipitation").
71 The law of self-defense permits the use of deadly defensive force to repel either
an ongoing or an imminent attack that threatens the defendant with death or serious
bodily injury. See supra note 34. Compare Wolfgang's definition:
The term victim-precipitated is applied to those criminal homicides in which
the victim is a direct, positive precipitator in the crime. The role of the
victim is characterized by his having been the first in the homicide drama
to use physical force directed against his subsequent slayer. The victim-
precipitated cases are those in which the victim was the first to show and
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Even with this different definition the numbers of male-precipitated
homicides by women partners are startling. One study of homicides
by women against husbands in Detroit between 1982 and 1983
found that 71% of these cases were victim precipitated, in contrast
to general homicide populations in which the victim-precipitation
rate is between 22% and 37.9%.72 Another study, based on a six-
city "random sample" survey of female homicide offenders, found
that 83.7% of killings by women of their mates were the result of
victim precipitation.7" Still another resulted in the finding that only
12% of all homicides by women were clearly nonconfrontational.74
Both the scholarship based on the national statistics compiled by the
FBI and the studies based on more local samples conclude that most
women who kill their partners do so in confrontational situations.
75
use a deadly weapon, to strike a blow in an altercation-in short, the first to
commence the interplay of resort to physical violence.
WOLFGANG, supra note 70, at 252. The term "criminal homicide" was used by
Wolfgang to exclude those cases initially classified by the police as accidental deaths
and killings in self-defense. Many sociologists follow Wolfgang's example and exclude
from their statistics noncriminal homicides, including self-defense cases; the
percentage of victim precipitation in homicides by women might well be higher if
researchers were to include cases that they characterize as noncriminal. See, e.g.,
James A. Mercy & Linda E. Saltzman, Fatal Violence Among Spouses in the United States,
1976-85, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 595, 596 (1989) (noting that 95% of "justifiable
homicides," or killings in self-defense, between spouses, were wives killing husbands).
72 See Ann Goetting, Homicidal Wives: A Profile, 8J. FAM. ISSUES 332, 337 (1987).
73 See Coramae R. Mann, Getting Even? Women Who Kill in Domestic Encounters, 5
JUST. Q. 33, 36 (1988).
7 See Nancy C. Jurik & Peter Gregware, A Method for Murder: The Study of
Homicides by Women, 4 PERSP. ON SOC. PROBS. (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript at 24,
on file with author) (specifically finding in their regional sample that, in only 12% of
all homicides by women, "the homicide was not immediately precipitated by an
argument or violent conflict with the victim"). Of homicides in which women killed
husbands or lovers, almost half involved ongoing attacks by the decedent; the other
half involved situations ranging from physically threatening moves by the decedent
at the time of the killing, to decedent's having beaten defendant earlier in the day.
See id. at 18.
75 One study based on national statistics was reported by Cazenave and Zahn.
Relying on data compiled by the FBI, they reported a likely 93% confrontation rate.
Only 7% of male-victim intimate homicides in the national sample were woman
offender precipitated. They drew their data from reports of homicides between
heterosexual intimates including present and former spouses, both licensed and
common-law, as well as those between men and women in intimate relationships who
may or may not have cohabited. Their approach is similar to that used in this Article.
See Noel A. Cazenave & Margaret A. Zahn, Women, Murder and Male Domination:
Police Reports of Domestic Homicide in Chicago and Philadelphia, Presentation at
the American Society of Criminology Annual Banquet (Oct. 31, 1986) (transcript on
file with author). Mercy and Saltzman, in contrast, relied on a sample drawn solely
from spousal homicides. See Mercy & Saltzman, supra note 71, at 595.
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These studies represent very interesting preliminary work, but
current available national data on homicides by battered women are
incomplete. There are no statistical studies that address all of the
following factors: (1) the number of women in the United States
who kill, (2) of those, the percentage who kill spouses or lovers, (3)
of those, the percentage who claim to have been battered by the
decedent, and (4) of those, the percentage who claim to have acted
in self-defense. 76 Also missing from the existing data are statistics
on outcomes of arrests in cases in which battered women killed
partners and claimed self- defense: of the arrests, how many are
prosecuted and in how many are prosecutions withdrawn; of the
prosecutions, how many result in guilty pleas and how many in
trials; and, of the trials, how many end in convictions.
77
Scholars who based their work on local samples include WOLFGANG, supra note
70. Cazenave and Zahn interpreted Wolfgang's study as showing that 85% of the
cases involved husband-victim precipitation. See Cazenave & Zahn, supra, at 2.
Christine Rasche, who studied mate homicides in one Florida county between 1980
and 1986, found that in 52% of cases where women killed male intimates, the
homicide occurred during an ongoing attack. An additional 20% involved women
responding to verbal threats. See Rasche, supra note 56, at 19-20. Another Florida
study, based on an analysis of court ordered psychiatric interviews of defendants
charged with killing common-law or legal spouses, concluded that 73% of the women
killed in victim-precipitated encounters. See Bernard et al., supra note 68, at 271,274.
Another study, byjurik and Winn, analyzing data drawn from presentence reports
prepared by probation officers in all intersexual murders or non-negligent homicides
in an Arizona County between 1979 and 1984, found that of the cases where the
precipitating incidents were known, 92% of the killings by women of men involved
"interpersonal conflicts" with their victims, ranging from arguments to physical fights
as precipitating incidents. See Jurik & Winn, supra note 68, at 230-31, 233. Their
study concluded that, "[liar from the stereotype of women killing an impaired victim,"
only 20% of the victims were impaired (defined as drunk, ill, or asleep), and that in
almost 75% of the impaired victim cases, the victim was aggressive and/or defensive
rather than helpless. See id. at 237.
76 For an explanation of this deficit in the empirical research, see Mercy &
Saltzman, supra note 71, at 595; Plass & Straus, supra note 67, at 3; see also Goetting,
supra note 70, at 16 (discussing the need for an analysis that includes each of these
factors and proposing a model for such an analysis).
77 One thing is clear, but not explained by the current state of statistical literature:
only a small minority of arrests are reflected in the appellate decisions.
An interesting problem, beyond the scope of this Article, is analysis of the
question why so few arrests are reflected in the appellate decisions. I have five
hypotheses, the first four of which are not inconsistent with the generally held view
that battered-women homicide defendants are convicted after trial at roughly the
same rate as are defendants in other homicides, whose conviction rate (75-80%) is
consistent with that of serious felonies generally. See Cazenave & Zahn, supra note
75, at 3. They are: (1) a disproportionate (to the general run of homicide cases)
percentage of these cases result in guilty pleas; (2) a similarly disproportionate
number are tried tojudges sitting withoutjuries (pursuant to a practice known to the
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The current preliminary conclusions of social scientists are
consistent with this Article's analysis of the appellate opinion sample
and its conclusion that the sample does not support the assertion
that most battered women homicide defendants kill in noncon-
frontational situations. Thus, the legal scholars' assumption is
wrong: the problems that battered women homicide defendants
face at trial do not result from their typically killing during a lull in
the violence.
II. EMPIRICAL CRITICISM OF THE ASSUMPTION THAT SELF-DEFENSE
JURISPRUDENCE IS DEFINED TOO NARROWLY TO TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT THE CONTEXT IN WHICH BATTERED WOMEN KILL
A second erroneous assumption of much current legal scholar-
ship is that existing criminal law, as a matter of definition, precludes
fair trials for battered women because it excludes consideration of
the context in which women, especially battered women, raise claims
of self-defense (even those battered women who act in confronta-
tional situations-whatever proportion various scholars believe them
to be of all battered women tried for homicide). 78 Relying on this
perception, many scholars propose radical redefinition of criminal
law doctrine. 79 In this Part of the Article, I will first describe
defense bar as "slow guilty pleas," where the trialIjudge is expected to convict of some
charge below the top count in the indictment in a case where the prosecutor would
not bargain, and where the defendant, in exchange, is expected not to appeal); (3) the
cases that go to jury trial are tried by defense lawyers who do not put on the record
or preserve for appeal the issues that would enable a researcher to identify them as
battered women's self-defense cases; (4) even where these issues are identified,
defendants in these cases do not appeal with the same frequency as do other
convicted defendants. See, e.g., GILLESPIE, supra note 24, at x (stating that women
"commonly" do not appeal their convictions). The fifth hypothesis is that a
disproportionate number are tried to verdicts of not guilty compared with the general
population of homicide defendants.
78 But see Kinports, supra note 22, at 441 (asserting that nonconfrontational
defendants can establish all of the elements of the self-defense claim).
79 In so doing, although they cite Professor Elizabeth Schneider, a leading theorist
on self-defense for battered women, they ignore the real significance of her work.
See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing Women's Self-Defense Work
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 195, 212-20
(1986) [hereinafter Schneider, Describing and Changing] (stating that expert testimony
for female defendants may present dilemmas for feminist theory); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement,
61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 648-52 (1986) (explaining that a rights discourse is a necessary
aspect of any political and legal strategy for change); Schneider, Equal Rights, supra
note 24, at 636-38 (developing a theory of sex bias for application in a homicide case
involving a woman defendant). Her scholarly work is grounded in her experience as
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current literature. I will then offer a definition of "fair trial," and
use that definition as a basis for analyzing scholars' claims in four
substantive law areas: (1) the definition of reasonableness against
which is measured the defendant's belief in the necessity of using
deadly force; (2) the definition, either "immediate" or "imminent,"
of the temporal proximity of the danger facing the defendant; (3)
the standard for evaluating the proportionality of the force
employed; and (4) the existence vel non of a duty to retreat and of
exceptions to the duty. Against the same measure, two evidentiary
issues are examined: (1) rules defining the choice of standards for
admissibility, scope, and purpose of evidence of the defendant's
social context, including evidence of the history of abuse (the
decedent's battering of the defendant in the past), any history of
other violence (the decedent's past violence toward third persons),
as well as expert testimony on the effects of the history of abuse;
and (2) the instructions given a jury regarding the relevance of
social context evidence to a self-defense claim.
A. The Assumption of Legal Scholars
Much current literature is premised on the assumption that bad
outcomes in battered women's homicide cases are the result of legal
definitions that prevent the possibility of fair trials.80 Scholars
an appellate litigator. The great accomplishment of the early"women's self-defense"
litigation strategy of which she and others were the architects in the 1970s was forcing
the recognition that criminal law, developed almost entirely in the context of male
defendants, was sufficiently flexible to accommodate the claims that women who
killed men acted reasonably.
For example, the Washington Supreme Court decision in State v. Wanrow, 559
P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (en banc), is remarkable not because it created a separate,
woman-identified standard of reasonableness, but because it held that the generally
applicable standard necessarily included the perspective of women and the context
of their acts and did so drawing explicitly on that court's own precedents involving
male appellants. See infra notes 106, 109, 124 & 132 and accompanying text. The
enduring value of Schneider's litigation and scholarship is in the clarity of its
insistence that a general discussion of "reasonableness" in criminal law should include
the perspective of women.
f0 See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 22, at 123, 126 ("The traditional doctrine of self-
defense is based on the experiences of men; it neither contemplates nor acknowledges
those acts of self-defense by women that are reasonable, but different from men's
.... The male experience permeates both the elements of the defense and the
standards of reasonableness."); Fiora-Gormally, supra note 27, at 158 (arguing that "a
[self-defense] standard is inappropriate if it will permit self-defense only where the
battered-wife defendant responds in a manner foreign to her acculturation...
requiring that the battered-wife respond in a 'manly' manner"); Mather, supra note
28, at 569 ("[A] male viewpoint permeates the law of self-defense. The common law
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assert that the elements of self-defense are designed narrowly to
apply to male-identified situations involving one-time-only and time-
bounded encounters. 81 Like the assumption that most cases are
nonconfrontational, this assumption is drawn from a limited review
of appellate opinions. As is the case with the definition of "con-
frontation" in current literature, 82 many scholars are imprecise in
defining the goal of their proposed legal redefinitions.
83
Believing that verdicts against battered women are the result of
the law's definitions, many scholars propose new definitions. One
argues that battered women's self-defense claims should be treated
as excuses rather than as justifications.8 4 Most, however, propose
their redefinitions within self-defense doctrine. One argues for a
"reasonable battered woman" standard85 while others argue for "a
reasonable woman" standard.8  Some proposals contemplate
expansion of the definition of "imminence"8 7 or its elimination
of self-defense developed (and the modern law continues with) a concept of self-
defense that is based on male notions of a 'fair fight,' of courageousness and
cowardice, and of danger and immediacy of harm."); Tinsley, supra note 24, §. 4, at
16 (noting that "[t]he imminent danger and necessary force requirements have been
developed in the context of a single, violent encounter between two men" and that
such a "stereotypical model" is inappropriate for battered woman defendants); see also
Laura E. Reece, Women's Defenses to Criminal Homicide and the Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel: The NeedforRelocation of Difference, 1 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 53,
55 (1991) ("The most serious problem female criminal defendants encounter is the
law itself. '[L]aw made by men, for men, and amassed down through history on their
behalf, codifies masculine bias and systematically discriminates against women by
ignoring the woman's point of view.'" (quotingJoNES, supra note 9, at 311)).
81 See Schulhofer, supra note 25, at 127.
82 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
13 Most authors define their goals generally in terms of "justice" or "acquittals."
See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition:
Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 52-53 (arguing for
expanding reform efforts beyond "the limited, albeit important [goal] of gaining
acquittal for battered women who kill"); Rosen, supra note 23, at 17 (proposing that
self-defense be classified as an excuse rather than as a justification since such a
redefinition "will result in more justice for battered women who kill"); Schulhofer,
supra note 25, at 129 (proposing a self-defense standard that "should be adequate to
produce acquittal in those cases involving both truly serious abuse and tangible
barriers to flight"). This Article's proposal is that the goal of any legal redefinition
must be limited to guaranteeing a "fair trial." See infra text accompanying notes 93-
95.
84 See Rosen, supra note 23, at 18-24.
85 See Kinports, supra note 22, at 416.
88 See Crocker, supra note 22, at 152 ("[A] new construct of self-defense is needed,
not only for battered women, but for all women."); Mather, supra note 28, at 573.
87 See, e.g., EWING, supra note 22, at 77 (proposing to protect "perhaps the
majority of battered homicide defendants, who kill not to avert an imminent threat
of death or serious physical injury but rather to protect themselves from the infliction
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altogether.a8 Still other commentators urge elimination of the
duty to retreat in states that apply it to attacks by cotenants or
guests occurring in the defendant's home.8 9 Others argue against
the proportional force requirement.90 Still others presume the
need for special standards governing admission of evidence.
9 1
of extremely serious psychological injury"); Fiora-Gormally, supra note 27, at 154
(arguing that "[t]o require that [a battered woman] react only under the immediate
threat of danger is to ignore the essential physical and psychological makeup of a
'reasonable', 'adjusted' and 'feminine' woman"); Rosen, supra note 23, at 34 (arguing
that current definitions of imminence, which require "consideration of only the
circumstances immediately surrounding the killing... necessarily defeat the woman's
claim"); Talbot, supra note 22, at 1545 (stating a "partial solution to the problem of
battered women who kill would be for the courts to interpret more broadly the
imminence requirement of the traditional doctrine of self-defense"); see also Martha
R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991). For a discussion of Professor Mahoney's proposal, which is
grounded in existing doctrine, see infra note 244.
88 See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 25, at 127 (arguing against a separate standard
of reasonableness for battered women, and urging instead that in those cases "the
traditional insistence on a literally 'imminent' infliction of great bodily harm must be
abandoned outright" because the correct inquiry is the necessity of the battered
woman's action rather than "imminence per se"); Sarah B. Vandenbraak, Note, Limits
on the Use of Defensive Force to Prevent Intramarital Assaults, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 643, 658
(1979) (proposing a flexible standard having no imminence limitation).
89 See, e.g., GILLESPIE, supra note 24, at 187-88 (arguing that those few states
applying this exception to the duty are especially unfair to women defendants);
Littleton, supra note 83, at 36 (arguing that the danger of attempting to leave the
abusive situation "makes a mockery of the standard self-defense analysis regarding
'duty to retreat'"). But see Schulhofer, supra note 25, at 129 (arguing in favor of
enlarging the duty to retreat beyond the immediate occasion, to encompass a general
obligation to leave the abusive relationship, or undergo a shift in burdens at a trial
on the question of the reasonableness of the use of deadly force: "Many women do
successfully escape from abusive mates. Those who instead resort to deadly force
should have to prove the concrete circumstances that prevented them from doing
likewise."(footnote omitted)).
90 Those who do so misstate the rule. See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 22, at 126
(noting that, in some jurisdictions, that "'[e]qual' force is interpreted to mean either
'like' or 'same' force"); Mather, supra note 28, at 587 (asserting that "the rule that a
woman may not use a weapon against an unarmed male assailant is absurd and
arbitrary").
91 These scholars, at least in this area of their commentary, seem to believe that
the creation of a general factual model of the battered woman who kills is necessary
to set a standard against which the act of a battered woman defendant is to be
measured. See Kinports, supra note 22, at 451-53 (suggesting that ajury should hear
evidence of, and be instructed to compare the actions of the defendant on trial to,
the facts of other cases involving battered women homicide defendants); Littleton,
supra note 83, at 37 (arguing that "the focus on the personal, interior, subjective
nature of the belief [that escape is impossible] without considering its class-wide,
external, statistical rationality, denies the defense to those individual women who have
not yet been beaten 'enough'"); Rosen, supra 23, at 38-39 (arguing from a very
different perspective for a change in the rules of evidence governing self-defense
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These proposals derive from the assumption that legal defini-
tions exclude consideration of the context of battered women's
actions and are therefore responsible for bad outcomes at their
trials. Ironically, these suggestions for redefinitions are similarly
beset with contextual difficulties. Their proponents have either
failed to place them in the context of the interrelationship of
proposals in one area with the operation of standards in another,
92
or have failed to ground them in a realistic analysis of the law's
current definitions. An analysis of the appellate opinions from an
interrelational perspective demonstrates that most battered women
are not convicted as the result of the criminal law's inability, as a
matter of definition, to accommodate their self-defense claims.
Thus, the assumptions which underlie most proposals for redefini-
tion are not empirically supportable.
trials of battered women in order to accommodate case-specific evidence of the
context in which other battered women have acted). But see Sharon A. Allard,
RethinkingBattered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspective, 1 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S
L.J. 191, 193-98 (1991) (arguing that battered-woman-syndrome testimony incorpo-
rates a stereotype of a "good," "normal" battered woman and that Black women,
inevitably classified by jurors as "other" because they do not fit the mold, do not
benefit from testimony that reinforces this white-identified stereotype). Allard calls
for creation of a battered woman model that incorporates race and class factors in an
"intersectional analysis." See id.
Professors Donovan and Wildman, who criticize the existing definitions of
reasonableness on the ground that they exclude "not only women, but also members
of other minority groups with distinct socioeconomic characteristics setting them
apart from mainstream middle class America," assume, without discussion, that their
proposed reformulation of evidence instructions will be adequate because "[tihe rules
of evidence relating to relevance will have already [by the time of instructions]
determined what evidence is permitted in the case. Any evidence relating to the
accused's social reality should be viewed as relevant." Dolores A. Donovan &
Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-
Defense and Provocation, 14 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 435, 436-37, 467 n.170 (1981).
92 For example, all of the proposed redefinitions, except that proposed by EWING,
supra note 22, at 90, ignore the operation of procedural rules that permit ajudge to
decide whether the defendant's case warrants a self-defense instruction. See, e.g.,
Kinports, supra note 22, at 454-57 (assuming implicitly that a defendant will be
entitled tojury instructions under the redefined standard of reasonableness proposed
by the author). For a discussion of the crucial importance of these rules to a fair
trial, see infra text accompanying notes 212-18.
Some scholars also ignore the relationship between legal instructions and the
rules governing admission of evidence. See, e.g., Donovan & Wildman, supra note 91,
at 467 n.170 (assuming that contextual evidence will automatically be covered injury
instructions).
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B. Analysis of the Opinions on Appeal from Battered
Women's Homicide Convictions
Many scholars err in assuming that proposed redefinitions will
lead to good outcomes. The predictors of not-guilty verdicts are
many and varied. Few are susceptible to change through legal
redefinition. Those few are included in this Article's definition of
the term "fair trial". The question whether a battered-woman
defendant can be fairly tried is here equated with the question of
whether she is able to "get to the jury"94 on the self-defense issue.
Getting to the jury involves more than simply getting an instruction
on self-defense. It includes (1) the content of the instruction on
substantive criminal law definitions of the elements of self-defense,
(2) the admissibility of evidence about the context of the defen-
dant's act and the instructions to the jury on the relevance of the
evidence, and (3) the procedural rules defining the quantity and
quality of evidence a defendant must produce to be entitled to a
self-defense instruction.
95
This part of the Article criticizes the assumption that appellate
opinions demonstrate that the law's definitions are so male-
identified as to exclude the self-defense claims of battered women
who kill men.96 Its focus is on the operation of those definitions
in the context of battered women's cases. 97 As was the case in
93 They include the interplay of sex, race, and class bias in the courtroom,
prevailing attitudes about family violence in the community from which the pool of
potential jurors is drawn, the quality of the lawyering on each side, and the resources
available in the form of money, expert witnesses, trial consultants, and investigators.
For analyses of the specific impact of these factors on trials of battered women who
kill, see WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Elizabeth Bochnak
et al. eds., 1981); Charles P. Ewing & Moss Aubrey, Battered Women and Public
Opinion: Some Realities about the Myths, 2J. FAM. VIOLENCE 257 (1987); Follingstad et
al., supra note 59.
94 Ninety-six percent of the trials that led to the appellate opinions analyzed were
jury rather than bench trials. Seejury/Bench (computer manuscript on file with the
author) described infra Appendix.II.C. For the purposes of this Article, however,
"getting to the jury" includes bench trials, where the finder of fact is ajudge.
95 The substantive and evidentiary issues are addressed in this part of the Article.
For a discussion of the impact of procedural rules, see infra text accompanying notes
212-23.
96 In the last section of this part, I will argue that the appropriate focus is on
judicial application of existing definitions. See infra text accompanying notes 186-209.
9 This Article is not a primer on the law of self-defense. Discussion of a state's
choice in any of the definitional areas will be limited to that choice's demonstrated
relevance in the appellate review of convictions of battered-woman defendants. A
state's decisions in other homicide cases or in battered women's cases involving
charges other than homicide will be discussed only when necessary to provide context
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Part I's criticism of the factual assumption that most incidents do
not involve confrontational situations, the sample analyzed is the
body of appellate opinions from which scholars have drawn their
conclusions.
98
Any evaluation of whether the law needs redefinition should
proceed from the recognition that, in fact, the criminal law does not
generally assume the one-time and time-bounded encounter that
many scholars believe is the foundation of its male-identified
definitions. Rather, the law's definitions have developed to reflect
the reality that the most common homicide case is one in which the
parties have a history with each other. Crime statistics for the last
three decades demonstrate that, in the great majority of homicides,
the parties were at least acquaintances. 9 Homicides among
friends and acquaintances are more common than those in any
other category.100 The second most frequent type is stranger,
followed by family homicides.10 1 The frequency of homicides
for the analysis of the application of its rules to battered women's homicide cases.
98 1 evaluated each of the opinions on which other scholars relied, and conducted
a search, see supra notes 44-48, which resulted in the retrieval of additional cases.
These opinions are in some instances the sources, and in others the interpretations,
of the substantive law definitions and of the evidentiary and procedural rules that
lower courts, at least in theory, must follow. The opinions of both intermediate and
highest appellate courts were analyzed. The decisions of both types of tribunals
provide information about the definitions and rules that appellate judges want trial
courts to employ. These opinions do not offer a complete picture of what actually
transpires at the trial level, in part because of the small percentage of trial verdicts
in these cases that lead to identifiable opinions on appeal. See supra note 77.
99 This pattern was true when most of the analyzed cases were decided. See, e.g.,
Margaret A. Zahn & Philip C. Sagi, Stranger Homicides in Nine American Cities, 78J.
GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377, 383 (1987) (finding that 76% of homicides were
committed by family member or acquaintance in cities studied in 1978). For an
analysis of the possibility of a change in the pattern in the 1980s, see F.B.L Report
Confirms Sharp Rise in Violent Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1990, at A10 (quoting
Professor Gerald Caplan as stating that 85-90% of all murders are now committed by
strangers). See generally Symposium on Stranger Violence, 78J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
223 (1987) (discussing various perspectives on violence among strangers in the 1980s).
100 See Goetting, supra note 70, at 8 ("Most reported killings in this country occur
between persons who have had some prior relationship. Between 1980 and 1985 only
13.3% to 17.6% of homicides involved persons unknown to one another." (citation
omitted)); Christine S. Sellers & Margaret A. Zahn, Offense Histories of Four Types
of Homicide Offenders, Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Academy of
CriminalJustice Sciences 4 (Mar. 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
101 For a description of the change in homicide patterns, see Plass & Straus, supra
note 67, at 5. The authors note that during the period 1976-84, stranger murders
occurred at less than half the rate of acquaintance murders. See id. Furthermore,
over that period, the rate of family homicides decreased while stranger homicides
increased, resulting in family murders occurring at the lowest rate, which was slightly
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among persons known to each other is reflected in existing
substantive criminal law definitions 10 2  and in evidentiary
rules.
103
Scholars who advocate change in certain aspects of self-defense
jurisprudence, which they identify as definitionally inflexible, often
recognize definitional flexibility in other aspects. They ignore,
however, the interrelationship of those areas and fail to assess the
impact of their proposals for redefinition on the rest of existing
law.104 This part of the Article examines the definitional context
in which battered women's homicide cases are tried.
lower than the stranger murder rate. See id.
102 For discussions of this reality in the specific substantive-law definitions of
reasonableness, imminence, proportionality of force, and the duty to retreat, see infra
notes 105-42 and accompanying text.
105 For instance, the current evidentiary law of every state permits evidence of the
history of abuse between the parties. See Susan Estrich, Defending Women, 88 MICH.
L. REV. 1430, 1436 (1990). In 1956 this evidentiary principle was applied to a
battered woman's homicide conviction in an opinion reversing a trial court's
exclusion of evidence of a history of abuse and of the decedent's reputation for other
violence:
[T]he law recognizes the well-established fact in human experience that the
known reputation or character of an assailant as to violence and turbulence
has a very material bearing on the degree and nature of the apprehension
of danger on the part of a person assaulted; also that one who is turbulent
and violent may the more readily provoke or assume the aggressive [sic] in
an encounter. Hence, as bearing on these issues, where a proper founda-
tion has been laid, it is conclusively established in almost all jurisdictions
that evidence of the turbulent and dangerous character of the victim of an
assault or homicide is admissible.
People v. Yokum, 302 P.2d 406, 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (quoting Annotation,
Admissibility of Evidence as to Other's Character or Reputation for Turbulence on Question
of Self-Defense by One Charged with Assault or Homicide, 64 A.L.R. 1029, 1030 (1930)).
For discussion of the interrelation of substantive-law choices and the standards
governing admissibility of and instructions regarding that evidence, see infra notes
154-160 and accompanying text.
104 See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 22, at 123-37, 144-50 (analyzing, correctly, the
flexibility of most substantive law definitions, but inaccurately concluding that the
reasonableness standard is rigidly male-identified); Kinports,supra note 22, at 415-20
(confusing evidentiary rulings on expert testimony with substantive-law rulings
recognizing a "reasonably prudent battered woman" standard; thus, inaccurately
assessing the traditional reasonableness standard and the likely impact of her proposal
that defendant's reasonableness be measured against killings by other battered
women, but accurately assessing the impact of flexibility in definitions of proportional
force, retreat, and imminence); Littleton, supra note 83, at 84 (confusing the trial
issue of individual culpability with an assessment of "class-wide reality," and
incorrectly equating an inability to escape the batterer with an inability to retreat on
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1. Substantive Law
a. The Choice of Reasonableness Standards
The choice of the reasonableness standard determines the
content of what the jury is told about assessing the necessity of a
defendant's action. In objective jurisdictions, the jury is told to
measure the defendant's belief in the necessity of using defensive
deadly force against a generic standard of reasonableness. In all
other jurisdictions, which constitute the majority, the jury is
instructed to use a standard that includes-to degrees that vary little
among these combination subjective-and-objectivejurisdictions-the
defendant's individual subjective
10 5 point of view.106
occasion of killing, but generally providing an accurate overview of other issues);
Mather, supra note 28, at 565-74 (noting, accurately, the flexibility in imminence and
retreat standards, but incorrectly assuming rigidity in the reasonableness standard and
confusing the definition of proportional-force rule with its application); Schulhofer,
supra note 25, at 116-30 (providing an accurate overview and a thoughtful, context-
based proposal for elimination of the imminence requirement from the general
requirement of necessity, but confusing the duty to retreat on occasion of killing with
a failure to leave the abusive relationship, and proposing to shift the burden of proof
on that issue to the defendant).
105 The term "subjective" plays two roles in the definition of the evaluation of a
defendant's belief. First, all jurisdictions require that the defendant have a subjective,
actual, and honest belief in the necessity of using deadly defensive force. The second
use of the term "subjective" is involved in the determination of the reasonableness
of that actual and honest belief. In objectivejurisdictions, reasonableness is measured
against the standard of a hypothetical generic reasonable person (or man). See, e.g.,
infra note 113 (describing objective standard in Georgia). In otherjurisdictions, there
is a subjective portion of the reasonableness test, which places the hypothetical
reasonable person in the situation of and having the information available to and the
experience and perceptions of the defendant on trial. "See, e.g., infra note 113
(describing subjective standard in Ohio). The majority standard is one that combines
subjective and objective tests of reasonableness. See Schneider, Describing and
Changing, supra note 79, at 219; see also Crocker, supra note 22, at 125 (correctly
describing the majority test as requiring reference to the defendant's individual
circumstances, but nonetheless labeling the test "an objective standard").
106 For the purposes of this Article, the cases analyzed were divided into four
categories of reasonableness standards: objective, subjective, combination of objective
and subjective, and reasonably prudent battered woman. See infra Appendix I.B.2.
The reasonable prudent battered woman, the subjective, and the combined subjective
and objective tests of reasonableness differ from the purely objective test in their
common focus on the characteristics of the individual defendant on trial. In theory,
they differ in the extent to which emphasis is placed on the specific characteristics of
the person charged. See Kinports, supra note 22, at 409-11. In actual operation, their
emphases on characteristics differ very little, and they are much more like each other
and, similarly, different from the purely objective test. See Schneider, Describing and
Changing, supra note 79, at 220. In Washington, for example, where the language of
State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (en banc), appears to establish a
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The combined nature of the standard actually used by a majority
of the states is sometimes obscured by the label a state's highest
court has attached to it. For instance, the highest court of New
York characterized a standard that used a combination of subjective
and objective analyses as "objective." 10 7 The New York court's
"objective" test has two parts and takes social context into account:
first, the jury must decide whether the defendant actually and
honestly believed in the necessity of using deadly defensive force;
second, the jury must decide whether a reasonable person in the
defendant's circumstances, including his or her history with the
decedent and his or her perceptions, would so believe.' 0 8 This
"objective" test is not appreciably different from a test characterized
as "subjective" by the Supreme Court of Washington in State v.
Wanrow.10 9 The "reasonably prudent battered woman" standard,
completely subjective standard, see infra note 109, the test retains an objective
component. See State v. Walker, 700 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Wash. App. 1985) (affirming
an assault conviction and holding that the defendant's evidence of her subjective
belief that she was in peril fell "woefully short" of establishing a reasonable
perception of imminent danger). Because the significant division is between objective
and all otherjurisdictions, the Table that summarizes the various states' standards as
they are reflected in opinions on battered women's appeals contains only two
categories of reasonableness: "0" (the objective jurisdictions) and "C" (the
jurisdictions that include to some degree a subjective inquiry in the standard). See
infra Table.
107 See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986) (holding through
interlocutory pretrial ruling that an "objective" assessment of reasonableness includes
consideration of the male defendant's background and character).
108 Thejury instructions given at the Bernhard Goetz trial, excerpted below, were
consistent with the Court of Appeals's ruling:
What then is a reasonable belief? A determination of reasonableness
must be based upon the circumstances facing the defendant or his situation,
such in [sic] terms encompass more than the physical movements of the
potential assailant .... These terms include any relevant knowledge the
defendant had about that person or persons; they also necessarily bring in
the physical attributes of a person's involvement including the defendant
[sic].
Furthermore, the defendant's circumstances encompass any prior
experiences he had, which would provide a reasonable basis for belief that
another person's intentions were to injure him or that the use of deadly
force was necessary under the circumstances.
A person may be said to reasonably believe that deadly physical force
is about to be used against him, if a reasonable person in his shoes, that is,
in the same circumstances and situation that he faced, would so believe. In
other words, in this case you must scrutinize the reasonableness of any
belief the defendant claims to have had by reference to a hypothetical
reasonable person who was [in the incident circumstances] and who faced
the exact situation which confronted the defendant.
Trial Record at 9218-19, People v. Goetz (transcript on file with author).
109 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (en banc). The Washington Supreme Court
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proposed by one scholar11° and apparently adopted in three
jurisdictions,'1 ' provides a definition that incorporates an objec-
approved the following language (which has variations in gender resulting from the
court's alternately quoting from its own precedents involving men and suggesting
language applicable to a female defendant):
[The disapproved instruction atWanrow's trial] incorrectly limited the jury's
consideration of acts and circumstances pertinent to respondent's
perception of the alleged threat to her person.
... On the contrary, the justification of self-defense is to be evaluated
in light of all the facts and circumstances known to the defendant, including
those known substantially before the killing.
'.. "All of these facts and circumstances should have been placed
before thejury, to the end that they could put themselves in the place of the
appellant, get the point of view which he had at the time of the tragedy, and
view the conduct of the [deceased] with all its pertinent sidelights as the
appellant was warranted in viewing it. In no other way could the jury safely
say what a reasonably prudent man similarly situated would have done."
. [This information is necessary for the jury to determine the]
"degree of force which...a reasonable person in the same situation...seeing
what [she] sees and knowing what [she] knows, then would believe to be
necessary."
Id. at 555-57 (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Tribett, 132 P. 875, 877 (Wash.
1913) and State v. Dunning, 506 P.2d 321, 322, (Wash. Ct. App. 1973)).
110 See Kinports, supra note 22, at 416.
111 No state appellate court has approved the use of battered-woman-syndrome
testimony to create a completely separate defense. In three states, appellate courts
have created or endorsed the creation of a separate standard of reasonableness to be
applied in the context of self-defense or relatedjurisprudence. The Supreme Court
of Kansas has endorsed a separate standard of reasonableness squarely in the context
of self-defense. See State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988); State v. Hundley,
693 P.2d 475,477 (Kan. 1985). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has endorsed such
a standard in the context of assessing the reasonableness of a perception of
provocation by the decedent that would warrant a verdict of manslaughter rather than
murder. See State v. Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161, 173 (Wis. 1983).
An intermediate appellate court in Missouri has interpreted that state's special
legislation permitting expert testimony on battered woman syndrome, see Mo. REV.
STAT. § 563.033 (1988), amended by Mo. ANN. STAT § 563.033 (Vernon Supp. 1991),
as creating a separate standard of reasonableness for battered women. See State v.
Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308, 312-13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (reversing conviction where
trial judge excluded expert testimony on the theory that the defendant was not
entitled to the benefit of a statute governing admissibility of "battered spouse
syndrome," and further stating that the operation of the evidentiary statute created
a "reasonable battered woman" standard of reasonableness); see also State v. Clay, No.
41069, 1989 Mo. App. LEXIS 1386, at *8 (Sept. 26, 1989) (affirming homicide
conviction of defendant's husband's lover, and upholding refusal to allow expert
testimony where there was no claim that the defendant acted in self-defense).
In 1989, a plurality opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania appeared to
endorse a separate standard of reasonableness. See Commonwealth v. Stonehouse,
555 A.2d 772, 784 (Pa. 1989). Recently, however, in the course of reversing a
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tive component, and does not differ significantly from the combined
standard currently in use in the majority of jurisdictions.
1 12
A reasonableness standard's outcome-determinative impact on
the content of a self-defense instruction is obvious.1 13 The choice
battered woman's conviction, that court issued four separate opinions, none
endorsing the Stonehouse suggestion of a separate standard. See Commonwealth v.
Dillon, No. 123, 1991 Pa. LEXIS 234 (Oct. 31, 1991) (comprising: a majority opinion,
signed by four of seven justices, reversing because of exclusion of decedent's prior
violence; two concurring opinions, each signed by three justices, each in support of
reversal on the additional ground of exclusion of battered-woman-syndrome
testimony, each disavowing a separate defense, and finding that the generally
applicable standard of reasonableness accommodated the self-defense claim of a
battered woman; and one concurrence signed by threejustices on the specific ground
that no separate defense was necessary).
Professor Kinports lists additional state courts (Florida, NewJersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Texas, and Washington) that she characterizes as in
agreement that the reasonableness standard is that of the "reasonable battered
woman." See Kinports, supra note 22, at 416 & n.88. Her error is the result of
confusing the definition of the reasonableness standard with those jurisdictions'
rulings on other instruction issues and on the scope and relevance of expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome.
112 See, e.g., Stewart, 763 P.2d at 579 (holding that no self-defense instruction
should be given in a sleeping-man case, applying a "reasonably prudent battered wife"
formulation to the "objective" part of its reasonableness test, and determining that
the generally applicable "subjective" portion of the test measui es the sincerity and
honesty of a defendant's belief); Felton, 329 N.W.2d at 173 (determining that its own
precedents required the conclusion that the objective portion of that state's combined
standard for measurement of the provocation by the decedent, which warrants
reduction of murder to manslaughter, "may be satisfied by considering the situation
of an ordinary person who is a battered spouse"). Compare Stonehouse, 555 A.2d at
784 (plurality opinion) (ruling that expert testimony serves to guide the jury in
weighing other evidence "in light of how the reasonably prudent battered woman would
have perceived and reacted to [the decedent's] behavior") with Commonwealth v. Ely,
578 A.2d 540, 542 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (noting that even under the Stonehouse
plurality standard the new definition goes only to the measurement of the perception
of imminence).
11 Compare the definition of the measurements employed in an objective
jurisdiction, "[It is not the law that] the fears of a coward wouldjustify homicide....
[The defendant's perceptions must be measured against those] of a reasonable man;
reasonably courageous-reasonably self-possessed," Teal v. State, 22 Ga. 75, 84 (1857),
with that of a subjective jurisdiction,
[G]uilt is personal, and.., the conduct of any individual is to be measured
by that individual's equipment mentally and physically. He may act in self-
defense, not only when a reasonable person would so act, but when one
with the particular qualities that the individual himself has would so do. A
nervous, timid, easily frightened individual is not measured by the same
standard that a stronger, calmer, and braver man might be.
Nelson v. State, 181 N.E. 448, 449 (Ohio Ct. App. 1932). Both Teal and Nelson in-
volved male appellants. For an analysis of the proposals for redefinition of the
reasonableness standard and of the likelihood that those proposals without changes
in other aspects of self-defense jurisprudence, will lead to better outcomes in
BATTERED WOMEN AND SELF-DEFENSE
of reasonableness standards is a factor in the likelihood of getting
any instruction on self-defense, but is not, by itself, determinative
of that issue.1 14 The inclusion of a subjective part of a reason-
ableness test does seem related to the likelihood that ajurisdiction's
courts will prefer the use of the feminine gender in instructions in
trials where the defendants are women.
115
The choice of the definition of reasonableness does influence
rulings on admissibility of evidence of the social context in which
the defendant acted 116 and instructions regarding the significance
of that evidence. It is not the sole determinant of those questions,
however, and the more significant impact is from the jurisdiction's
definition of the temporal proximity of danger.
117
nonconfrontation cases, see infra notes 227-38 and accompanying text.
114 On this most basic get-to-the-jury issue, getting any instruction at all, analysis
of the opinions demonstrates that the impact of the reasonableness standard that is
chosen is effectively negligible. In appellate cases containing a discussion of the
reasonableness standard, no significant difference exists between the objective and
the combination jurisdictions in the frequency of complaints on appeal that no self-
defense instruction was given at trial. See No Self-Defense Instruction (computer
manuscript on file with the author) described infra Appendix II.D. Defendants in
confrontation cases routinely get to the jury on that threshold question with the same
regularity in jurisdictions on both sides of the divide between objective jurisdictions
and those with some subjective component. See id. In nonconfrontation cases, there
is a similar pattern: defendants fail to get self-defense instructions in the same
percentages in both types ofjurisdictions. See id.
The issue of simply getting some self-defense instruction is correlated more
closely to a state's decision about the quantum and quality of the evidentiary showing
necessary to entitle a defendant to an instruction than it is to the standard explained
to the jury once an instruction is given. Most, but not all, of the highest standards
occur in objective jurisdictions. See infra Table. The impediment to getting to the
jury is the definition of that procedural rule. See infra notes 212-18 and accompany-
ing text.
115 Compare California's rule in People v. Bush, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430, 437 (Ct. App.
1978) (holding that "the jury was properly instructed that if defendant acted out of
fear of death or great bodily harm and did only what a reasonable person would have
done in his own defense, the homicide was justifiable") with State v. Bailey, 591 P.2d
1212, 1215 n.3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (reversing an assault conviction and noting that
"preferably, a woman defendant should be entitled to have jury instructions framed
in the feminine gender in order to convey to the jury that they consider her actions
in the light of her own perceptions and experience").
116 The question here is the quantity and quality of other evidence that the
defendant must produce as a condition precedent to the admissibility of social-context
evidence (including history of abuse and other violence). The highest threshold-
showing requirements are those in states that have both an objective reasonableness
standard and a narrow definition of the temporal proximity of the threatened harm.
See infra text accompanying notes 153-65.
117 The narrow choice of definition occurs more frequently in objective than in
other jurisdictions. For a discussion of the significance of these two definitions in
combination, see infra text accompanying notes 153-65.
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b. The Definition of the Temporal Proximity of Danger Facing the
Defendant-the Choice Between "Imminent" and "Immediate"
Both objective jurisdictions and those with a subjective compo-
nent of the definition of reasonableness condition the justification
for use of deadly force upon a defendant's reasonable belief in
either an imminent or an immediate threat of death or serious
bodily injury.118 The choice, stated simply, is between a require-
ment that the jury focus on the circumstances, including past events,
surrounding the defendant's action and a requirement that the
focus be limited to the particular instant of the defendant's action.
In this Article, the issue is analyzed as the requisite temporal
proximity of the danger.1
19
In terms of getting to the jury, the choice between "imminence"
and "immediacy" has several implications, 120 but not, standing
alone, for the likelihood that a defendant will receive any self-
defense instruction at all.' 2 1 The choice of definition, by itself,
is a significant indicator of the importance of the social context of
a defendant's action. 1 22 It has an effect, but not in isolation from
118 For a breakdown of the states' definitional choices between imminency and
immediacy, as they are reflected in battered women's homicide appeals, see infra
Table. For another recent review, see LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 34, § 5.7(d).
119 States are not consistent in their use of terms to reflect their choices. Most use
the term "immediate" to reflect a preference for the narrower particular instant focus
and "imminent" to denominate a broader surrounding circumstances focus. This
pattern is not consistent with LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 34, § 5.7(d), who use the
term "imminent" to mean the narrower definition. I have chosen to follow the
pattern of usage in the majority of states. For an analysis of the Model Penal Code's
role in the selection and confusion of the terms, see Peter D.W. Heberling, Note,
Justification: The Impact of the Model Penal Code on Statutory Reform, 75 CoLUM. L. REV.
914, 931-32 (1975).
120 Its impact on outcomes is the primary focus of the scholars who urge its
enlargement or who propose the elimination of the requirement. For a criticism of
their proposals, see infra text accompanying notes 244-48.
121 No significant difference exists between imminent and immediatejurisdictions
in the rate of complaints on appeal that the trial judge refused to give any instruction
on the question of self-defense.
122 In "imminent"jurisdictions, both those with objective and those with combined
tests for reasonableness, evidence of history of abuse justifies a defendant's acting
more swiftly than would a reasonable stranger facing the same situation. See, e.g.,
People v. Bush, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430, 436-37 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the trial
court should explain the significance of prior threats and that one who has received
threats is justified in acting more quickly). California's reasonableness test is
objective. See infra Table.
For similar instructions that flow from that principle, see State v. Hundley, 693
P.2d 475, 478 (Kan. 1985) ("[T]he question is whether the instruction allows thejury
to consider 'all the evidence' or whether the use of the word 'immediate' rather than
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other factors, on the receipt of social context evidence. 123  It
primarily affects (1) the instructions given a jury regarding the
significance of that evidence1 24 and (2) the scope of expert testi-
mony.
The first of these impacts relates to lay testimony on the
decedent's violence toward the defendant or toward third persons.
A battered woman defendant in an "imminent" jurisdiction is more
likely than her counterpart in an "immediate" jurisdiction to get a
jury instruction specifically on the relevance of the decedent's past
violence.1 25 This principle is the same for evidence of violence
toward third persons and for evidence of violence toward the
defendant. The instruction explains to the jurors that the evidence
of the decedent's past violence should be considered as they
evaluate the defendant's state of mind and the reasonableness of the
defendant's perception that the decedent posed an imminent threat
of death or serious bodily injury.
126
'imminent' precludes the jury's consideration of the [evidence of] prior abuse
[directed at the defendant by the decedent]".). The trial court in Hundley had ruled
that the term "imminent" more accurately reflected that state's determination to have
the jury focus on the context in which the defendant, a battered woman, acted. See
id. at 478-79. The Kansas Supreme Court held that an instruction using the term
"immediate" was reversible error, a result that was viewed by the court as following
necessarily from its holdings in earlier cases not involving battered women:
Itis well settled in Kansas thatwhen self-defense is asserted, evidence of the
cruel and violent nature of the deceased toward the defendant is admissible,
as it was in this case. The question is what instruction should accompany
this evidence in order to charge the jury with the proper manner in which
such evidence should be considered.
Id. at 477 (citation omitted). Kansas, an otherwise objective state, applies a
"reasonably prudent battered woman" standard of reasonableness. See infra Table.
123 Those states with both an objective reasonableness test and an "immediacy"
definition of temporal proximity of danger are those that impose higher threshold-
showing preconditions to the receipt of this evidence. See infra note 126 & text
accompanying notes 127-28.
124 For instance, the Washington Supreme Court held that an instruction using
the term "immediate" impermissibly narrowed the focus of thejury's attention to the
time immediately before the defendant's action: "'It is clear that the jury is entitled
to consider all of the circumstances surrounding the incident in determining whether
[the] defendant had reasonable grounds to believe grievous bodily harm was about
to be inflicted.'" State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548,556 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (quoting
State v. Lewis, 491 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971)).
125 For an example of the language that appellate courts have ruled should be
employed, see supra note 122. A few "immediate" jurisdictions impose this
requirement on trial judges. See infra Table.
126 See infra Table. A corollary to the entitlement of an instruction on the
relevance of the decedent's past violence is the principle that a prosecutor cannot
argue in summation that such evidence is irrelevant to the question of self-defense.
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The second correlation between the temporal proximity of
danger definition and social context evidence concerns the scope of
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome.1 27 In some
states, the testimony is received because it is deemed relevant for
the evaluation of whether the defendant reasonably perceived the
danger facing her to be imminent. When the danger is defined as
immediate, however, a defendant is less likely to have the expert's
evidence received for the specific purpose of assisting the jury to
assess the reasonableness of her perception of the temporal
proximity of danger.
28
c. Proportionality of Force Used to Meet Threatened Harm
The requirement that a defendant use only the degree of force
necessary to repel an ongoing or threatened attack is believed by
some authors to work to the disadvantage of women defendants
who use a weapon against a man who is armed only with his
hands. 129 Their assumptions are that (1) the rule is the equivalent
of a "like force" requirement, which allows a defendant to use a
weapon only against an attacker who also has a weapon, and (2)
such a rule by definition ignores the social reality of most wom-
en. 130 If the proportional force requirement of most jurisdictions
operated in conformity with those assumptions, it would work to
exclude the self-defense claims of most defendants whose cases are
represented in the analyzed opinions.
131
With regard to violence toward third persons, in some of the "imminent"jurisdictions
and in a minority of "immediate" jurisdictions, the jurors are also instructed to
consider the evidence in determining who was the initial aggressor in the fatal
encounter. See infra Table.
127 For a summary of the standards for allowing expert testimony and the scope
and relevance of expert testimony, see infra Table.
128 See infra Table. Generally, an expert's testimony is limited to the impact of the
history of abuse on the formation of a defendant's belief that the danger was
imminent (or immediate); the testimony may not include an opinion on whether the
defendant's belief was reasonable. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
129 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
130 The term "social reality" is used by Crocker as part of her argument that
generally applicable individualized standards of reasonableness will be insufficient to
accommodate the claims of battered women defendants: "[T]he male experience
permeates not only legal standards of conduct, but also the very definition of social
reality." See Crocker, supra note 22, at 152. Tlfe concept as it relates to proportional-
ity-of-force inquiries was explained by the Washington Supreme Court in State v.
Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (en banc). See infra note 132 and accompanying
text.
131 In only five percent of the opinions did the incident involve the decedent's use
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In the overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions, however, the rule
does not prohibit resort to a weapon against an unarmed aggressor.
One much-cited rejection of the weapon against weapon rule is
found in State v. Wanrow.13 2 At the time of that decision, there
was at least one intermediate court, whose analysis was later rejected
b y other courts in the jurisdiction, that had held that the propor-
tional force rule was a "like force" rule, which prohibited use of a
of a weapon other than his hands. In each of the cases analyzed, the woman
defendant used a weapon. Although a few defendants resorted to unusual weapons,
including a car, a bedpost, and a kerosene heater, most of the defendants used guns
(64% in the confrontation category and 63% in the nonconfrontational category) or
cutting instruments (28% of the confrontation cases and 11% of the nonconfrontation
cases). See infra Appendix I.B.I. These findings are similar to those of Mercy &
Saltzman, supra note 71, at 596, 598. In their study, based on homicide data from the
FBI for 1976 through 1985, firearms were used in 71.5% of spouse homicides, at
similar rates for both wife and husband victims (71.0% of the wife victims and 72.2%
of the husband victims). See id. at 596. They found, however, that over twice as many
husband victims (24.7%, versus 12.1% of wife victims) were killed by cutting
instruments, and only 1.6% of husband victims, versus 11.8% of wife victims, were
bludgeoned to death. See id. These findings are also similar to national statistics for
all homicides: "Between 1968 and 1978 the proportion of killings committed with
firearms varied between 63% and 65.7%." Goetting, supra note 70, at 10-11.
Interestingly, Cazenave & Zahn came to somewhat different conclusions in their
homicide study of Chicago and Philadelphia in 1978. They found much starker
gender differences: "Male offenders are much more likely to use guns while females
tend to use knives. Finally, only male offenders commit beating or strangulation
homicides." Cazenave & Zahn, supra note 75, at 11.
132 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (en banc). That case involved a woman defendant
(not a battered woman) who shot an unarmed man whose reputation for aggression
was known to her. The Washington Supreme Court, relying on its own precedents
from cases in which both the defendants and the decedents were male, held that the
level of force available to her had to be assessed under two social-context criteria:
one specifically relevant to the facts on appeal and the other generally relevant to
women confronting male aggression.
First, the court held that ajury should be allowed to consider evidence of the
decedent's history of violence in determining whether the defendant's force was
proportional to the threat she perceived:
Under the law of this state, the jury should have been allowed to consider
[information about the appellant's knowledge of the decedent's reputation
for aggressive acts] in making the critical determination of the "degree of
force which ... a reasonable person in the same situation.., seeing what
[s]he sees and knowing what [s]he knows, then would believe to be
necessary."
Id. at 557 (quoting State v. Dunning, 506 P.2d 321, 322 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973)).
Second, the court noted the social reasons underlying the necessity for the use
of a weapon by a woman who is confronted with a male attacker: "In our society
women suffer from a conspicuous lack of access to training in and the means of
developing those skills necessary to effectively repel a male assailant without resorting
to the use of deadly weapons." Id. at 558.
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weapon unless the attacker was also armed. 133  Most jurisdictions
now reject the notion that the proportional force rule operates to
forbid use of a weapon against an unarmed attacker. Some of these
jurisdictions rejected the notion decades before Wanrow was
decided. 3 4  The majority rule, applicable to both male and
133 See, e.g., People v. Davis, 337 N.E.2d 256, 260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) ("A belief
that the decedent, unarmed, might kill or greatly injure the defendant, while she had
a loaded gun, was unreasonable.").
The Davis decision is, however, arguably at odds with the pronouncements of the
state's highest court in People v. Smith, 88 N.E.2d 834 (Ill. 1949), which held that it
is not necessary "that the deceased should have used against his slayer a deadly
weapon to justify a killing in self-defense." Id. at 836. Furthermore, the Davis
analysis has been rejected by other appellate courts in Illinois. For example, in a case
decided three months after, but containing no reference to Wanrow, the court
unequivocally rejected a like-force requirement and reversed the conviction of a
battered woman who testified at trial that she shot the decedent in the midst of an
ongoing attack: "It is a firmly established rule that the aggressor need not have a
weapon to justify one's use of deadly force in self-defense." People v. Reeves, 362
N.E.2d 9, 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); see also People v. Estes, 469 N.E.2d 275, 283 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984) (holding that "[w]here it is clear that the aggressor is capable of
inflicting serious bodily harm and it appears that he intends to, then it is not
necessary that the aggressor be armed for the defendant to employ deadly force in
self-defense").
134 In 1940, for example, the highest court in Tennessee reversed the conviction
of a woman who shot her husband in the midst of an ongoing attack. The court
noted that its decision on proportionality of force was based on its own earlier
decisions that involved male defendants:
[W]here there is so much disparity in the size and strength of the parties,
particularly where, as in this case, the slayer is a woman, in fairness and
justice to her, she should have the benefit of the rule announced by this
court in [earlier cases] as follows:
"Where great bodily violence is being inflicted, or threatened,
upon a person, by one much stronger and heavier, with such
determined energy that the person assaulted may reasonably
apprehend death or great bodily injury, he is justifiable in using a
deadly weapon upon his assailant. It makes no difference whether
the bodily violence is being, or about to be, inflicted with a club,
or a rock, or with the fists of an overpowering adversary of
superior strength and size."
Kress v. State, 144 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Tenn. 1940) (citations omitted) (quoting Bitner
v. State, 169 S.W. 565, 568 (Tenn. 1914)). A similar analysis led an intermediate
appellate court in Oklahoma in 1954 to reverse a battered woman's conviction, on the
ground that the trial court had erred when it instructed the jury that it was never
reasonable to use a weapon to repel an unarmed assault. See Easterling v. State, 267
P.2d 185, 189 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954); see also People v. Moore, 275 P.2d 485, 494
(Cal. 1954) (reversing conviction of a woman who shot her unarmed husband, and
holding that she did not use excessive force and that, in the context of the history of
abuse, her action in arming herself with a gun given to her by a police officer for
protection in anticipation of an attack did not make her the initial aggressor); Bennett
v. State, 188 A.2d 142, 144 (Md. 1963) (reversing conviction of a battered woman who
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female defendants, is that the reasonableness of a defendant's
degree of force is decided on a case-by-case basis and that the use
of a weapon against an unarmed attacker is notperse disproportion-
ate.
13 5
d. Duty to Retreat
In the course of some scholars' discussions of the definition of
the duty to retreat, there is a tendency to blur the definition of the
retreat rule with the question of whether the woman could have
escaped the relationship. 136 Most appellate courts do not make
this mistake, although some trial courts have. A survey of the cases
analyzed shows that the duty to retreat was generally not the cause
of bad trial outcomes and that, in most of those cases where it was
outcome-determinative, it was the result of the rule's application
rather than its definition.
Only a minority ofjurisdictions have provisions that a defendant
may not use deadly force unless he or she could not have retreated
safely from the encounter. 137  Most jurisdictions that have that
requirement exempt from the duty to retreat those defendants who
are attacked in their homes.1 3 8 In some of those exempting
shot her husband on the grounds that excessive force was not used and anticipatory
arming did not make the wife the initial aggressor).
135 Only 10% of the cases analyzed presented a proportionality of force issue on
appeal. See infra Appendix I.B.2. In none of these, except for the Davis case, see
supra note 133, did an appellate court find the level of force per se unreasonable
because the defendant used a weapon when not confronted with one. Sufficiency of
the evidence was the issue on appeal in most of the cases addressing the proportional
force question. Half of those convictions were affirmed, not because the use of a
weapon was disproportionate, but because courts found that excessive force was
manifested by the woman's continued use of the weapon once the decedent was
disabled. See, e.g., People v. Lucas, 324 P.2d 933, 936 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)
(holding that defendant's continued shooting of her disabled, unarmed husband while
he was falling strongly weighed against a self-defense justification for the defendant);
Hill v. State, 497 N.E.2d 1061, 1065 (Ind. 1986) (concluding that the degree of force
exercised by the defendant was notjustified because the defendant continued firing
shots at her husband when he fell to the ground and was no longer a threat). For a
discussion of the phenomenon that women use this type of "excessive force" much
less frequently than men, see WOLFGANG, supra note 70, at 47, and Rasche, supra note
56, at 12.
136 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
137 See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 34, § 5.7, at 659; see also Mather, supra note
28, at 568 (noting that "the majority ofjurisdictions hold that the innocent party has
no duty to retreat"). But see GILLESPIE, supra note 24, at 187 (asserting that "about
half of the states require a person to retreat, if possible .... before standing ground
and fighting back").
1 This exemption is a long-standing one in mostjurisdictions that impose a duty
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jurisdictions, however, the exemption does not apply if the attacker
is a cohabitant 39 in the home or if the defendant was the initial
aggressor; 140 the duty to retreat rule applies instead. In the cases
in the sample, the most common location of a homicide was the
defendant's home. 14 1 The duty to retreat was an issue in only a
minority of the opinions analyzed.
42
2. Evidentiary Rules
This Part of the Article will analyze existing standards governing
the admissibility and scope of evidence regarding a defendant's
social context, 143 and examine the relationship of those standards
to retreat. See, for example, its description by Justice Benjamin Cardozo in an
opinion reversing the conviction of a male appellant:
It is not now, and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own
dwelling is bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may stand his ground and
resist the attack. He is under no duty to take to the fields and the highways,
a fugitive from his own home .... The rule is the same whether the attack
proceeds from some other occupant or from an intruder. It was so
adjudged in [an 1884 Alabama case). 'Why,' it was there inquired, 'should
one retreat from his own house, when assailed by a partner or cotenant, any
more than when assailed by a stranger who is lawfully upon the premises?
Whither shall he flee, and how far, and when may he be permitted to
return?'
People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497-98 (N.Y. 1914) (citations omitted) (quoting
Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8, 16 (1884)). See generally infra text accompanying notes 254-
56 (discussingbattered women's deprivation of a fair trial injurisdictions that impose
a duty to retreat and do not provide an exemption for defendants attacked in their
own homes).
139 See Mather, supra note 28, at 569 n.195; infra note 255 and accompanying text.
140 For an analysis of initial-aggressor cases, see Kinports, supra 22, at 434-37.
141 In 73% of the confrontation cases, the incident was in the defendant's home:
56% occurred in a home shared with the decedent and 17% occurred in a place not
shared by the decedent. In 3% of the opinions no location was specified. One case
occurred in the decedent's home. The remaining 24% occurred in other locations.
See Location (computer manuscript on file with the author) described infra Appendix
II.E.
The defendant's home was the place of occurrence in 69% of the nonconfron-
tation cases. Sixty-one percent took place in a home that she shared with the man,
and 8% occurred in her home not shared by him. Two cases took place in his home.
The remaining 25% took place in a location other than the home of the defendant
or decedent. See id.
142 The retreat rule was an issue in 12% of all of the cases in the sample and was
involved on appeal in 13% of the cases arising from incidents in the defendant's
home. For discussion of reversals on the ground of improper application of the
retreat rule, see infra note 202.
143 The emphasis in this section is on social context evidence offered by the
defendant in the form of testimony about the defendant's past violence toward her
or toward third persons, and of expert testimony about the effects of the decedent's
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to ajurisdiction's substantive law definitions of reasonableness and
temporal proximity of danger. 44 Current evidentiary rules in the
overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions provide for the admission of
social context evidence offered by a defendant.
145
Roughly twelve years ago, when cases involving use of the term
"battered woman" at trials first reached appellate courts, 146 two
history of abuse against the defendant.
144 The substantive-law definitions of the proportional force and retreat
requirements do not correlate to evidentiary rulings. For that reason, these two
factors are excluded from the Table.
145 Evidence regarding the decedent's pastviolence toward the defendant ("history
of abuse") and toward third persons ("history of other violence") is admissible in
every jurisdiction. The variations among the states come in two areas: (1) the
threshold showing required of a defendant as a condition precedent to the admission
of the evidence, see infra notes 154-66 and accompanying text, and (2) the purposes
for which the evidence is received, see infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text. The
majority of states admit testimony on battered woman syndrome. See infra Table.
146 Reported opinions on appeals of women homicide defendants who killed
abusive partners and who claimed self-defense date back at least to 1902. See infra
note 149 (discussing Williams v. State, 70 S.W. 756, 758 (Tex. Ct. App. 1902)). The
use in trials of the term "battered woman" and the attempts to introduce expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome both began in the late 1970s. See JULIE
BLACKMAN, INTIMATE VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF INJUSTICE 205 (1989) (dating "the
beginning of the use of testimony on the battered woman syndrome" at 1978);
LENORE WALKER, TERRIFYING LovE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How SOCIETY
RESPONDS 302-27 (1989) (describing her testimony as an expert at trials dating back
to 1977).
Appellate rulings on the admissibility of battered-woman-syndrome testimony
followed closely thereafter. See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 639
(D.C. 1979) (reversing ruling that proffered testimony by Dr. Lenore Walker was not
beyond the ken of jurors, determining that such testimony would be "highly
probative" and that, because the defendant's status as a battered wife "may have had
a substantial bearing on her perceptions and behavior at the time of the killing, it was
central to her claim of self-defense," and remanding for consideration of other bases
for exclusion), opinion after remand, 455 A.2d 893, 896 (D.C. 1983) (upholding trial
court's determination on remand that the defendant failed to establish the general
acceptance in the scientific community of Dr. Walker's methodology). Other
appellate opinions addressed the proffer of battered-woman-syndrome testimony at
trials taking place in 1977 through 1980. See Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (Ga.
1981) (reversing trial court's exclusion of expert testimony based on its conclusion
that the subject matter was within the ken ofjurors: "We disagree and find that the
expert's testimony explaining why a person suffering from battered woman's
syndrome would not leave her mate, would not inform police or friends, and would
fear increased aggression against herself, would be such conclusions thatjurors could
not ordinarily draw for themselves."); People v. Adams, 430 N.E.2d 267,272 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1981) (ruling that defense counsel's failure at trial to make an offer of proof
constituted a waiver on appeal of the issue of exclusion of expert testimony, but
reversing the conviction on other grounds); People v. White, 414 N.E.2d 196, 200 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980) (finding no error in exclusion of opinion of defendant's personal
physician that "battered women 'tend to remain with their mates'"); State v. Anaya,
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relevant rules of evidence were already in place. These rules
developed in the context of the most common types of homicide
cases-that is, cases in which the parties knew each other but were
not involved in a history of family violence. 147 The first, applica-
ble in all nonstranger homicide cases involving a claim of self-
defense, relates to evidence of past violence directed by the
decedent against the defendant.1 48 Evidence of the "history of
abuse" is offered in the form of testimony about violent actions
against the defendant or about threats to commit acts of violence.
This evidence is usually admitted on the theory that it is relevant to
the defendant's state of mind and to the reasonableness of the fear
of danger.149 The second rule permits evidence of a decedent's
violence toward persons other than the defendant. That evidence,
which is here called the "history of other violence," has been
admitted routinely to show the defendant's state of mind and the
reasonableness of the perception of danger. When used as state-of-
mind evidence, it is usually admitted in the form of reputation
438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981) (following analysis of 1979 Ibn-Tamas opinion, and
holding that exclusion of expert testimony was error and ordering new trial), opinion
after remand, 456 A.2d 1255 (Me. 1983) (affirming conviction after second trial);
People v. Powell, 424 N.Y.S.2d 626, 630-31 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1980) (denying motion for
a new trial at trial level, and ruling that the proffered affidavit of Dr. Walker failed
to establish that battered-woman-syndrome testimony was after-discovered evidence
that could not have been offered at defendant's 1979 trial), afrd, 442 N.Y.S.2d 645
(N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Burhle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Wyo. 1981) (upholding
exclusion of testimony proffered by Dr. Walker, and, following the analysis of the
District of Columbia court in Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d 626, noting that "[iln our holding
here we are not saying that this type of expert testimony is not admissible; we are
merely holding that the state of the art was not adequately demonstrated to the court,
and because of inadequate foundation the proposed opinions would not aid the
jury").
147 See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
148 See supra note 103.
149 In 1902, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applied this general rule to a
battered woman's homicide case, and held that exclusion of evidence concerning the
decedent's history of abuse was an error:
[I]t is admissible for the defendant, having first established that he [sic] was
assailed by the deceased, and in apparent danger, to prove that the deceased
was a person of ferocity, brutality, vindictiveness, and of excessive strength;
such evidence being offered for the purpose of showing either (1) that the
defendant was acting in terror, and hence incapable of that specific malice
necessary to constitute murder of the first degree; or (2) that he [sic] was
in such apparent extremity as to make out a case of self-defense; or (3) that
the deceased's purpose in encountering the defendant was deadly.
Williams v. State, 70 S.W. 756, 757-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1902) (citations omitted); see
also infra Table.
BATTERED WOMEN AND SELF-DEFENSE
testimony known to the defendant, and occasionally in the form of
testimony about the defendant's knowledge of the decedent's
specific prior acts of violence. 50  In some jurisdictions, the
history of other violence is admitted for an additional purpose-to
show that the decedent was the aggressor in the fatal encounter with
the defendant. Evidence of specific acts of violence, including
convictions for violent crimes, is received in those latter jurisdic-
tions. 151 In some instances, such evidence is admitted even where
the defendant had no knowledge of the acts or convictions.
152
The definitions contained in these rules are of general applica-
bility and long standing. At least in theory they operate in battered
women's trials as they do in "ordinary" homicide trials where a
claim of self-defense is raised. No reason grounded in the structure
or content of the rules would preclude this class of defendants from
using trial testimony available to other defendants.
153
a. Implications of Choices of Standard of Reasonableness and of
Definition of Temporal Proximity of Danger for Rules Regarding History-
of-Abuse Evidence
The threshold-showing requirements-the definition of the
conditions precedent to receipt of evidence of history of abuse-fall
into three main categories: (1) some jurisdictions require that the
defendant must first offer prima-facie evidence, sometimes in the
form of proof of an overt act by the decedent, that the decedent was
the aggressor on the particular occasion;154 (2) others have the
less strict requirement that the defendant must first offer some
evidence (less than would be required to make a prima-facie case)
that the decedent was the aggressor; and (3) opinions in the
150 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 193, at 571-72 & nn.2-3 (Edward W. Cleary et
al. ed., 3d ed. 1984). For a recent review, in a case involving a male appellant, of
authorities on admission of various forms of history-of-other-violence evidence, see
State v. Waller, No. 73488, 1991 Mo. LEXIS 98, at *10 (Sept. 10, 1991).
151 See Wailer, 1991 Mo. LEXIS 98, at *10.
152 See id.
153 For an analysis of the disparate application of the rules providing for
admission of social-context evidence, see infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
154 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 70 S.W. 756, 757-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1902)
(requiring a defendant to offer evidence of aggression by the decedent as a
precondition to the court's admittance of evidence of the decedent's history of
abuse). For an analysis of Louisiana's statutory elimination, applicable only in family
violence cases, of the overt-act showing as a precondition to admission of history-of-
abuse evidence, see infra note 291.
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remaining jurisdictions have discussed no defined requirement
except that the defendant must claim self-defense.
1 55
Imposition of the most stringent requirement often puts a
defendant (battered woman or not) with personal knowledge of the
decedent's propensity for violence in what one scholar has labeled
accurately a "catch-22 situation." 15 6 Such a defendant often seeks
to introduce evidence of past violence in order to demonstrate the
reasonableness of her belief that immediate or imminent harm was
threatened on the occasion of the killing. She offers evidence of the
context of her knowledge of the decedent in order to demonstrate
that, within that context, the decedent's action, although short of an
objectively apparent "overt act of aggression," was a signal that
deadly violence was at hand. In states with the most stringent
requirement, however, that evidence is precluded precisely because
of the absence of an action that looks to an outsider like a tradition-
al overt act.1 57 The prima-facie or overt-act showing requirement
is found most often, but not exclusively, in states with objective
standards of reasonableness and with "immediate" as the definition
of the temporal proximity of danger.
1 58
In the intermediate-showing states, which require "some
evidence," but where the quantum necessary is below the prima-
facie level, there is no particular correlation between this require-
ment and their choices regarding the importance of context.
1 59
Those choices do correlate in the lowest-standard states, the
majority of which have a combined reasonableness test and define
the danger as imminent, rather than immediate.
160
155 The threshold-showing requirements of the various states are summarized infra
Table. The routine acceptance of the history-of-abuse evidence is reflected by the
number of states where the opinions on battered women's appeals did not even
contain a discussion of the threshold-showing requirement. See infra Table. All of
the cases analyzed for this Article contained some reference to a history of abuse. See
supra note 36 and accompanying text.
156 See Mather, supra note 28, at 567. Unfortunately, Mather fails to carry through
her perception to an analysis of the need for reforming not just the statutory
definition of "imminent," but also the rules that create the impediments to the jury's
receMt of the evidence of past violence.
See Kinports, supra note 22, at 426 n.141; see also id. at 426-28 (advocating
elimination of the overt-act requirement). In thosejurisdictions that impose an overt-
act threshold-showing requirement, the rules need redefinition. For a description of
this Article's proposal, see infra note 291 and accompanying text.
158 See infra Table.
159 See infra Table.
160 See infra Table.
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b. Implications of Choice of Reasonableness and of Temporal Proximity
of Danger for Rules Regarding History-of-Other-Violence Evidence
With regard to history of other violence, or evidence of the
decedent's violence toward third persons, the threshold-showing
requirements of the vrious jurisdictions fall into the same three
categories that defined requirements for admission of history-of-
abuse evidence. 161  The highest-showing states are usually the
jurisdictions that require both objective reasonableness and
immediate danger, and in only a few of those is history-of-other-
violence evidence received for the purpose of proving that the
decedent was the aggressor in the incident that led to his
death.
16 2
Most of the intermediate-showing states (which require "some"
evidentiary showing) have a subjective component in the reasonable-
ness test and define the danger as imminent.163 While some of
the intermediate-showing states permit ajury to consider history-of-
other-violence evidence in its determination of who started the
fight,164 others do not.165  The jurisdictions with the lowest or
most flexible requirements are, like the intermediate-showing states,
primarily those jurisdictions whose choices on reasonableness and
definitions of danger take into account social context.
166
c. Expert Testimony on Effects of History of Abuse
Like evidence of a history of abuse or a history of other
violence, expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome
167
161 See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
162 See infra Table.
165 See infra Table.
164 See infra Table.
165 See infra Table.
166 See infra Table.
167 Dr.Julie Blackman describes the typical content of expert testimony regarding
the battered woman syndrome thus:
Typically referred to as testimony on the 'battered woman syndrome,'
expert testimony about the psychology of battered women details those
psychological traits that typify battered women and their perceptions of the
potential dangerousness of the abuser's violence. The nature of expert
testimony begins with a description of what studies have shown to be
characteristic of battered women.... An important aspect of this portion
of the testimony comes from the fact that research findings often go against
prevailing misconceptions about battered women. Thus, misconceptions can
be corrected. The concluding portion of expert testimony involves the
presentation of information about the defendant herself and the extent to
1991)
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is offered to show the trier of fact the context of a defendant's
actions. 168  By the offer of battered-woman-syndrome expert
which her experiences and reactions are consistent with what one would
expect of a woman whose spouse or lover abused her.
BLACKMAN, supra note 146, at 190. For other descriptions of such expert testimony,
see EWING, supra note 22, at 3, 51-60; LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
221 (1979); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 14-18 (1984);
WALKER, supra note 146, at 178-81; Mary Ann Douglas, The Battered Woman Syndrome,
in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL 39,39-44 (DanielJay Sonkin ed., 1987); Roberta K.
Thyfault, Self-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial, in REPRESENTING ...
BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 30,30-35 (Sara LeeJohann & Frank Osanka eds., 1989).
For the status of the admissibility of battered-woman-syndrome testimony in the
various states, see infra Table.
168 The common purpose of both lay and expert testimony is reflected by the
similarity of rules governing their admissibility. In many ways, however, lay and
expert testimony on social context are dissimilar. Lay testimony on the decedent's
violent propensities has long been admitted on the theory thatjurors are capable of
using the information to assess the reasonableness of the defendant's belief and
actions. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. Expert testimony has been
received only recently, on the theory that jurors are not capable, without expert
assistance, of assessing the impact on a defendant of the decedent's violent
propensities when they have manifested themselves in the form of family violence.
See infra note 185. These differences explain the early reluctance of some courts to
require the admission of expert testimony. See supra note 146 (describing early
decisions). The differences are the likely explanation for the continuing reluctance
of a minority of courts. See infra notes 171-80 and accompanying text.
Some courts, the majority of which had already ruled that expert testimony is
admissible when offered by a battered woman defendant, have confronted
prosecutors' efforts to introduce battered-woman-syndrome testimony against men
accused of assaulting or killing their wives or lovers. See, e.g., Arcoren v. United
States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1240-41 (8th Cir. 1991) (ruling that a prosecution's expert
testimony was admissible to explain victim's recantation); State v. Baker, 424 A.2d
171, 173 (N.H. 1980) (affirming trial court's decision to admit victim's battered-
woman-syndrome evidence to rebut defendant's insanity defense); State v. Frost, 577
A.2d 1282, 1287-88 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (holding that battered-woman-
syndrome evidence was admissible to bolster the victim's credibility and noting that
"[i]t would seem anomalous to allow a battered woman, where she is a criminal
defendant, to offer this type of expert testimony in order to help thejury understand
the actions she took, yet deny her that same opportunity when she is the complaining
witness and/or victim and her abuser is the criminal defendant"); State v. Pargeon,
No. CA-3582, 1991 WL 115983, at *1-*2 (Ohio Ct. App.June 10, 1991) (ruling that
prosecution's use of expert testimony in case in chief "to prove that appellant's wife
was a battered woman suffering from battered woman syndrome" was reversible error
for two reasons: (1) the testimony served as evidence of appellant's prior bad acts
and could support the impermissible inference that the defendant has a propensity
to beat his wife, and that he therefore must have beaten her on the particular
occasion; and (2) both an Ohio Supreme Court ruling and a subsequent Ohio
statutory enactment limited admission ofbattered-woman-syndrome expert testimony
to situations in which the defendant raises the affirmative defense of self-defense);
State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165, 1170-73 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (affirming trial court's
decision to admit battered-woman-syndrome testimony to explain the victim's
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testimony, a defendant does not assert her entitlement to a
completely new defense. 169 Rather, she asserts her right to ex-
plain to the jury the effects of intimate violence and the relationship
of its effects to her self-defense claim under existing self-defense
law.
170
i. The Relationship Between the States' Rulings on Admissibility of
Battered-Woman-Syndrome Expert Testimony and their Rulings on
Admissibility of Other Types of Context Evidence
A decade ago most states had no existing body of law, apart
from the rules regarding evidence of a decedent's past violence,
which assisted the appellate courts in evaluating early claims of
reluctance to report abuses or end the abusive relationship).
169 Some trial counsel have believed, incorrectly, that the issue of the admissibility
of battered women syndrome is the same as the question of the creation of a new
defense. See, e.g., State v. Scott, Nos. K86-09-0161, K86-09-0162, 1989 Del. Super.
LEXIS 291, at *3-*5 (July 19,1989) (finding counsel ineffective for urging guilty plea,
because of his belief in difficulty of proving the "battered woman's defense" and
failure to recognize that the correct standard of self-defense was Delaware's generally
applicable subjective test of reasonableness); State v.Jackson, 435 N.W.2d 893, 895,
897 (Neb. 1989) (affirming conviction where defendant and her counsel conceded
lack of imminent danger and "defended solely on her allegation that she suffered
from 'battered wife' syndrome"). No state has adopted a separate defense based
solely on the admission of expert testimony.
Some states have, within the framework of self-defense analysis, adopted a
separate standard for assessing the reasonableness of such a claim. See supra note
113. Those jurisdictions have been clear in their statements that the creation of a
separate standard of reasonableness is not the equivalent of the recognition of a
separate defense. See, e.g., State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 570 (Kan. 1986) ("Evidence
of the battered woman syndrome is not a defense to a murder charge. The evidence
is introduced to help the jury understand why a battered woman is psychologically
unable to leave the battering relationship and why she lives in a high anxiety of fear
from the batterer. The evidence aids the jury in determining whether her fear and
her claim of self-defense are reasonable."), opinion after retrial, 734 P.2d 1161 (Kan.
1987); see also State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988) (disapproving the
Hodges formulation of the reasonableness standard for self-defense, and agreeing that
the question is self-defense rather than a separate defense).
The overwhelming majority of the states where battered-woman-syndrome
testimony is admitted apply generally applicable standards of reasonableness in
battered women's homicide trials. See infra Table.
170 Aside from its general relevance to the defendant's state of mind, and unlike
the other types of context evidence, the purposes for admitting testimony on battered
woman syndrome do not fall neatly into two or three categories. Rather, the various
states have arrived at many different and often inconsistent rationales for its
admission. The wide range is attributable, at least in part, to the novelty of using an
expert to explain state of mind in a case not involving a mental status defense. See
infra note 174 and accompanying text; infra Table.
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error in the exclusion of battered-woman-syndrome evidence.
17 1
There were, to be sure, existing standards for the qualification of
experts, 172 but the application of those standards assisted only in
the most preliminary of inquiries. 7 3 The real question confront-
ing the courts-the extent to which an expert could explain the
battered woman syndrome and its relevance to a self-defense claim-
could not be resolved by resort to a state's jurisprudence on insanity
claims because, in most cases, the defendants claimed self-defense
and asserted no mental status defense. 174 Nor could guidance be
found in existing law on character evidence because expert
testimony was not offered to prove a defendant's reputation for
peaceable, law-abiding behavior in the past.'
75
171 See supra notes 146 & 168.
172 For comparisons of the traditional and the more modern federal rules
approaches concerning the receipt of battered-woman-syndrome testimony, see
Crocker, supra note 22, at 137-43, and Mather, supra note 28, at 575.
175 Most states that excluded battered-woman-syndrome testimony on the ground
that the field was insufficiently developed, or that the proffered expert lacked the
necessary qualifications, subsequently confronted head-on the question of whether to
permit an expert to explain to the jury the operation of the syndrome and the
syndrome's relevance to a defendant's claim of self-defense. See, e.g., State v. Koss,
551 N.E.2d 970, 972-75 (Ohio 1991) (reversing aline of cases upholding the exclusion
of battered-woman-syndrome testimony and reviewing the status of testimony
admissibility in other states).
174 Until recently, Louisiana required the assertion of a mental status defense as
a precondition to the admission of testimony on "abused or battered wife syndrome."
See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 420 So. 2d 663, 677-78 (La. 1982) (finding no error in trial
judge's refusal to allow psychiatric testimony to rebut evidence of specific intent
where defendant had not plead not guilty by reason of insanity). The rule was
changed by legislation aimed specifically at overturning the common-law require-
ment. See infra note 291. In Dyer v. Commonwealth, No. 90-SC-248-MR, 1991 Ky.
LEXIS 150, at *19-*21 (Sept. 26, 1991), the Kentucky Supreme Court appears to have
ruled that battered-woman-syndrome testimony describes a mental condition and can
be offered only by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist trained to make such
diagnoses. Although Dyer involved an appeal from a conviction for child sex abuse,
the Kentucky Supreme Court overruled Commonwealth v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387 (Ky.
1990), which held that battered-woman-syndrome testimony did not describe a mental
condition, and that an expert could be properly qualified without being a psychiatrist
or a clinical psychologist, and which in turn overruled Commonwealth v. Rose, 725
S.W.2d 588 (Ky.) (limiting the testimony of a registered nurse to a general description
of the syndrome), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 838 (1987).
175 Compare State v. Kelly, 685 P.2d 564, 567 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (concluding
that evidence of a defendant's alleged prior aggressive acts offered to rebut an
expert's testimony on battered woman syndrome is inadmissible because the rebuttal
evidence was designed to challenge a pertinent element of character, and expert
testimony, in contrast, was "offered to explain the reasonableness of [the defendant's]
apprehension of imminent danger," not her character) with People v. Ciervo, 506
N.Y.S.2d 462,464 (App. Div. 1986) (permitting the prosecution to use evidence of the
defendant's prior bad acts for the purposes of proving motive, impeaching the
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The use of experts in battered women's homicide trials has
presented a difficult conceptual problem beyond the questions
whether the subject was fit for expert testimony and whether the
proffered expert was qualified: courts are also required to decide
how to define both the central relevance of the testimony and its
permissible scope. The conceptual novelty of this problem has not
caused wide variation in the states' threshold-showing require-
ments, 176 which are similar to the analogous requirements for
admission of evidence on history of abuse and other violence.
177
The rule in some states is that a defendant may not offer otherwise
admissible expert testimony before she has established prima facie
by extrinsic evidence that she acted in self-defense and that she had
suffered a history of abuse. Furthermore, sometimes the prima-
facie case for self-defense can be made only with proof of an overt
act of aggression by the decedent.178 In other states, the condi-
tion precedent is the introduction by the defendant of "some
evidence" of self-defense and of a history of abuse.1 79 In the
remainder of the states, the testimony has been admitted on a claim
of self-defense, in the context of evidence of a history of abuse,
without discussion of any requirement of a specified quantum of
evidence in support of the claim.
180
ii. Variations in Rulings Regarding Central Purpose, Relevance, and
Scope of Battered-Woman-Syndrome Testimony
Even more than in their admissibility rulings, states vary in their
approaches to the issue of the purpose, relevance, and scope of
expert testimony once it is admitted at all. Minnesota, for example,
permits only generic testimony to explain the phenomenon of
battered woman syndrome and, therefore, exhibits the most
defendant's credibility, and refuting the defendant's claim to be "a victim of 'battered
woman's syndrome'").
176 In cases involving battered women, after the court has determined that the
subject is fit for expert testimony, and that the expert is qualified, the threshold-
showing question is what evidence must the defendant adduce as a condition
precedent to the expert's testimony.
177 For a discussion of the threshold requirements for history of abuse and history
other violence, see supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text. For a listing of
threshold-showing requirements for lay and expert testimony on social context, see
infra Table.
178 See infra Table.
179 See infra Table.
180 See infra Table.
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extreme policy of the admitting jurisdictions by limiting expert
testimony to a general description only, without reference to the
specific defendant on trial. 18 ' A few opinions appear to permit
a battered-woman-syndrome expert to offer an opinion on the
ultimate question whether, in fact, the battered woman defendant's
act was reasonable. 8 2 Between the extremes are a variety of
conclusions about relevance and scope.'
83
181 The Minnesota Supreme Court has limited the scope of expert testimony to
a description of the syndrome and its characteristics and has specifically precluded
testimony that a particular defendant actually experiences the syndrome. See State
v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 1989).
In Wisconsin, limitation to a general description was upheld in a ruling limited
to the facts of the case on appeal. See State v. Landis, No. 86-0892-CR, at *4-*5 (Wis.
Ct. App. Mar. 11, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (affirming the trial court's
decision to limit expert testimony to general characteristics of battered women, but
refusing to admit specific testimony as to whether defendant fell into that category
since the expert had limited contact with the defendant, had not diagnosed her, and
had not been present when the defendant testified at trial).
Kentucky's generic-testimony limitation, defined in Commonwealth v. Rose, 725
S.W.2d 588 (Ky.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 838 (1987), was overturned by Commonwealth
v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1990). The decision in Craig was overruled in Dyer v.
Commonwealth, No. 90-SC-248-MR, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 150, at *19-*21 (Sept. 26,1991),
but the generic-testimony limitation was not reinstated.
182 See, e.g., State v. Wilkins, 407 S.E.2d 670, 672-73 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991)
(reversing on ground that trial court erred when it disallowed battered-woman-
syndrome expert's "ultimate opinion" regarding defendant's actual belief, but no
discussion of propriety of an expert opinion on the reasonableness of that belief).
Compare Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (Ga. 1981) (holding that expert opinion
testimony on issues to be decided by the jury, including the ultimate issue, is
admissible when the conclusion is beyond the ken of the average person) with Pugh
v. State, 401 S.E.2d 270, 272 (Ga. 1991) (finding no error in trial court's refusal to
allow a battered-woman-syndrome expert to answer the ultimate question whether
defendant shot her husband in self-defense, because it was not a question outside the
ken of the averagejuror according to the test of Smith) and Mullis v. State, 282 S.E.2d
334, 337 (Ga. 1981) (finding no error in exclusion of battered-woman-syndrome
testimony on the ultimate question of the reasonableness of the fears of the
defendant, which could be comprehended by the average juror and therefore does
not meet the test articulated in Smith).
Other states place specific limits on expert testimony in order to prevent
presentation of opinions on the ultimate issue. See, e.g., People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr.
167, 180 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating that an expert's opinion about a defendant's mental
state is admissible as long as the expert does not express an opinion on the ultimate
issue of whether the defendant had the mental state required for the charged
offense); State v. McClain, 591 A.2d 652, 657 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 1991) (holding
that expert testimony is relevant only to the honesty of defendant's belief, not its
objective reasonableness).
183 Some decisions regarding relevance and scope, like states' rulings on the
ultimate-opinion question, reflect courts' resort to existing evidentiary law on
analogous questions. For instance, in jurisdictions that permit bolstering of the
testimony of ordinary witnesses, a syndrome expert's testimony is received specifically
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There are only two apparent correlations between a state's
conclusions about the purpose of expert testimony and its defini-
tions of the standard of reasonableness and of the temporal
proximity of danger. First, states that define the harm threatened
as imminent are more likely than those requiring immediacy to
receive expert testimony on the theory that it is relevant to the
jury's assessment of the reasonableness of the defendant's judgment
about the proximity of the harm threatened. 184 The second
apparent correlation is in the area ofjury instructions. Jurisdictions
that include a subjective inquiry in the reasonableness standard are
slightly more likely than objective ones to require a special instruc-
tion on the significance of battered-woman-syndrome testimony or
to include specific reference to the testimony in the jury charge on
the reasonableness standard.
185
to bolster a defendant's testimony. See, e.g., State v. Frost, 577 A.2d 1282, 1287 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (noting that expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome is admissible to bolster a woman's credibility, both as a criminal defendant
and as a complaining victim of assault). See generally Estrich, supra note 103, at 1435
(stating that, at a minimum, evidence of battered woman syndrome is relevant to the
woman's credibility as a witness to overcome juror incredulity of her story); Mather,
supra note 28, at 577 (noting admission of expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome by some courts for the specific purpose of bolstering the woman's position
and giving her credibility). In those jurisdictions which prohibit bolstering, courts
deny either a general proffer of an expert or a proffered line of questions to the
expert aimed at bolstering. See, e.g., State v. Dannels, 734 P.2d 188, 193 (Mont. 1987)
(holding irrelevant and inadmissible expert testimony proffered to buttress the
credibility of the defendant's explanation for lying to investigators); cf In re Nicole
V., 518 N.E.2d 914, 917 (N.Y. 1988) (noting the exceptional circumstances of child
abuse cases for purposes of admitting bolstering testimony). For the range of
definitions of scope and relevance, see infra Table.
184 Because states with a combined standard of reasonableness are more likely to
have imminence than immediacy as the definition of temporal proximity of danger,
the likelihood of the receipt of expert testimony for this purpose is greater in
combination than in objectivejurisdictions. Seesupra notes 126-28 and accompanying
text; infra Table.
i5 Although the specific question of jury instructions on this aspect of expert
testimony was not before the court, a concurringjustice in Commonwealth v. Dillon,
No. 123, 1991 Pa. LEXIS 234 (Oct 31, 1991), explained the relationship of the expert
testimony to the jurors' evaluation of reasonableness:
The danger of not presenting expert testimony in these cases is that the
jury may well be predisposed to judge the actions and reactions of a woman
in a position that they cannot hope to comprehend. In my view, many
jurors who know nothing about battered women simply find the tales of
abuse too incredible to believe and thus, refuse to keep an open mind about
the rest of the evidence, being convinced that "no one would have put up
with such abuse therefore it must not be true." The testimony of the expert
is intended to refute some of the common prejudices against battered
women, thus permitting the jury to have a better ability to judge the
1991]
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C. Alternative Explanations of Fair-Trial Problems
Encountered by Battered Women Defendants
To say that battered women are convicted, neither because they
typically kill during a lull in the violence, nor because their self-
defense claims are excluded as a matter of definition from tradition-
al doctrine, is not to say that there are no impediments to fair trials
in their homicide cases. A conclusion that legal definitions can
accommodate their claims does not mean that, in fact, their cases
are fairly tried. There is preliminary support for a conclusion that
the getting-to-the-jury problems encountered by these defendants
result generally from the application rather than from the structure
and content of existing self-defense jurisprudence.
1. Comparison of Reversal Rates in Battered Women's Appeals
with Those in Other Homicide and Felony Appeals
Of the base category of cases, 59% of the appeals resulted in
affirmance of the conviction, 40% resulted in reversals, and 1% of
the base were categorized as "other" than affirmances or rever-
sals.1 8 6  A 40% reversal rate18 7 is substantially higher than the
evidence rationally, rather than judge it on the basis of an erroneous
prejudice. Once the jury is educated by an expert about the battered
woman syndrome, they are in a much better position to assess the facts
before them.
This Court has consistently held that in self-defense cases, thejury must
decide whether the acts of the defendant are reasonable in light of the way
in which the defendant perceives the alleged danger. It is only when the jury
understands how the defendant perceives the alleged danger are they able
to make a rational judgment about the defendant's actions. In a self-
defense case in which the defendant is a battered woman, rationally
understanding the way in which she perceives danger may not be "within
the range of ordinary training, knowledge, intelligence and experience" of
the jury.
What may seem to be "reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm" to a
person who is not subject to abuse may not correspond with the reasonable
fear of someone who has been living with an abusive husband.
Id. at *23-*26 (Cappy, J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted).
186 The terms "affirm" and "reverse" in this part of the Article are used to
describe the ultimate disposition of the conviction. If a high court reversed an
intermediate appellate court's reversal of a conviction, for instance, the decision is
categorized as "affirmed" because the effect of the decision was to uphold the
conviction. This Article defines as "reversals" only those cases in which appellants
were discharged or granted new trials. Cases in which appellate relief was limited to
reversal of one count with affirmance of another or to sentence reduction only were
included as affirmances. "Other dispositions" consisted of, for example, prosecution
appeals after acquittals. See supra note 57.
187 The 40% reversal rate represents all of the cases analyzed, including
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national average for homicide appeals. A recent study published by
the National Center for State Courts concluded that only 8.5% of
appeals result in discharge or the order of a new trial. 88 In that
study, Chapper and Hanson found that the rates for disposition of
homicide appeals were similar to those for appeals from other
felony convictions.18 9 They studied primarily intermediate courts
(which make the final determination in most criminal appeals) and
found that 79.4% of appeals resulted in affirmance of the convic-
tions, 8.5% in reversals requiring dismissal of the charges or a
remand for a new trial (1.9% in dismissal, 6.6% in an order for a
new trial), 7.3% in sentence reduction or remands for resentencing,
and 4.8% in reversal of some but not all counts on appeal. 190 The
most frequent issues raised on appeals were rulings on admissibility
of evidence (43%), sufficiency of the evidence (35%), and appropri-
ateness of jury instructions (30%).191 Although those bases for
reversal were also the most frequent ones raised in battered
women's appeals,19 2 battered-women appellants' success rate was
dramatically higher than that found in the Chapper and Hanson
study.
1 9 3
confrontation, nonconfrontation, and those with too few facts to categorize. In the
confrontation category, 52% of the convictions were affirmed, 47% were reversed,
and 1% were otherwise resolved. Of the nonconfrontation convictions, 86% were
affirmed, 12% were reversed, and 1% were other dispositions. See Affirmance and
Reversal Rates (computer manuscript on file with the author) described infra
Appendix II.F; infra note 193.
188 SeeJoY A. CHAPPER & ROGER A. HANSON, NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
UNDERSTANDING REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CRIMINAL APPEALS: FINAL REPORT 38 (1990).
189 See id. at 37.
190 See id. at 35. My analysis included both intermediate and high courts, and the
40% reversal rate reflects results in both. The reversal rate was 42% in the high
courts and 38% in intermediate courts. See Affirmance and Reversal Rates, supra note
187.
191 See CHAPPER & HANSON, supra note 188, at 32.
192 Of the reversals in the battered women's appeals, only 16% were based on the
trial court's exclusion or limitation of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome.
Other evidentiary errors served as the basis for 32% of the reversals. Reversals on
sufficiency-of-evidence grounds represented 10%, while reversals on the basis of
errors in jury instructions accounted for 41%. See Error Coding (computer
manuscript on file with the author). The Error Coding computer program combines
the results of an opinion-by-opinion analysis with data produced by the information
management program described in Appendices I and II.
193 In the nonconfrontation category, the rates of affirmance (86%) and reversal
(12%) conform much more closely to the findings of Chapper and Hanson's study
than do those in the confrontation category. The much lower reversal rate for
nonconfrontation than for confrontation cases lends support to the argument that in
nonconfrontation cases fair trial problems result from legal definitions more than
1991)
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It may be that the higher reversal rate for battered women is an
indication that trial judges are refusing to apply long-standing
principles of substantive, evidentiary, and procedural law to
battered women's claims of self-defense and that their refusal
accounts for the greater success rate on appeal in these cases.
194
Anecdotal evidence from appellate cases studied supports the
preliminary hypothesis that many trial courts do not see battered
women's cases as appropriate for the application of traditional self-
defense jurisprudence and that appellate courts reverse because of
their failure to apply existing law.
195
2. Appellate Court Discussions
The appellate opinions that reversed convictions on the basis of
"ordinary" errors, 196 those aside from exclusion or limitation of
expert testimony, did so because trial courts failed to apply to
battered women's cases established precedents that had been
developed in cases involving male appellants. In some instances,
the appellate opinions discussed the fact that trial judges seemed to
assume that a battered woman defendant acted in conformity with
from erroneous judicial applications of standards. Currently proposed redefinitions,
however, are not likely to have the effect of increasing the possibility of fair trials for
battered women defendants, whether "fair trials" are equated with getting to thejury
or with good outcomes. See infra text accompanying notes 238, 246 & 294-95.
194 On the other hand, it may be that the disparity does not reflect a higher rate
of trial errors in battered women's cases than in other homicides and serious felonies;
it may instead indicate a higher level of attention to those errors. There are at least
three possible explanations for a higher reversal rate that are consistent with the
assumption that there is no higher rate of trial-level error in battered women's cases
than in other trials. First, trial lawyers may pay more attention in these cases and
make better records. Second, appellate lawyers may pay more attention and frame
the issues more clearly. Finally, it may be that appellate judges are more interested
in battered women's appeals, see them as presenting novel questions, and therefore
pay more attention to "ordinary" errors. The first two possible explanations, both
involving the hypothesis that battered women get better trial and appellate
representation than other defendants and appellants, seem unlikely. In the cases
analyzed, 25% of the opinions affirming convictions involved discussion of trial and
appellate counsel's waiver of issues through failure to preserve them for or pursue
them on appeal. See Waiver (computer manuscript on file with author) described
infra Appendix II.G. This is an area for further examination along the lines suggested
infra note 195.
195 A systematic evaluation of the significance of the higher reversal rate, which
is beyond the scope of this Article, would be based on a study of selectedjurisdictions
over a fixed period of time and would compare the reasons for reversal in appeals
from battered women's homicide convictions with those from other convictions for
homicide.
196 See supra text accompanying notes 191-92.
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a vigilante stereotype rather than as an arguably reasonable person.
An illustrative description of trial courts' refusal or inability to
perceive the applicability of existing standards occurs in State v.
Branchal,197 where the trial judge refused to instruct on self-
defense and excluded history-of-abuse evidence, commenting "that
it did not want to condone spousal retaliation for past vio-
lence.""' A specific instruction on vigilantism concerns was
given by a trial judge in Washington: "A killing is notjustified when
made for the purpose of avenging insults, abuse or a previous
assault which has ended ... .""' An older example is People v.
Giacalone,200 where the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the
trial court's direction of a guilty verdict and, apparently in response
the lower court's assessment of the evidence, noted that despite
evidence of a long history of abuse, "the record does not show that
she was revengeful .... Tears and sorrow seem to have been her
portion."
20 1
Most opinions did not set forth, either directly or implicitly, the
comments accompanying the trial-level rulings. The reversing
opinions typically are limited to recitals of the clear and long-
standing precedents, ignored by the trial judges, on definitions of
197 684 P.2d 1163 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
195 Id. at 1167-68. The appellate court noted that the rule providing for admission
of such evidence was almost a century old: "'If there is even slight evidence to
indicate that the act of killing was done under a present, reasonable apprehension to
himself of great bodily harm, prior threats should not be excluded.'" Id. at 1168
(quoting Thomason v. Territory, 13 P. 223, 226 (N.M. 1887)). The opinion contains
the following summary of the excluded evidence:
Th[e offer of proof by defense counsel] included incidents when the victim
hit defendant with a board; broke out the windows in defendant's mother's
house and threatened defendant with a knife; threw defendant's daughter
into a pigpen with a grown pig; forced defendant to eat at gunpoint; shot
at her with a high-powered rifle; and forced defendant to touch a dead
rattlesnake by menacing her with a knife and a gun. The tendered
evidence also included one instance when the defendant called the police
for assistance but was told that nothing could be done and that the family
must resolve their problems on their own. Other tendered evidence would
have shown that the victim had a reputation for violence, particularly toward
old people. Through a state police officer defendant would have shown that
on one occasion the victim terrorized, beat, and robbed an elderly couple.
Id. at 1167.
199 State v. Crigler, 598 P.2d 739, 741 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). The instruction in
Crigler constituted reversible error because it misstated both the state's "imminence"
definition and the significance of history-of-abuse evidence.
200 217 N.W. 758 (Mich. 1928).
201 Id. at 760.
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duty to retreat, 20 2 temporal proximity of danger,20 3 proportion-
ality of force, 20 4 and of standards for admission of history-of-
abuse evidence, 20 5 and for instructions on history of abuse.
206
The trial courts' refusals to apply established legal principles are
202 See, e.g., Watkins v. State, 197 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
(relying on a 1929 precedent for entitlement to an instruction on the privilege of
nonnecessity of retreat), overruled by Conner v. State, 361 So. 2d 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1979); People v. Lenkevich, 229 N.W.2d
298, 300 (Mich. 1975) (relying on a 1961 ruling that cited an 1860 case exempting
people attacked at home from the duty to retreat); Commonwealth v. Fraser, 85 A.2d
126, 128 (Pa. 1952) (stating that the privilege of nonretreat when attacked by an
intruder "has always been recognized as the law of this State" and should have been
applied to a defendant who had separated from the decedent and obtained her own
apartment; the privilege was not defeated by the lower court's view that the decedent
"'was defendant's lawful husband, and as such he was entitled to return to his wife's
apartment'" (quoting lower court opinion)); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (Wash.
1984) (en banc) (citing a 1936 precedent as support for the conclusion that the trial
court erred in refusing to instruct thejury that the defendant had no duty to retreat).
203 See infra text accompanying notes 245-50; see also Crigler, 598 P.2d at 741
(concluding that an additional reversible error was the trial court's use of "immedi-
ate" rather than "imminent" in its instruction). The Crigler court relied on the
holding of State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (en banc), see Crigler, 598
P.2d at 741, which in turn had relied on precedents dating back to 1902 for guidance
in framing the jury instructions.
204 See, e.g., People v. Reeves, 362 N.E.2d 9, 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (noting "firmly
established rule that the aggressor need not have a weapon to justify one's use of
deadly force in self-defense"); Bennett v. State, 188 A.2d 142, 144 (Md. 1963) (citing
precedents dating from 1894 for proposition that anticipatory arming does not
deprive a defendant of the right to claim self-defense).
205 See, e.g., People v. Yokum, 302 P.2d 406, 416 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (stating
that exclusion of history-of-abuse evidence violated a rule "'conclusively established
in almost all jurisdictions,'" including California (quotingAnnotation, Admissibility of
Evidence as to Other's Character or Reputation for Turbulence on Question of Self-Defense
by One Charged with Assault or Homicide, 64 A.L.R. 1029, 1030 (1930))); Borders v.
State, 433 So. 2d 1325, 1326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (relying on precedents dating
back to 1891); State v. Edwards, 420 So. 2d 663, 671 (La. 1982) (finding that
precedent with respect to previous threats was established in 1909); State v.
McMillian, 64 So. 2d 856, 857 (La. 1953) (holding that the exclusion of history-of-
abuse evidence was error, as "text writers throughout the country recognize that
evidence of prior difficulties between the accused and the deceased is admissible and
relevant" for the purpose of showing "the reasonableness of defendants fear ... at
the time of the homicide"); People v. Stallworth, 111 N.W.2d 742, 746 (Mich. 1961)
(finding that the defendant should have been permitted to introduce testimony
pertaining to the decedent's reputation for violence as "[sluch testimony is generally
held admissible in homicide cases").
206 See, e.g., People v. Bush, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430, 436 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding
erroneous the trial court's refusal of an instruction on the significance of prior threats
and noting that the rule requiring history-of-abuse instruction had been announced
in 1949); State v. Temples, 327 S.E.2d 266,267 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that
offering evidence of decedent's general good character, for purpose of rebutting
history-of-abuse testimony, violated precedent established in 1942).
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consistent with the hypothesis that the problem in these cases is the
inability of many judges to see battered women's use of deadly force
as reasonable under established definitions.
20 7
' D. Summary of Analysis of Opinions
Impediments to getting to the jury result from the law's
definitions in only a minority of jurisdictions. Where they exist,
these definitional impediments operate, not in a vacuum, but in
conjunction with other substantive, evidentiary, and procedural
provisions. Any attempt at redefinition must take those interrela-
tionships into account.2 0 8 In the majority of jurisdictions, it is not
the definition of self-defense jurisprudence that prevents battered
women from receiving fair trials. Rather, the failure of trial judges
to apply the generally applicable standards of self-defense jurispru-
dence in cases where the defendants are battered women is to
blame. Problems that result from a refusal to apply the law will not
be remedied by either current proposals for legal redefinition or by
the creation of separate standards.
20 9
II. WHERE LEGAL DEFINITIONS CAUSE DEPRIVATION OF FAIR-
TRIAL RIGHTS, REFORM EFFORTS SHOULD BE AIMED AT
GENERALLY APPLICABLE DEFINITIONS
A first step before undertaking reform in any jurisdiction is
deciding whether fair-trial problems are the result of definitions or
of judicial applications of existing standards. Most problems
resulting from judicial reluctance to apply existing appropriately
207 The same belief, that traditional self-defense doctrine does not encompass the
reasonableness claims of battered women who kill, is reflected by one trial judge's
explanation of jury verdicts of not guilty in these cases:
Juries have always had the power, though not the right, to nullify the law,
to ignore the self-defense requirement of immediacy, for example, and the
defendant's lack of options. Now I see an upsurge in this nullification
process, with some judges going along .... There is a direct correlation
between the use ofself-defense and the sense that law-enforcement agencies
are not doing their jobs. Juries seem to be saying that if I were a battered
woman ... I would have killed him.
Margot Slade,Justice is Stretched to Allow Wider Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1988,
at B5 (quoting Brooklyn Supreme Court justice James B. Starkey).
208 From this perspective, I will offer specific criticism of proposed redefinitions
of evidentiary and substantive law, particularly those aimed specifically at battered
women defendants, which are especially susceptible to narrow application by trial
judges. See infra text accompanying notes 227-38 & 257-78.
09 See infra notes 227-37 and accompanying text.
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defined doctrine will not be remedied by redefinition. In the
minority of jurisdictions where the structure and content of self-
defense doctrine are defined in a way that prevents fair trials,
reformers should assess which definitions, alone or in combination
with other factors, are the impediments. The analysis must include
systematic evaluation of substantive law, evidentiary provisions, and
procedural rules, as well as the effects of change in one area upon
the operation of definitions in other areas.
2 10
The impediments to getting to the jury that result from the
definition and structure of substantive, evidentiary, and procedural
law limit a defendant's ability to have the jury receive evidence and
instructions regarding the social context of her action. Definitions
in need of change exist in each of these three areas. Current
reform efforts address only two of them. Most currently proposed
and recently accomplished substantive and evidentiary changes
aimed at guaranteeing the fair-trial rights of battered women share
a common failure of their proponents to recognize the interrelation
of existing definitional impediments.
Within the area of substantive-law proposals, most of the
suggested redefinitions deal with creation of a new or separate
standard of reasonableness. In the area of evidentiary changes,
most of the suggested redefinitions do not, by their terms, provide
separate standards for battered women defendants. 21 ' In this
Part of the Article, I will make suggestions for change in both
substantive and evidentiary definitions. To put these suggestions in
context, I will begin with a discussion of procedural rules that
current reformers ignore.
210 1 propose that the methodology of such an evaluation of a state's self-defense
jurisprudence be that utilized in this Article. See supra notes 105-85 and accompany-
ing text. Among the factors to be considered are those summarized for each state in
the Table.
211 Many of these changes, discussed infra text accompanying notes 257-84,
provide special evidentiary standards for defendants accused of homicides that occur
in the context of family violence and refer to "battered person syndrome." Another
proposed evidentiary rule change, Act of Oct. 10, 1991, 1991 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv.
812 (Deering) (to be codified at CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107) [hereinafter Cal. Act], was
introduced to add a provision to the evidence code. It uses the term "battered
woman syndrome," but is specifically applicable to male defendants also.
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A. Procedural Rules
Current scholarship addresses the content of self-defense
instructions and the admission of evidence on the question of
whether the battered woman acted in self-defense, but generally
ignores the threshold question of whether the defendant is entitled
to an instruction at all on self-defense. 212 A jurisdiction's defini-
tion of the evidentiary showing that is a precondition to entitlement
to the instruction is the single most important determinant of a
defendant's ability to get an instruction on self-defense. The
content of a self-defense instruction is only relevant if the rules do
not block a defendant from receiving one, and the significance of
evidence of a defendant's social context is clear to jurors only when
a judge tells them to consider its significance to her claim of self-
defense. The definition and application of the rules that govern a
judge's decision on whether to allow the jury to consider self-
defense illustrates the enormous power of trial judges to make
outcome-determinative decisions in cases involving battered women
defendants. Substantive and evidentiary law proposals must be
analyzed in the context of the operation of this definitional
requirement.
The most basic of the get-to-the-jury inquiries is this: what
criteria must a defendant satisfy before the judge will instruct her
jury to consider whether she acted in self-defense? The inquiry has
four parts. 213  The first, called the quantum of evidence in this
Article, defines the amount of evidence on the self-defense claim
the defendant must offer and have admitted. The conclusions
reached in various jurisdictions range from (a) "slight" or "any,"
through (b) enough to raise the (even insubstantial) possibility of a
reasonable doubt, to (c) "appreciable" or "substantial." The second
definition involves the source of the evidence, whether it may come
from any witness (including evidence developed during direct and
cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses), or whether it
must be offered through a witness or witnesses called by the
defense. The third inquiry is the scope-or the required extent-of
the evidence: does the defendant get a self-defense instruction if
212 Exceptions are EWING, supra note 22, at 90 (discussing one aspect of this
question), and Mahoney, supra note 87.
213 For a description drawn from battered women's appeals of the standards set
in each of the four parts in the various jurisdictions, and of their correlations with the
jurisdictions' definitions of reasonableness and temporal proximity of danger, see
infra Table.
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she produces evidence of any element of the claim, 214 or must she
satisfy the trial judge that she has produced evidence (at the
required quantum, from the required source) on each element of
the self-defense claim? The final inquiry, called the quality of the
evidence in this Article, is whether the trial judge, whatever the
quantum of evidence required and whatever its required source and
scope, exercises his or her own determination about the credibility
of the evidence of self-defense.
2 15
A rule whose definition of the last part of the test includes the
judge's duty to evaluate credibility puts defendants most at risk of
judicial misapplication of substantive and evidentiary standards,
regardless of the standards' definitions. A judge vested with the
power to make credibility determinations on the sufficiency of
defense evidence essentially has license to direct a verdict against a
defendant.
216
214 In jurisdictions where the defendant need adduce evidence on only one or
some of the elements, thejudge instructs thejury on the legal requirements of all of
the elements, and the jury decides whether they have been satisfied. See infra note
224 & Table. Compare State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811,818 (N.D. 1983) (reversing
conviction in sleeping-man case because self-defense instruction contained incorrect
reasonableness standard, and assuming without discussing defendant's entitlement to
a self-defense instruction despite lack of evidence on imminence) with State v.
Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988) (holding that defendant in a sleeping-man
case who failed to establish imminence was not entitled to an instruction on self-
defense).
215 For the relationships between a state's choices in each of the four parts and
its definitions of the reasonableness standard and of the temporal proximity of
danger, see infra Table. The highest-requirement states are usually, but not always,
those with both an objective test and an immediacy requirement. See infra Table.
216 The Alaska Court of Appeals analyzed the constitutional significance of the
procedural rules governing standards for getting to the jury in the context of a case
in which a defendant had killed his abusive brother:
[T]he role played by the trial court in deciding whether a self-defense
instruction is called for must be a limited one. The court must be mindful
of the need to refrain from adjudicating factual issues that fall within the
jury's domain. Application of too severe a standard in determining whether
"some evidence" of self-defense has been presented will inevitably place the
court in jeopardy of encroaching on the prerogative of the jury and, to that
extent, impinging on the right of the accused to ajury trial .... Thus, in
determining whether "some evidence" of self-defense has been presented,
the court is not called upon to determine the credibility or strength of the
evidence or the weight to be given to testimony.
Paul v. State, 655 P.2d 772, 775-76 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). The court further stated:
Where there is evidentiary support for special facts sustaining a rational
defensive theory, to which the court's attention is specifically directed, the
defendant is entitled to have the jury charged on that theory. However
weak the evidence, however implausible the theory may appear to be, the
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The appellate opinions resolving battered women's complaints
on appeal that no self defense instruction was given demonstrate
the critical importance of the definition of this standard. Although
courts in various jurisdictions reversed trial judges' resolutions of
each of the other inquiries, no trial-level ruling denying a self-
defense instruction was reversed in any jurisdiction that permitted
credibility determinations. 217  A different result was reached in
jurisdictions where the rules limited the judge's credibility-determin-
ing role, even where high standards were used in other parts of the
test.2
18
In a proper formulation of the showing-necessary requirement
the required quantum of evidence is "any" or "slight."219 The
evidence may come from any source, whether introduced during the
prosecution's case on direct or cross-examination or during the
defendant's case.220 The defendant does not have the burden of
satisfying the judge that she has produced the requisite evidence on
each element of the defense; 221 rather, the jury is instructed on
matter is for the jury's determination.
Id. at 776 n.5 (citing Wilson v. State, 473 P.2d 633,638 n.2 (Alaska 1970) (Rabinowitz,
J., dissenting) (quoting Brooke v. United States, 385 F.2d 279, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
217 The likely explanation is that each of the other requirements is susceptible to
review and, where necessary, quantification on the basis of an appellate record.
Credibility judgments are more difficult to review and are generally subject to an
abuse-of-discretion analysis. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding that the determination of the sufficiency of the credible evidence
submitted in support of the self-defense justification is for the trial court), later
proceeding, 712 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming denial of post-conviction
relief). But see State v. Landis, No. 86-0892-CR, at *4-*5 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 11,
1987) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file) (stating that because it is the trial judge's duty
to decide "if there are sufficient credible facts" as a matter of law no deference was
owed the trial court's conclusion that there were insufficient credible facts tojustify
submitting the question of self-defense to the jury, but upholding the trial court's
conclusion after the appeals court conducted a separate review of the facts).
218 For examples of reversals for failure to instruct on self-defense from
jurisdictions with high requirements in the first three parts of the test but with no
defined judicial duty to assess credibility, see People v. Giacalone, 217 N.W. 758,759-
60 (Mich. 1928) (reversing conviction despite rule requiring evidence from the
defendant on each element of the claim, including proof of an overt act of aggression
by the decedent); State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268, 1270 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)
(reversing conviction despite standard requiring sufficient evidence from the
defendant to raise a reasonable doubt on each element of the self-defense claim);
State v. Branchal, 684 P.2d 1163, 1165 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (same).
219 For examples of states with this formulation, see infra Table.
220 See infra Table.
221 This question is analytically distinct from that of the constitutionality of
imposing the burden of proof on self-defense on a defendant, which was resolved in
Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (finding such an imposition constitutional).
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the jurisdiction's definition of each element and on its obligation to
determine whether the defendant's evidence satisfies it.222 Final-
ly, the judge makes no credibility determination regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence.
225
B. Substantive-Law Definitions
1. Choice of Standard of Reasonableness
No current legislative proposal suggests a separate standard of
reasonableness for battered women, though it is the subject of
scholarly argument. 224 The high courts of Kansas and Wiscon-
Difficult as that burden is for any defendant, particularly a battered woman, to meet,
see Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 948, 950 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari), it is not clearly a greater impediment to a fair trial than a procedural rule
that operates to deny a battered woman any instruction on the question. Ohio, for
instance, where the burden of proof is on a defendant who claims self-defense, has
a low necessary-showing requirement for an instruction on self-defense and relatively
few appeals complaining that no self-defense instruction was given. One scholar
explicitly contemplates that the defendant will have the burden of proof on
"psychological self-defense." See EWING, supra note 22, at 90-91. Another would, in
some battered women's trials, impose such a burden on the question of her failure
to leave the relationship. See Schulhofer, supra note 25, at 117-21.
222 For a rules approach to this question, see Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S.
58, 62-64 (1988) (holding that a defendant is entitled to instructions on entrapment
despite his failure to admit all elements of the crime, and summarizing federal and
state precedents involvingjury instructions on inconsistent defenses). See also People
v. Everette, 565 N.E.2d 1295, 1298-99 (Ill. 1991) (holding that a homicide defendant
is entitled to instructions on both accident and self-defense, even when evidence for
one is "'very slight'" (quoting People v. Brachter, 349 N.E.2d 31, 34 (Ill. 1976)
(quoting People v. Khamis, 103 N.E.2d 133, 136 (Ill. 1951) and People v. Kalpak, 140
N.E.2d 726, 728 (Ill. 1957)))). But see Commonwealth v. McFadden, 587 A.2d 740,
744 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that defendant claiming accident as well as self-
defense was entitled to self-defense charge when there was evidence in support of all
elements of self-defense and her testimony did not negate any element).
223 See, e.g., Paul v. State, 655 P.2d 772, 775-76 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (describing
the role of the court in deciding whether a self-defense instruction is proper).
224 Some legislative proposals appear to set a separate standard, but in fact apply
to evidentiary rather than to substantive-law provisions. A recent example is
Pennsylvania's House Bill 1295 that would amend the criminal code to provide for
a "Battered Person's Defense." See Pa. H. 1295, 175th Gen. Assembly., 1991 Sess.
(amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 505.1(b) (1991)). The provisions of the proposed
amendment in fact relate to the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the
"battered person syndrome." See id. § 505.1(b).
The intermediate appellate court of Missouri, however, has interpreted legislation
providing for the admission of such testimony as creating a separate standard for
battered women defendants. See State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308, 312-13 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990). Another court suggests that legislative efforts are necessary to reform
the definition of reasonableness in jurisdictions where the statutory definition is
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sin,225 as well as the intermediate appellate court of
Missouri,226 have recognized a "reasonable battered woman" or
a "reasonably prudent battered woman" standard. The operation of
a purportedly separate standard in these jurisdictions illustrates the
lack of theoretical coherence and practical utility of the scholars'
proposals.
a. Criticism of Scholarly Proposals for a Separate Standard for Battered
Women
Scholars who address the question of standards in the context
of battered women's homicide trials do not answer the fundamental
question posed by Professor Schneider: how to resolve the tension
between group and individual standpoint in the context of a
criminal trial, whose purpose is the assessment of individual
culpability.227 If there is a separate standard of reasonableness,
to what degree does the definition of the group require conformity
to the definition by the individual defendant on trial?2
28 Profes-
sor Kinports specifically contemplates a factual model that seems
objective. See People v. Furber, 43 Cal. Rptr. 771, 776 (Ct. App. 1965) (reversing a
conviction on other grounds; noting that where evidence at trial showed a history of
past abuse of the defendant at the hands of her husband, but an equivocal
confrontation between them at the time of the incident, there was no error in denial
of self-defense instruction under existing objective standard of reasonableness, and
propsals for change should be addressed to the legislature).
25 Of those two, only the Kansas Supreme Court has squarely announced a
separate standard for battered women who claim self-defense. See, e.g., State v.
Stewart, 763 P.2d 572,579 (Kan. 1988) (reviewing the development of the standard).
The standard reviewed in Stewart incorporated both subjective and objective
components, first using "a subjective standard to determine whether the defendant
sincerely and honestly believed it necessary to kill in order to defend... [and] then
[using] an objective standard to determine whether defendant's belief was reason-
able." Id. Specifically, "in cases involving battered spouses .... [the objective test
would be] 'how a reasonably prudent battered wife would perceive [the aggressor's]
demeanor.'" Id. (quoting State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 479 (Kan. 1985)).
Wisconsin's separate standard was announced in a slightly different context. See
State v. Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161, 172 (Wis. 1983) (applying a separate standard to the
evaluation of the reasonableness of a defendant's claim that the decedent provoked
the homicide and that her conviction should be for the lesser offense of manslaugh-
ter). For a discussion of the current status of the "reasonably prudent battered
woman" standard in Pennsylvania, see supra note 111.
226 See supra notes 111 & 224.
227 See Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 79, at 217-18. Crocker does
address the challenge. See Crocker, supra note 22, at 131-32.
228 Kinports suggests that the jury should be invited to weigh the differences
between the case on trial and other cases involving battered women defendants. See
Kinports, supra note 22, at 452.
1991]
444 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:379
very close to a new stereotype, 229 that of the reasonable battered
woman who kills:
Where the facts differ markedly from this model, courts frequently
reject self-defense claims .... Any such differences between a
particular case and other similar cases can be brought to the jury's
attention to rebut the defendant's self-defense claim .... The
jury ... should be given the opportunity both to weigh the
differences between the case before it and other homicide cases
involving battered women and also to consider the defendant's
explanations for those differences in determining whether or not
this defendant was truly a battered woman.
230
This proposal is unconstitutional. Guilt is personal. A defendant's
due process rights forbid the prosecution's or the court's appeal to
the jury to compare the facts of her case to the facts of similar trials.
This model is also open to precisely the narrow application
observed in jurisdictions that have a reasonably prudent battered
woman standard. 231  Phyllis Crocker, although she prefers a
"reasonable woman" standard, offers one that is similarly open to
narrow application: "A better approach to battered women's self-
defense cases may be to use an objective, explicitly group-based view
of the reasonableness of the individual defendant and of battered
women generally."232
The creation of a generalized model of the battered woman, to
say nothing of the battered woman who kills, invites courts to
229 Kinports bases such a model on a set factual pattern:
[B]ecause the cases involving battered women who kill their husbands in
nonconfrontational settings tend to follow a certain pattern, the jury's task
may be simplified. Typically, the battered woman admits that she killed her
husband. Indeed, she frequently calls the police immediately after the
incident and does nothing to attempt to conceal her complicity. In
addition, the woman often does not realize she has killed her husband until
she is informed he is dead. She may not even remember the events leading
up to the killing. When she learns her husband is dead, she frequently
expresses grief and remorse, explaining that she did not intend to kill him
but only to prevent him from inflicting further abuse or from impeding her
escape.
Id. at 450-51 (citations omitted).
230 Id. at 451-52.
231 See infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
232 Crocker, supra note 22, at 152. A "group-based view of the reasonableness of
... battered women generally" invites the same stereotyping. The proposal ignores
the force of the author's earlier correct assertion that "[t]he issue in a self-defense
trial is not whether the defendant was a battered woman, but whether she justifiably
killed her husband." Id. at 149.
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prevent the fair trials of women who are not "good" battered
women. In the next Part, I will show that courts in jurisdictions
with a separate standard have readily accepted the invitation.
b. The Operation of a Separate Standard of Reasonableness
In the states which employ it, an objective standard is a
definitional impediment to good outcomes and, in combination with
other factors, to getting to the jury.2 33 Replacement of an objec-
tive standard with a separate standard for battered women does not
guarantee removal of that impediment. In jurisdictions that have
adopted a separate standard, its application, to the extent that it is
reflected in appellate opinions, often operates to establish a
definitional standard of the "reasonable battered woman who kills,"
which is difficult for many defendants to meet.
In Kansas, defendants who fail to satisfy the requirements of
that jurisdiction's "reasonably prudent battered wife" test are
measured against that state's otherwise generally applicable
objective standard of reasonableness:
233 See supra notes 105-17 and accompanying text. The objective standard's
outcome-determinative impact at trial is, obviously, analytically different from the
question whether the standard affects the statistical likelihood of success on appeal.
They may, of course, be related, and there are reasons to think that they will be
related: a state whose standard is more subjective is likely to be one in which rights
of individual defendants are particularly valued; such a state may well have appellate
determinations that are more pro-defendant.
Although this is not a necessary correlation, it does seem to occur in the choice-
of-reasonableness area. Of the convictions in confrontation cases, 80% were affirmed
in opinions where the resolution of issues raised on appeal required discussion of the
jurisdiction's choice of an objective standard, as opposed to 23% affirmances in cases
where the relevant standard discussed involved a subjective component, and 52%
affirmations in all confrontation cases. These figures apply only to cases in which the
choice of standards was discussed by the court as it resolved the issues presented on
appeal. An examination of all of the opinions (both confrontation and nonconfronta-
tion, including those hot discussing the choice of standard) arising from the objective
states leads to the finding that 87% of the convictions were affirmed and 13% were
reversed. See Affirmance and Reversal Rates, supra note 187.
Of all opinions (confrontation and nonconfrontation) in the states where the
opinions discussed the requirement that the reasonableness standard include the
individual characteristics of the defendant, 30% of the convictions were affirmed, 67%
were reversed, and 3% were otherwise disposed. These numbers contrast dramatically
with the rates for the whole base of cases (including those where choice of
reasonableness standard was not relevant to disposition of the appeal): overall, 59%
of convictions were affirmed, 40% were reversed, and 1% were otherwise disposed.
See id.
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Where the battered wife syndrome is an issue in the case, the
standard of reasonableness concerning an accused's belief in
asserting self-defense is not objective, but subjective. The jury
must determine, from the viewpoint of a defendant's mental state,
whether defendant's belief in the need to defend herself was
reasonable.
The trial court properly refused Debbie's requested instruction
because its language presumed that Debbie was in fact a battered
wife. There was conflicting evidence on this point. If the
requested instruction were given, it would have taken from the
jury the opportunity to evaluate the evidence for itself. Further,
and more to the point, the evidence presented in this case did not
support giving a subjective self-defense instruction .... Debbie
did not testify that she killedJ.R. in self-defense. Instead, the fatal
shot, according to Debbie, was accidental. Her only arguable act
of self-defense against her husband was related to the first shot.
Debbie was not charged with any crime related to the first shot
and therefore the subjective self-defense instruction had not
relevance and should not have been given.
2 34
A plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court endorsed a
"reasonably prudent battered woman" standard in 1989.235
Shortly thereafter, the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the
exclusion of battered-woman-syndrome testimony, noting that even
if a majority of the highest court were to adopt a separate standard,
the appellant before the court failed to meet it:
[T]he plurality opinion ... emphasized that expert testimony
pertaining to the battered woman syndrome was appropriate "where
uncontradicted testimony reveals that the defendant was a victim of
234 State v. Meyer, No. 59,213, at *8-*9 (Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1986) (LEXIS,
States library, Kan file). The Kansas court noted that the defendant described
responding to an ongoing attack and claimed that her first shot was in self-defense
and that her second and third shots, one of which wounded a roomer and the other
of which killed her husband, were accidental. See id. Missouri similarly limits
application of its evidentiary statute to cases in which the defendant satisfies the trial
judge that she acted in self-defense. See State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1990) (finding no error in exclusion of expert testimony because a "literal
reading of [the Battered Spouse Law] prohibits the battered spouse syndrome where
the defendant has not been able to raise the issue of self-defense") (citing Battered
Spouse Law, Mo. REV. STAT. § 563.033 (1988), amended by Mo. ANN. STAT § 563.033
(Vernon Supp. 1991)).
235 See Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 784 (Pa. 1989) (plurality
opinion). The majority opinion reversed the conviction on the ground that counsel
was ineffective for failing to request an instruction on the relevance of the history of
abuse. For a discussion of the apparent rejection of a separate standard in a later
opinion of that court, see supra note 111.
BATTERED WOMEN AND SELF-DEFENSE
such abuse." The facts of the instant case are not so compelling.
Whether appellant in the instant case was a battered woman was
sharply disputed by the Commonwealth, and the evidence was
contradictory. Appellant's testimony that she had been beaten by a
drunken husband prior to the stabbing and her general accusation that
he had beaten her repeatedly during fourteen months of marriage was
largely uncorroborated and was substantially contradicted by other
evidence.
236
Redefinitions that are specific to a particular class of defendants
are susceptible to narrow application by trial judges, and those who
see women who kill as outside standard doctrine often find a way to
exclude them from specially designed exceptions. For example, a
trial judge in Missouri made a pretrial determination, reversed on
appeal, that a defendant was not entitled to the operation of the
statute providing for admission of "battered spouse syndrome"
testimony because she was not married to the abuser.
237
Replacing the objectively reasonable man with a new stereotyped
reasonable battered woman does not work, either as a theoretical or
as a practical matter. A separate standard is not likely to guarantee
fair trials or good outcomes in either confrontation or nonconfron-
tation cases. In the latter category of cases, any reasonableness
standard with an objective prong can operate as an impediment to
fair trials. Neither the scholarly proposals nor the courts endorsing
a separate standard have moved to a completely subjective test.
Scholars propose and courts retain an objective component in the
separate test of reasonableness.
238
236 Commonwealth v. Dillon, 562 A.2d 885, 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (citations
omitted), rev'd, No. 123, 1991 Pa. LEXIS 234 (Oct. 31, 1991). For discussion of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's series of concurring opinions in the Dillon reversal,
two of which make clear that expert testimony is relevant to the generally applicable
self-defense standard, see supra note 111.
237 See State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308,312 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). The Missouri
legislature subsequently changed its definition to "battered person syndrome." See
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.033 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
238 See supra notes 229-32; infra note 241 and accompanying text. To the extent
that a model of the reasonable battered woman is a standard defendants must meet,
it is likely that both confrontation and nonconfrontation cases will involve women
who are not sufficiently in conformity with its requirements. For scholarly proposals
for the imposition of such a standard, see supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
For restrictive legislative definitions in the context of evidence codes, see infra notes
263-78 and accompanying text.
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c. The Appropriate Standard of Reasonableness
The case of Bernhard Goetz 239 has been characterized as a
"hard case for feminists" because the subjective portion of the
reasonableness standard employed at the trial is seen as having led
to the acquittal of a subway vigilante, 240 and because retaining
more of an objective test than was employed in that trial is seen as
likely to work to the disadvantage of battered women, especially
those who kill in nonconfrontational circumstances.
24 1
The Goetz standard, however, is consonant both with the
standard of reasonableness currently employed in mostjurisdictions
and with the self-defense claims raised by most battered women
defendants. The correct standard uses a combination of subjective
and objective analyses to aid the jury's determination whether the
defendant actually and honestly believed in the necessity of using
deadly force, and whether a reasonable person in the defendant's
circumstances-including her history with the decedent and her
perceptions of his dangerousness-would so believe.
242
In objective jurisdictions the necessary redefinition is not the
creation of a separate standard for battered women. It is the
creation of a generally applicable standard which incorporates a
subjective reasonableness analysis. Including a subjective inquiry in
the reasonableness analysis has an impact on more than the content
of the self-defense instruction. It influences the content of related
instructions on evidence of history of abuse and history of other
violence. It has an effect also on the permissible scope of battered-
woman-syndrome testimony.
243
239 See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
240 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND
THE LAW ON TRIAL 39-62 (1988) (discussing the history and development of the
reasonableness standard).
241 See Shirley Sagawa, Comment, A Hard Case for Feminists: People v. Goetz, 10
HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 253, 263-67 (1987). Sagawa's arguments demonstrate the
unlikelihood of widespread support for a completely subjective standard, despite a
sense that nonconfrontation defendants are unjustly convicted under a standard with
an objective component. For the jury instructions given at the Goetz trial, see supra
note 108.
242 See supra notes 108-09.
243 Although in most jurisdictions there is no correlation between utilization of
a subjective test and admissibility of context evidence, the Supreme Court of Ohio
ruled that its reversal ofa long line of cases excluding expert testimony was required
by two conclusions: (1) that battered woman syndrome was commonly accepted in
the scientific community; and (2) that the reasonableness test in that jurisdiction is
subjective. See State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 972-74 (Ohio 1990). The court quoted
with approval an instruction similar to those set forth supra notes 108-09, and
BATTERED WOMEN AND SELF-DEFENSE
2. Definition of Temporal Proximity of Danger
Some scholars suggest elimination of the imminence require-
ment in the context of battered women defendants. 244 Complete
elimination of the requirement would remove an impediment to fair
trials that occurs most frequently in nonconfrontation cases,
although on balance its elimination would probably not maximize
the safety of women's lives.245  There is, however, no current
proposal for its complete elimination. 246 Rather, reformers retain
a general necessity requirement, recognizing that the law of self-
defense is a rule of necessity.
The appropriate definition, utilized by most jurisdictions, is
"imminent" rather than "immediate."247 The court's instructions
on imminence should specifically direct the jury to consider the
history between the defendant and the decedent, the decedent's
history of other violence, and expert testimony introduced on the
effects of the history of abuse.
248
determined that expert testimony was essential for thejury to obey the mandate that
"you must put yourself in the position of the Defendant, with her characteristics,
knowledge, or lack of knowledge, and under the same circumstances and conditions
that surrounded the Defendant at the time." Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 973.
244 See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 25, at 122-26 (arguing in favor of retaining a
general necessity requirement and eliminating the requirement of "imminence per
se"). For a discussion of the likelihood that this change alone would change outcomes
in nonconfrontation cases, see infra text accompanying notes 295. Much more likely
to have a positive effect, both on the ability of nonconfrontation defendants to get
to the jury and on the outcomes in their cases, is Professor Martha Mahoney's
suggestion for introduction of evidence of "separation assault" to meet the imminence
requirement. See Mahoney, supra note 87, at 83-93 (proposing definition and
explanation of "separation assault" as evidence regarding the likelihood of increased
violence toward women who attempt to leave abusive relationships, and arguing, with
particular reference to sleeping-man cases, that such evidence will both answer the
question why a battered woman would fear retaliation for attempts to escape and why
the imminence of the danger facing her should be analogized to that in hostage
situations).
245 More men kill women partners than women kill male partners. See FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS
12 (1989) (stating that in 1989,3.8% of all homicide victims were men killed by their
wives or girlfriends, but 6.7% of all homicide victims were women killed by their
husbands or boyfriends).
246 One current legislative proposal is New York's Assembly Bill 4970, introduced
in 1991 to amend N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 to use the word "imminent" in the
justification definition. The proposal's accompanying comments suggest a purpose
to make clear that existing statutory and case law require imminent rather than
immediate danger and to guarantee to battered women defendants the benefit of that
clarification.
247 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
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Jury instructions that direct a jury to focus on the "immediate"
circumstances of the killing, which occur most frequently in
"objective" jurisdictions, 249 limit a defendant's ability to get the
question of social context before the jury.250  The immediacy
requirement results in a higher threshold showing for admission of
evidence and in a lower likelihood that instructions are given to the
jury on the relevance of evidence received about the history of other
violence, the history of abuse, and expert testimony.
251
a. Assessment of the Reasonableness of the Degree of Force Employed
In this area, scholars have posited and then argued against a
like-force requirement that does not exist. There are no current
proposals in any legislature for change in this substantive area, and
none are necessary. The appropriate inquiry in this area is the one
ordinarily conducted: whether the force employed by the defendant
was necessary, not whether it was the same as that directed against
the actor. 252 It is true that trial courts have applied the propor-
tionality-of-force requirement in a way that has limited defendants'
ability to get to the jury on the question of self-defense, and they
have been reversed for so doing.253 Redefinition does not reach
the application problem.
b. Duty to Retreat
Scholars are correct when they observe that battered-women
defendants are denied fair trials in the minority ofjurisdictions that
impose a duty to retreat and do not exempt from that duty
defendants attacked in their homes.254 In some of those jurisdic-
tions, the definition, coupled with a procedural rule that requires
evidence on each element of a self-defense claim, prevents defen-
dants from getting any self-defense instruction at all. In others, the
jury is instructed on self-defense but is also instructed that the law
of self-defense is inapplicable if they find, as a matter of fact, that
the defendant violated the defined duty to retreat.255 In this area,
249 See infra Table.
250 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
251 See infra Table.
252 See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
253 See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
254 See supra notes 139-42.
255 See Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 326 N.E.2d 880, 884 (Mass. 1975). In this case
the jury was instructed on self-defense and told that the defendant had a duty to
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legislative reform is necessary, yet there are no proposals pending
in the relevant jurisdictions. Elimination of the duty to retreat, in
the minority of jurisdictions that impose it, will not undercut the
operation of the general requirement that the defendant use deadly
defensive force only when necessary. Standing alone, however, such
a change will not guarantee fair-trial rights. If necessity is measured
against an objective reasonableness test and against an immediacy
requirement, the elimination of a duty to retreat will not necessarily
result in an increase in the number of defendants who can get to
the jury on self-defense.
At a minimum, in those jurisdictions that retain a general duty
to retreat, defendants attacked in their homes should be exempted
from its operation, and the exemption should not depend on the
status of the attacker. This definitional change, of general applica-
bility, is essential to remove an impediment to getting to the jury in
cases that arise in the context of family violence.
256
C. Evidentiary Rules
Most recently enacted and currently proposed amendments or
additions to evidentiary codes257 do not advance their usually
stated purposes of enlarging the fair-trial rights of battered-women
defendants by increasing their ability to put before the jury evidence
in the form of expert testimony on the effects of a history of abuse.
In some cases, the amendments actually cut back on ajurisdiction's
existing provisions. 258  In others, including the minority where
retreat, even though the incident occurred in her home. The court specifically
declined to adopt an exception to the retreat doctrine. See id. at 883. Thereafter, the
Massachusetts legislature exempted from the retreat requirement defendants attacked
at home by persons unlawfully in the dwelling. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 278, § 8A
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). The retreat rule still applies to persons attacked by
cohabitants and invitees.
256 See supra text accompanying notes 136-42.
257 The term "codes" is used to refer to the evidentiary law of ajurisdiction. In
some states rules of evidence are codified, in others, evidentiary rules are all common
law, and in somejurisdictions the rules are a combination of code and common law.
The criticisms of the enactments and proposals discussed in this Article are in part
the result of the failure of their proponents to analyze existing provisions, whether
codified or common law.
258 With the exception of Louisiana and Missouri, appellate rulings providing for
the admissibility of expert testimony have been made on the basis of existing
evidentiary doctrine rather than as the result of the passage of special legislation. See
LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 404 (West 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.033 (Vernon Supp.
1991). In Ohio, the pendency of legislation requiring admission of expert testimony
may have influenced the Ohio Supreme Court's decision to overturn its own line of
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existing evidentiary law is insufficient to guarantee the admission of
expert testimony, the amendments are so specifically and narrowly
drawn that they will make the testimony available to only a small
percentage of battered-women defendants. These defects are the
result of two related failures. First, the advocates for change often
do not analyze existing law for the purposes of determining whether
perceived impediments to the admission of this social-context
evidence actually result from the laW's structure and content.
259
Secondly, they fail to make use of current social science findings to
define the categories of evidence whose admission is legislated.2 60
Expert testimony about the effects of a history of abuse has been
ruled admissible by the vast majority of appellate courts that have
confronted the question, 261 generally because it is deemed rele-
vant to a self-defense claim for the broad purposes of explaining a
defendant's state of mind and of rebutting myths and misconcep-
tions about battered women, and generally after a defendant claims
self-defense and introduces evidence of a history of abuse.
262
Many enacted and proposed reforms contain provisions that are
significantly more restrictive than the existing law in most jurisdic-
tions. For instance, some legislators have undertaken to define the
content of expert testimony in a way that is not only narrower than
the current definition in their jurisdictions, but is also inconsistent
with the findings of social scientists. An illustrative example is the
statutory definition of "battered person syndrome" proposed but
not introduced in Washington and modeled closely on an enacted
Missouri provision:
"Battered person syndrome" means a group of concurrent psychologi-
cal and behavioral characteristics resulting from repeated victimization
by family violence or threat of family violence, including:
(a) An extreme level of anxiety or depression;
cases upholding the testimony's exclusion. See supra note 243 (discussing State v.
Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990)).
259 There is also a failure to determine in those jurisdictions where there is a
definitional impediment to admission of expert testimony whether the problem
occurs in the definition of admissible evidence or whether it occurs in the definition
of the threshold-showing requirements that set the preconditions to the admission of
evidence, however it is defined. A liberal definition of expert testimony will not solve
the problem of requiring a high showing by extrinsic evidence before it may be
received.
260 For criticism of legislative provisions for a diagnostic checklist of the "battered
person syndrome," see infra text accompanying notes 263-67.
261 See infra Table.
262 See infra Table; supra text accompanying notes 176-80.
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(b) Repeated unsuccessful attempts to stop, decrease, or escape from
acts or threats of family violence;
(c) Extreme fearfulness of the family violence perpetrator and constant
anticipation of future acts of violence; or
(d) Loss of belief in one's ability to take effective action for self-
protection.
263
Neither Missouri's earlier statute264 nor Washington's existing
common-law evidentiary rule26 5 contained any attempt to limit
the content of expert testimony. The definition quoted above, even
though its four "included" factors are arguably disjunctive, is one
with which many experts would not agree. 266  The Missouri
legislators' and Washington advocates' assumption of the general
applicability of the second factor-the battered person's repeated
attempts to leave or stop the violence-is not shared by the Ameri-
can Psychological Association. 26 7  Another factual
assumption2 68 reflected in some current reform efforts, also
263 Proposed bill to amend WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.010(3)(b) (West 1991)
[hereinafter Washington's proposed bill] (on file with author). The fact that the
legislation was not introduced may reflect Washington legislators' recognition of its
flaws. The proposed bill's language is the same as that of a statute enacted in
Missouri. SeeMo. ANN. STAT. § 563.001(1)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (amendinga 1988
version of the same statute). Its advocates in Washington appear to have borrowed
the Missouri language without any attempt to distinguish between the state of
evidentiary common law in Washington, see State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (Wash.
1984) (en banc), and the very different deficiencies in Missouri's jurisprudence that
its 1988 statute was designed to remedy.
264 That statute provided for the admission of "battered spouse syndrome"
testimony. See generally State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)
(discussing admissibility under "battered spouse syndrome" statute).
265 See Alleiy, 682 P.2d at 316.
266 See BLACKMAN, supra note 146, at 192-200; BRoWNE, supra note 68, at 177;
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 167, at 78; see also Brown v.
State, No. 64,355, 1990 Kan. App. LEXIS 581, at *10 (Aug. 3, 1990) (quoting trial
testimony of prosecution expert that there is no fixed checklist of characteristics).
267 The Association has argued:
Often the woman does not reach out for help from family, friends or the police
because she is ashamed of her status as a battered woman and because she
has been isolated from these sources of assistance by the batterer. Even
when the woman seeks help from others, they are usually reluctant to
intervene and often encourage her to return home, thereby confirming her
belief that the fault is hers or that relief is not available.
American Psychological Association, BriefofAmicus Curiae at 2, Hawthorne v. State,
470 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis added), quoted in Ewing &
Aubrey, supra note 93, at 258. No legal scholars suggest that repeated, unsuccessful
attempts to leave typically characterize the behavior of battered women.
268 If it is not a factual assumption, then the drafting reflects a deliberate intent
to exclude certain battered women from the operation of the reform.
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belied by the work of social scientists, is that battering occurs only
in relationships involving present or past marriage or cohabita-
tion.269 In fact, women are also battered by men with whom they
are in intimate relationships but with whom they have not
lived.2 7 °
Recent legislative efforts have contained a further restriction on
battered-woman-syndrome expert testimony, limiting the testimony
to cases involving charges of the use of force against another.
2 7 1
Other statutory language limits introduction of expert testimony to
cases involving the defendant's use of deadly force and, therefore,
excludes assault cases. 272 Still other proposals limit introduction
of such testimony to those cases in which a defendant claims self-
defense or defense of third persons273 and exclude duress, acci-
dent, and insanity claims.
In some of the statutes and proposals limiting admission of
expert testimony to cases involving self-defense claims, there are
even more refined limitations on the purpose and scope of expert
testimony. These statutes and proposals limit the testimony to the
reasonableness of a defendant's belief that the use of force was
immediately necessary,
274 or that danger was imminent.
275
269 See, e.g., MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-916(2) (1991) (defining "battered
spouse syndrome" as a condition of one who has been abused by "a spouse, a former
spouse, cohabitant, or former cohabitant").
270 Seesupra note 75; see also Cal. Act, supra note 211 (using CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 542 definition of battered woman to include persons "with whom the respondent
has had a dating or engagement relationship").
271 See e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.033.1 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (limiting admissibili-
ty of battered-woman-syndrome evidence to "the issue of whether the actor lawfully
acted in self-defense or defense of another"); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06(B)
(Anderson Supp. 1990) (limiting battered-woman-syndrome expert testimony to "a
person charged with an offense involving the use of force against another"); Pa. H.
1295, supra note 224 (providing that the battered person defense can be used "[i]f a
person is charged with an offense involving the use of force against another"); Tex.
S. 275, 72d Leg., 1991 Sess. (enacted Apr. 29, 1991, to be codified TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 19.06) (providing that "in order to establish the defendant's reasonable belief
that use of force or deadly force was immediately necessary ... relevant expert
testimony... relating to family violence' can be offered); Vt. H. 329, 1991 Sess. (bill
as introduced) (on file with author) (proposing to permit battered-woman-syndrome
testimony in "cases involving the use of force").
272 See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-916 (1991).
273 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.033.1 (Vernon Supp. 1991); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2901.06 (Anderson Supp. 1990); Pa. H. 1295, supra note 224; Tex. S. 275, supra
note 271; Vt. H. 329, supra note 271.
274 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.033.1 n.3 (Vernon Supp. 1991); Tex. S. 275, supra
note 271.
275 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Anderson Supp. 1990); Pa. H. 1295,
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These provisions may be read to exclude the presently admissible
testimony on state of mind, on myths and misconceptions, and on
the question why the defendant did not leave the abusive relation-
ship.2 7 6 Further, some legislative language creates an additional
hurdle to the admissibility of expert testimony in the form of a
written notice requirement and a mandatory court-ordered pre-trial
psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant.2 7 7 The
risk of such provisions is not only that they subject a self-defense
claim to the procedural rules governing insanity defenses, but also
that they appear by their terms and have been interpreted by trial
judges to provide for a pre-trial factual determination whether the
defendant meets the statutory definition of a person who experienc-
es the battered woman syndrome.
278
Appropriate legislation regarding admissibility of expert
testimony and other social context evidence may have several goals.
In jurisdictions in which expert testimony is not received or is
received in a limited fashion,279 legislative efforts should be
geared toward bringing the law into conformity with the general
rule in the majority of jurisdictions. In jurisdictions already in
conformity with the majority rule, legislative efforts may be
undertaken to secure existing law against the possibility of change
with changing judicial personnel or to send a message to trial judges
who persist in declining to apply existing doctrine.
28 0
Certain provisions are essential to legislative language, whatever
the existing law of the jurisdiction in which it is drafted. First, a
legislature should no more attempt to define the content of
battered-woman-syndrome expert testimony by providing a
diagnostic checklist than it would attempt 'to structure or limit
testimony from other experts. 28 1 The preferable language is
supra note 224; Vt. H. 329, supra note 271.
276 See infra Table.
277 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.033.2 (Vernon Supp. 1991); Washington's proposed
bill, supra note 263.
278 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
279 For examples of limitations, see supra note 181.
280 In both types of jurisdictions the efforts may share yet another purpose:
public education on the larger social problem of battering.
281 For instance, although many states define mental status defenses generally in
terms of the effect on the defendant's ability to form the requisite intent, none
defines or limits the factors that may lead to a particular diagnosis. See, e.g., N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 1987) (defining without setting up a diagnostic
checklist an affirmative defense that a defendant lacked criminal responsibility
because "as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to
know or appreciate either: 1. The nature and consequences of such conduct; or 2.
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general and flexible rather than descriptive of a particular syn-
drome; and the legislation certainly should not attempt to codify
elements of a syndrome. 282  In those circumstances, where a
certain level of specificity regarding the nature of the testimony is
deemed necessary, 283 the language should still be sufficiently
general to maintain conformity with current scientific opinion.
284
The admissibility of battered-woman-syndrome expert testimony
should not be limited to criminal cases involving charges of use of
force.285  Rather, it should be admissible in all cases, civil and
That such conduct was wrong").
282 An example of useful language, taken from Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
proposed in New York where courts routinely admit expert testimony, is found in
Assembly Bill 5341 drafted to amend the evidentiary provisions of Section 60.15 of
the Criminal Procedure Law and Section 834 of the Family Court Act: "If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise." N.Y. Assembly 5341, 1991 Sess. (Memorandum in
Support of Legislation) (on file with author). The accompanyingjustification offered
for the bill makes clear that its liberal provisions are meant to apply to testimony on
battered woman syndrome as well as other testimony regarding "complex psychologi-
cal and social phenomena, such as rape trauma syndrome [and] untimely disclosure
of child sexual abuse .... " See id. (Justification Section). The language itself is
generally applicable to all civil, criminal, and family court proceedings. See id.
(Purpose Section).
283 Some legislators apparently require a certain level of specificity because they
want to be associated with a statute that, by its terms, demonstrates a concern for
battered women. See Telephone Interview with Sue Osthoff, Executive Director of the
National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women (June 17, 1991)
[hereinafter Osthoff Interview].
284 A congressional resolution regarding expert testimony in criminal trials of
battered women, whose preamble specifically details its focus on battered women,
contains useful general language within the domestic violence limitation:
[I]t is the sense of Congress that
(1) expert testimony concerning the nature and effect of domestic
violence, including descriptions of the experiences of battered women,
should be admissible when offered in a state court by a defendant in a
criminal case to assist the trier of fact in understanding the behavior, beliefs,
or perceptions of such defendant in a domestic relationship in which abuse
has occurred;
(2) a witness should be qualified to testify as an expert witness based
upon her or his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, and
should be permitted to testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise; and
(3) a domestic relationship about which such expert testimony should
be admissible includes relationships between spouses, former spouses,
cohabitants, former cohabitants, partners or former partners, and between
persons who are in, or have been in, a dating, courtship, or intimate
relationship.
H.R. Con. Res. 89, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
285 Although such a limitation creates no impediment in homicide and assault
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criminal, in which an explanation of the state of mind of a party or
witness is otherwise relevant and admissible. If a limitation of such
evidence to criminal cases is deemed necessary,286 the statute
should, at a minimum, apply to criminal trials generally, and expert
testimony should be admissible where relevant to any defense.
28 7
Judicial recognition of the empirical work of social scientists
regarding the prevalence of myths and misconceptions about
battered women 288 makes clear that there is no sound justification
for statutory language that is open to an interpretation limiting the
testimony's relevance to the specific self-defense issues of immi-
nence or degree of necessary force at the time of the incident.
28 9
Where impediments to the admissibility of expert testimony
arise not from the problems of defining the testimony itself, but
from the requirements of threshold showings by the party offering
it, legislation should be aimed at both guaranteeing that those
showing requirements do not impede the fair-trial goal of full jury
consideration of a defendant's case and guaranteeing their consis-
tency with the current law of most jurisdictions.
2 90
Reform efforts designed to enact generally applicable evidentia-
ry standards and definitions should have the following two effects
when applied specifically to battered women's self-defense cases.
First, when a defendant claims to have acted in self-defense, both
cases, it unnecessarily restricts the use of expert testimony.
286 This necessity is political. For another example of such political consider-
ations, see supra note 283. Advocates have reported to the National Clearinghouse
for the Defense of Battered Women that some legislators want attention focussed
specifically on criminal trials of battered women and are willing to ignore the
relevance of expert testimony to civil cases in which battered women are parties. See
Osthoff Interview, supra note 283.
287 The limitation of the testimony to a defendant is not logically compelled, so
long as the language makes clear that expert testimony may not be introduced against
a defendant for the purpose of proving the occurrence of the charged offense. Such
a provision is consistent with most current holdings regarding the prosecution's use
of battered-woman-syndrome testimony. See Cal. Act, supra note 211; supra note 168.
288 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dillon, No. 123, 1991 Pa. LEXIS 234, at *19-*26
(Oct. 31, 1991) (CappyJ., concurring) (referring to a number of empirical works as
authorities on myths and misconceptions about battered women).
289 See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
290 See infra Table.
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evidence of the history of abuse and of a history of other violence,
where offered, should be admissible without a prior showing of an
overt act on the part of the decedent.29 ' Second, once that
testimony is received, it should be a sufficient predicate for receipt
of expert testimony. The expert testimony should be admitted to
explain the effects of a history of abuse on a defendant's behavior
and perceptions and to rebut popular myths and misconceptions
about battered women. 292 There should be no requirement of a
judicial determination either pre-trial or at trial that the defendant
"established" herself as a battered woman.
CONCLUSION
In most jurisdictions, existing substantive law and related
evidentiary and procedural rules are defined in a way consistent
with the self-defense claims of battered women who kill. Again, in
mostjurisdictions, to the extent that those defendants are precluded
from getting a self-defense instruction, from presenting evidence of
a history of abuse or expert testimony, and from having the jury
instructed on the relevance of that evidence, the preclusion is the
result of unfair application of existing law and not of its structure
or content. Current reform efforts aimed at redefining the law
offer neither the necessary nor the sufficient conditions for change
in those jurisdictions.
291 In Louisiana, an overt-act requirement had operated to preclude the admission
in many cases of evidence of history of abuse and history of other violence, and a
mental-status defense requirement precluded the admission of expert testimony in
self-defense cases. See supra note 174. The Louisiana legislature enacted language
that is useful in its general definitions, but insufficiently general in its applicability only
to criminal cases that arise in the context of family violence and in which the defense
is self-defense:
[W]hen the accused pleads self-defense and there is a history of assaultive
behavior between the victim and the accused and the victim and the accused
lived in a familial or intimate relationship such as, but not limited to, the
husband-wife, parent-child, or concubinage relationship, it shall not be
necessary to first show a hostile demonstration or overt act on the part of
the victim in order to introduce evidence of the dangerous character of the
victim, including specific instances of conduct and domestic violence; and
further provided that an expert's opinion as to the effects of the prior
assaultive acts on the accused's state of mind is admissible ....
LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 404(A)(2) (West 1990).
292 The testimony admitted to explain social context is not character evidence and
should not open the door to rebuttal by evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts. See
supra notes 40 & 175.
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In the minority of states where fair-trial rights are impeded by
substantive and evidentiary law definitions, current reform efforts
will not remove existing impediments because their proponents
have failed to analyze the interrelationship of those two areas of
self-defense jurisprudence, to assess the impact on each of the rules
defining the circumstances under which any self-defense instruction
is given, and to draw on existing empirical work. Consequently,
both scholarly and legislative proposals not only do not enlarge, but
often have the effect of narrowing a battered woman defendant's
ability to get to the jury on her self-defense claim. Improvement of
the chances of getting to the jury will not result from proposals for
separate standards for battered women.
This Article's suggested reform of the standards defining the
procedural requirements for a self-defense instruction, 293 in
combination with its substantive and evidentiary law proposals, is
the change most likely to have a specific impact on the cases of
battered women who kill in both confrontational and nonconfronta-
tional circumstances. Neither a reasonably prudent battered woman
standard that retains an objective component, 294 nor the elimina-
tion of an imminence requirement with retention of a general
necessity requirement, 295 will alone lead to better outcomes. The
substantive law standards proposed by scholars, like the special
evidentiary provisions presented to legislatures, will be applied in
high threshold-showing jurisdictions to prevent defendants from
introducing context evidence and from receiving self-defense
instructions. Taken together, the proposals of this Article present
the reform plan most likely to enable all battered women defendants
to get to the jury on their self-defense claims.
Made in the context of a careful assessment of the interrelation-
ship of the elements of self-defense jurisprudence, the proposals are
modest. They are aimed, not at changing societal attitudes toward
battering, but at maximizing jurors' access to information about the
social context of the act of the defendant whose case they must
decide. They will not eliminate judicial bias against battered women
who kill, but they will minimize the opportunities for trial judges to
293 See supra text accompanying notes 212-13.
294 See supra notes 229-32 & 241 and accompanying text.
293 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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implement that bias through the exclusion of evidence or the denial
of self-defense instructions. They represent the realistic limits of
the possibility of influencing jury verdicts through legal redefini-
tions.
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BATTERED WOMEN AND SELF-DEFENSE
APPENDIX I
METHODOLOGY - IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS
OF OPINIONS
My purpose was to test two assumptions that dominate the
current legal literature on the homicide trials of battered women
who assert self-defense: (1) that most battered women who kill do
so in nonconfrontational situations; and (2) that existing self-
defense jurisprudence is too narrowly defined to accommodate the
claims of these defendants. In the literature, both assumptions
purport to be derived from reviews of selected opinion issued on
battered women's appeals from convictions; but no author appeared
to have conducted a complete and systematic analysis of all of the
relevant opinions. I decided to conduct such an analysis.
A. Identification of the Relevant Opinions
I read each case cited by authors who, on the basis of the
assumptions discussed above, proposed redefinition of self-defense
jurisprudence. In addition, I conducted an exhaustive survey of
other legal literature-law review articles, comments, and notes, as
well as books, treatises, practice manuals, periodicals, and newslet-
ters-that addressed issues presented by the homicide trials of
battered women, and read each case cited by those authors. Finally,
I conducted an independent search-using both traditional methods
and Lexis and Westlaw-for cases that fit the definition set forth in
the Article supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text and that raised
trial errors on appeal.
Those searches, conducted between June 1989 and November
1991, led to the retrieval of over 400 opinions issued between 1902
and 1991. I excluded from my analysis several categories of cases:
those in which the factual discussion did not include a history of
abuse of the defendant by the decedent; those in which the
defendant was not a woman; those in which the defendant and the
decedent were not involved in an intimate heterosexual relationship;
those in which the charge against the defendant was other than
homicide; those in which no self-defense claim was raised; those that
did not address trial or pre-trial errors; and trial-level opinions.
Two hundred seventy opinions survived that exclusion process.
Those opinions represented 223 incidents.
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Most of these 223 cases had been tried in the courts of forty-five
states and of the District of Columbia. At the time of the close of
the search, there were no appellate opinions that fit the definition
from Connecticut, Hawaii, Rhode Island, South Dakota, or Ver-
mont. Included in the base were federal opinions which arose both
from cases originally tried in federal district court and from habeas
corpus petitions or direct appeals challenging state court convic-
tions.
B. Analysis of the Opinions
The identified cases were coded and entered in Folio VIEWS
v2.0 (Folio Corporation 1990), an information management
computer program. Each entry, or "Folio," represented only one
incident. Cases involving multiple opinions (sometimes resulting
from successive appeals from the same conviction, other times
resulting from appeals after reversals and subsequent convictions
after new trials) contained sub-entries for those opinions. The
opinions were coded by state, year of decision, and level of
appellate tribunal.
1. Analysis of Incident Facts
A single entry for each incident enabled me to avoid over-
counting the homicide convictions which led to more than one
appellate opinion. Folio VIEWS is designed to count each entry as
only one match, even if a code or search term utilized in a query
occurs more than once in the document. The factual information
entered was that discussed in each opinion.
The factual circumstances of the homicides were entered with
both codes and search terms. For example, each case was coded as
"Y" (confrontation), "N" (nonconfrontation), or "Q" (resolution of
the question on appeal did not involve discussion of the incident
facts). The definitions of these terms are set forth in the Article
supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text. Their application to the
analyzed cases is described in the Article supra notes 50-53 and
accompanying text. Descriptive search terms were inserted in the
coded cases, so that, for instance, within the "Y" category I could
retrieve cases where the defendants' facts were controverted at trial,
or within the "N" category I could retrieve cases in the subcatego-
ries of sleeping-man, contract-killing, and defendant-as-initial-
aggressor.
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The information entered for the factual analysis also included
a summary of the circumstances of the homicide, a review of the
history of abuse, the location of the incident, the weapons used by
the defendant and by the decedent (if any), evidence of a history of
other violence directed against third persons by the decedent, the
introduction of expert testimony (which, when offered, was usually
in the form of battered-woman-syndrome evidence in the cases tried
after 1977), and any evidence of prior bad acts of the defendant.
2. Analysis of Definitions and Applications of Legal Principles
The legal analysis of the opinions was entered, similarly, with a
combination of codes and descriptive search terms. Each case was
coded, according to the final disposition of the last opinions as
affirmed, reversed, or other disposition. To the extent discussed in
the opinions, each was also coded for the applicable standard of
reasonableness (for purposes of analysis, the coding identified four
standards: objective; subjective; combinations objective and
subjective; and reasonably prudent battered woman), the definition
of temporal proximity of danger (immediate or imminent), and the
showing necessary requirement for entitlement to a self-defense
instruction. Search terms were used to identify opinions which
discussed the remaining legal questions analyzed: the substantive
law issues of duty to retreat and proportionality of force; the
evidentiary issues of admissibility of history of abuse, history of
other violence, and expert testimony on the effects of a history of
abuse, and the related question of instructions on the relevance of
such evidence. Similarly, search terms were used to identify the
"ordinary" issues resolved in many of the appeals, including
admissibility of a defendant's confession, sufficiency of the
evidence, evidentiary issues not involving social context, ineffective
assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, pretrial publicity,
presumptions, waivers, and miscellaneous jury instruction issues.
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APPENDIX II
METHODOLOGY - RETRIEVAL OF INFORMATION AND GENERATION
OF COMPUTER "MANUSCRIPTS"
Folio VIEWS v2.0 permits retrieval of individual codes and
search terms and combinations thereof. The method of retrieval is
a "Query" for the information entered in a Folio. Each query
results in a "View." The queries may be inclusive as well as
exclusive. I can, for instance, retrieve all confrontation cases that
were reversed because of an improper instruction on duty to
retreat, or alternatively, all confrontation cases that were reversed
on that ground in which the incident did not occur in the defen-
dant's home. When I design a query, the program displays the
number of folios with each characteristic as well as the number of
folios with the specified combinations of characteristics. It displays
also the total number of cases in the program. When I execute a
query, the program creates a view, which contains each of the folios
that meet the query's definition. It is possible to save views and
make them a permanent part of the program. Within permanent
views, the design of a query displays the number of folios with the
characteristics identified as well as the total number of folios in the
permanent category.
The views created within the program are the "manuscripts" to
which reference is made in the Article. The manuscripts do not
represent the limits of the combinations of factors that can be
evaluated with the aid of the program. Rather, they are those that
contain general information or those on which certain conclusions
specifically rely, and they are described below in the order in which
they are cited in the Article.
A. Mainfile
"Mainfile" is the information base that contains all of the
information entered about the analyzed opinions. A focussed view
produces a list containing the name, citation, year of decision, level
of appellate tribunal and disposition on appeal for each case. In the
case of the folios containing more than one opinion, the most
recent opinion is listed.
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B. Confrontation/Nonconfrontation
"Confrontation/Nonconfrontation" is a list containing the name,
citation, year of decision, level of appellate tribunal and disposition
on appeal for each case, together with the coding "Y," "N," or "I,
as those codes are defined supra Appendix I.B.1.
1. Confrontation
"Confrontation" is a view generated by a query for "Y" within
Mainfile. When the query is designed, the program displays both
the number of confrontation cases and the total number of cases in
Mainfile. This view contains a summary of each opinion in the
category. A focussed view of Confrontation produces a list
containing the name, citation, year of decision, level of appellate
tribunal, and disposition on appeal for each case.
2. Nonconfrontation
"Nonconfrontation" is a view generated by a query for "N"
within Mainfile. When the query is designed, the program displays
both the number on nonconfrontation cases and the total number
of cases in Mainfile. This view contains a summary of each opinion
in the category. A focussed view of Nonconfrontation produces a
list containing the name, citation, year of decision, level of appellate
tribunal and disposition on appeal for each case. Within Noncon-
frontation, queries for sleeping-man, contract-killing, and defen-
dant-as-initial-aggressor cases produce both a display of the numbers
in each category and a summary of each opinion. A focussed view
of each of these Nonconfrontation subcategories produces a list
containing the name, citation, year of decision, level of appellate
tribunal, and disposition on appeal for each case.
3. Question
"Question" is a view generated by a query for "Q" within
Mainfile. When the query is designed, the program displays both
the number of cases whose opinions do not include a discussion of
the incident facts and the total number of cases in Mainfile. This
view contains a summary of each opinion in the category. A
focussed view of Question produces a list containing the name,
citation, year of decision, level of appellate tribunal, and disposition
on appeal for each case.
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C. Jury/Bench
"Jury/Bench," the breakdown between jury trials and cases tried
to a judge sitting without a jury, is a view generated by the queries
for jury ("AN bench") and for "bench" within Mainfile. When
designed, the query displays the number of each in relation to the
total Mainfile. When executed, the query generates a view that
contains a summary of each opinion in either category. A focussed
view of either produces a list containing the name, citation, year of
decision, level of appellate tribunal, and disposition on appeal for
each case.
D. No Self-Defense Instruction
"No Self-Defense Instruction" is the view of all appeals from jury
convictions in which the appellant complained that the jury received
no instruction on the law of self-defense. A comparison of the
numbers of these complaints, between objective jurisdictions and
those that include some subjective component in the standard of
reasonableness, is generated by a query for "no self-defense
instruction" in combination, serially, with the codes for the various
standards of reasonableness, described supra Appendix I.B.2
("std.o", "std.s.", "std.c.", and "std.r."). An additional comparison
of the numbers of such complaints between confrontation and
nonconfrontation cases is generated by a query for "no self-defense
instruction" and "Y," in serial combination with the reasonableness
codes, and for "no self-defense instruction" and "N," in serial
combination with the reasonableness codes.
E. Location
"Location" is a series of views generated by queries for codes
that were placed in all folios and for search terms inserted in some.
Each case was coded to reflect the location of the incident: the
home shared by the defendant and decedent ("sh"); the home of the
defendant where the decedent did not live ("dh"); some other
location ("1o"); an unspecified and therefore unknown location
("lu"); or the home of the decedent ("vh"). Cases coded as "lo" (a
known location, other than the home of the defendant to decedent)
also contain search terms for the identification of the locations
(common examples being cars, bars, and outside areas near the
home of one or both of the parties). The design of a query for each
code generates the number of cases containing the code and the
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total number of Mainfile cases. Confrontation and Nonconfronta-
tion are permanent views, and within each the design of a query for
a location code generates the number of cases containing the code
and the total number of cases in either the Confrontation or the
Nonconfrontation category.
F. Affirmance and Reversal Rates
"Affirmance and Reversal Rates" is a combination of the
permanent views for "Affirmed," "Reversed," and "Other," and of
queries that combine them with other permanent views. The overall
affirmance and reversal rates (as well as the rate of "other"
dispositions on appeal) are generated by the display of a query for
each, which contains the number of cases in each view as well as the
number of cases in Mainfile. Executing each query produces a view
that contains summaries of all opinions in each category. Within
each, a focussed view produces a list containing the name, citation,
year of decision, level of appellate tribunal, and disposition on
appeal for each case.
The numbers of affirmance and reversals in the confrontation
and nonconfrontation categories are displayed in response to the
designs of queries that combine, serially, the views for Affirmed
("afd"), reversed ("rev"), and Other ("AN (afd/rev)"), with the view
for Confrontation and then with that for Nonconfrontation. The
results of those queries are a series of permanent views: Affirmed-
Confrontation ("afd.y"); Affirmed-Nonconfrontation ("afd.n");
Affirmed-Other ("afd.o"); Reversed-Confrontation ("rev.y");
Reversed-Nonconfrontation ("rev.n"); and Reversed-Other ("rev.o").
The numbers of appellate resolutions in each of those six
categories that involved discussions of a state's reasonableness
standard were displayed in response to the design of queries that
combined, serially, each of the six categories with the permanent
views for the reasonableness standards. For purposes of comparison
of the numbers of affirmances and reversals (both confrontation
and nonconfrontation, including cases in which the opinions
contained no discussion of the standard) between objective states
and those with some subjective prong of the reasonableness test, I
created special views (combining with each permanent view of
reasonableness standard other opinions form the represented states)
and designed queries that combined those special views with the
permanent Mainfile views for Affirmed, Reversed, and Other
dispositions.
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The numbers of affirmances and reversals by high and interme-
diate appellate courts are displayed in response to the designs of
queries that combine, serially, the views for Affirmed, Reversed, and
Other, with the codes for the highest courts ("high") and for
intermediate tribunals ("int").
G. Waiver
"Waiver" is a view that contains cases in which the appellate
court refused to reach a claimed trial error because trial counsel
had failed to preserve it or because appellate counsel had failed to
pursue it. Waiver includes opinions that reversed convictions (on
the basis of other errors that were properly presented). The
number of convictions affirmed by courts that found that counsel
waived claimed trial errors, in comparison with the total number of
affirmances, is displayed in response to the design of the query,
which combines the search term "waiver" with the permanent view
"Affirmed."
